It is obvious that the Vietnamese Prime Minister, Mr. Pham Van Dong, has visited New Delhi for the specific purpose of persuading Mrs. Gandhi to accord immediate recognition to the Heng Samrin regime in Kampuchea and to sell the Soviet line on Afghanistan which the Cubans have been canvassing in various capitals on Moscow’s behalf. On both counts he has drawn blank. He has himself been candid enough to disclose that India and Vietnam have basic differences on Afghanistan and that New Delhi does not feel that right now the circumstances are appropriate for the recognition of the regime in Phnom Penh. It will be patently unfair, indeed churlish, to suggest that Mr. Pham Van Dong has used the visit to announce a reversal of his government’s previous position on the status of Jammu and Kashmir in order to “persuade” Mrs. Gandhi to be forthcoming on the issue of Kampuchea. But there is a link between Hanoi’s stand on the issues of Kashmir, Kampuchea and Afghanistan. It views the latter two as part of the East-West contest (it regards China as an ally of the US) and it has volunteered to recognise Jammu and Kashmir as an integral part of the Indian Union because this has been the Soviet position for years and because it has ceased to be close to Beijing. This provides a clue to India’s policy on both Afghanistan and Kampuchea. As a non-aligned country, it has to apply a yardstick different from that of Vietnam which is sustaining the regime in Phnom Penh and is wholly committed to the Soviet Union in the larger East-West conflict.
On the face of it, Mrs. Gandhi is going back on her earlier commitment to recognise the Heng Samrin regime as stated in so many words the Congress (I) election manifesto last December. But she has no reason to be apologetic about it. For the situation in the region as a whole has changed dramatically with the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan. Even in the absence of this action by Moscow, recognition of the Vietnamese-backed set-up in Phnom Penh by India would have meant favouring the Soviet side because Hanoi is critically dependent on the Kremlin’s support and is aligned with the latter. But the move could have been justified in local terms. The Pol Pot regime was among the cruellest mankind has seen in recent decades and it could not have been overthrown without Vietnamese intervention in some form. Before the virtual Soviet takeover in Afghanistan, it was also not obligatory for New Delhi to be unduly sensitive to the susceptibilities of the Chinese and the Americans. But the Soviet action has brought the cold war to India’s doorstep and it is not easy for it to separate Kampuchea from Afghanistan. India’s concerns are different from those of the members of the ASEAN who are reluctant to recognise the Heng Samrin regime. It is inevitably more concerned over the possible expansion of Chinese power and influence than of Vietnam’s. As such it cannot either make common cause with them on the Kampuchean issue or join an anti-Soviet campaign. But it cannot do the opposite either.