It was perhaps only to be expected that the joint Indo-Soviet “declaration” issued at the end of Mr. Brezhnev’s visit to New Delhi would not reflect the differences that are said to exist between the two governments on the issue of Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan. In fact the declaration does not refer to this issue even indirectly. This is understandable, though President Brezhnev has used his address to members of the Indian Parliament to reaffirm most trenchantly the Soviet position that it will not withdraw its forces from Afghanistan so long as its neighbours, especially Pakistan, do not conclude a “good-neighbourly agreement with the government of Afghanistan.” But in the face of this assertion which flows from, and is backed by, the awesome military might of the Soviet Union, now truly a super-power, it is rather difficult to take at its face value Mr. Brezhnev’s professions of adherence to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.
The Soviet spokesman, Mr. Zamyatin, reiterated in New Delhi that Soviet troops were there in Afghanistan in response to the Afghan government’s invitation. He would not say which one – the one headed by Mr. Amin who was murdered within hours of the arrival of the Soviet troops, or the present one headed by Mr. Karmal which did not exist at that time. This is an important issue which cannot be sidetracked. But even if it can be, the Soviet Union cannot meet the charge of interference in Afghanistan’s internal affairs. For it cannot claim that it is only, or even mainly, helping the set-up in Kabul to defend its borders against armed infiltrators from outside. It is fighting an insurrection within Afghanistan and not merely assisting the Afghan government troops in their efforts. The Soviet government’s behaviour is no worse than that of many others. Only, the Kremlin should not protest too much.
The signatories to the joint declaration are justified in expressing concern over “the deterioration in the international environment” and the “emergence of new hotbeds of tension.” It is also only proper that they should describe cessation of the arms race, especially in respect of nuclear weapons, as “the task of the highest priority facing the world today.” The massive Soviet presence in Afghanistan is at once a result and a cause of this deterioration. And so is the growing U.S. power in the Indian Ocean. Indeed, it will not be an exaggeration to say that the centre of the Soviet-US contention has shifted from central Europe to south-west Asia, though, of course, this shift may not turn out to be definitive and long-term in view of the current crisis in Poland.
In other words, the three issues – the arms race, the rise of new hotbeds of tension and the deterioration in the international environment – are inextricably linked with one another. They are not likely to be resolved as far into the future as we can see. They can, however, be eased but only as a result of a serious and meaningful dialogue between Washington and Moscow. There are indications that the two are moving in that direction. Mr. Reagan and his likely nominees to high office have, for instance, begun to back away from an outright rejection of the SALT II agreement and the Kremlin has begun to put it out that it expects to be able to establish better relations with the incoming US administration than it could with the outgoing one. But the joint declaration does not reflect this more hopeful possibility. Apparently either Mr. Brezhnev did not have the time to attend to this aspect of the declaration or regarded it more useful to be seen to have secured an Indian endorsement of a tough line.
India is placed in an extremely uncertain position. New Delhi just cannot predict how responsibly or irresponsibly the Reagan administration will behave in the region. This obliges Mrs. Gandhi, on the one hand, not to confirm the would-be Republican rulers in Washington in their old suspicions regarding this country and, on the other, to avoid misunderstanding with the Soviet leadership. Having taken care of the second problem with Mr. Brezhnev’s visit, she should now be able to attend to the first with her usual skill and determination. It is a delicate task in which she is entitled to the support of her people.