The U.S. administration has been the loudest in its protestations of neutrality in the Iraq-Iran war. Yet it has been the first great power to give up neutrality, though of course indirectly. It has made three significant moves so far. All these are understandable in view of the stakes the United Stales and its West European and Japanese allies have in the goodwill of the oil-rich Gulf states. But these effectively knock out its claim to neutrality in the conflict. To begin with, it announced that it would use its naval power to keep the Straits of Hormuz open. This was intended to put Iran on notice that it must not act against other Gulf states even if they harbour Iraqi warships and provide other forms of support to Baghdad. Teheran not only acknowledged that it had got the message but also said that it would abide by it. Washington then sent four radar aircraft to Saudi Arabia. This was an assurance to the Saudi rulers that Iran will not be allowed to attack their country regardless of their sympathy for and support to Iraq. Finally, it has decided to provide military hardware to Arab stales in the Gulf which are feeling threatened. But threatened by whom? And why? Are they not feeling threatened by Iran precisely because they have not been strictly neutral in its war with Iraq? In between the second and third moves, Washington advised King Hussein of Jordan that he should not side with Iraq in the war and transfer U.S. military hardware to it. But no one can say in all conscience either that King Hussein has heeded this advice or that the United States will not continue to look after Jordan’s security.
The Soviet policy is less easy to decipher. Soviet diplomacy can be quite crude. As such it is possible that the Soviet ambassador in Teheran offered military assistance to the Iranian Prime Minister, Mr Rajai, who turned it down. But it is not easy to accept the Iranian version of the meeting. Though there is a clear convergence between Iranian interests and the Soviet perception of their interests, the Kremlin can easily afford to wait and let the Iranians do the running. Similarly, since Soviet diplomacy can be Janus-faced, it is possible that Moscow is sending military assistance to Iraq through the Jordanian port of Aqaba and that it is drawing on its stock in Ethiopia and South Yemen for the purpose. But it is difficult to accept the veracity of American reports to this effect. The Kremlin is not likely to be all that anxious to bail out President Saddam Hussein who has been moving away from it. And surely it would not have chosen this time to conclude a treaty friendship with Iraq’s arch foe Syria if it wanted to help Baghdad. President Assad has made no secret of his sympathy for Iran. He has even held manoeuvres on the Iraqi border in order to tie down Iraqi forces there. The treaty with the Soviet Union can encourage him to be even more provocative towards Iraq. All this does not necessarily clinch the issue, but it does make it look unlikely that Moscow is rushing military equipment to Iraq.
