The ministry of external affairs has spared little effort to ensure that the forthcoming non- aligned conference does not end in bitter recriminations. Its officials have visited several capitals to canvass support for a consensus approach and they feel that the exercise has not been futile.
While it is difficult to be sure whether or not they are being unduly optimistic, it does appear that the Indian approach on Afghanistan, at once principled and realistic, has come to command a wide measure of acceptance. This may not help resolve the issue of Soviet withdrawal in the near future. But it may help avoid extension and aggravation of the conflict. And if this turns out to be the case, India can legitimately claim credit for making a contribution, however small, to the cause of stability in the region.
Consistent with its principles and interests, India could not have taken a stand different from the one it has. In view of its consistent opposition to the presence of foreign troops and bases in any third world country, it could not have endorsed Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, whatever its view of the events leading to it. Similarly, in view of its friendly relations with the Soviet Union for a quarter of a century and the Soviet record of support for it on certain crucial occasions, it could not have joined an anti-Soviet propaganda campaign. As a result it opened itself to the charge of ambivalence and it appeared at one stage as if it would be isolated among its neighbours and non-aligned nations.
Persuaded
But the Indian approach happened to be realistic as well. Once the Kremlin had moved its troops into Afghanistan, it could not be forced to withdraw. It could only be persuaded to do so. And it could be persuaded only on terms generally acceptable to it – the presence of a friendly regime in Kabul and cessation of external assistance to rebel groups out to topple it.
Several factors, in addition to its awesome military power, favoured the Soviet Union – Afghanistan’s geographical proximity, its physical terrain which denied the guerillas the cover which the thick forests in Vietnam provided to the Vietcong, the bitter tribal and ideological divisions among the mujahidins, the absence of a neighbour who could play the same role as North Vietnam and China had played in the case of the anti-US struggle in South Vietnam, Pakistan’s vulnerability on account of ethnic divisions within it and the unpopularity of its regime and, finally, the inability of the United States to mount sufficient pressure on the Kremlin.
Gradually the reality has begun to sink in. This is best illustrated by two recent developments. The Islamic summit in Taif in Saudi Arabia has adopted only a lukewarm pro forma resolution on Afghanistan. The participants hardly paid any attention to the Afghan guerilla leaders who had gone there to mobilise support for their cause. And on his return from Taif, President Zia-ul-Haq has reaffirmed his view that the Soviet Union has adopted a flexible attitude and that it should be possible to open tripartite discussions between Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran under UN auspices. Teheran has not defined its position equally clearly. But its leaders and people are too preoccupied with the war with Iraq and the internal struggle for power to be able to play a significant role in shaping the course of events in Afghanistan.
This does not necessarily mean that the Indian view would find quick and general acceptance at the non-aligned conference. Some distant countries in Africa and Latin America may, out of considerations which have little to do with the power realities in and around Afghanistan, insist that the conference call for an immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. But in doing so, they will be unfair to countries in the region which cannot but be keen to avoid being drawn into a Russia-American contest for dominant influence in the area. Indeed, even the United States will be well advised to recognise that its own interests demand that it encourages its friends to isolate developments in Afghanistan so that these do not spill over into other countries in the region and add to the turbulence there.
But if the Soviet presence in Afghanistan is a fact of life which cannot be wished away through brave declarations, so is the growing US naval might in the Indian Ocean. To begin with, there was no connection between the two. President Carter proposed the establishment of the “quick redeployment force” in 1977, that is, even before the pro-Soviet revolution in Afghanistan in April 1978. The overthrow of the Shah, who had served as a proxy for the United States in the oil-rich gulf, in early 1979, lent urgency to the move. The subsequent seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca and the consequent exposure of the fragility of the Saudi regime in 1979 finally convinced the Americans that only their own direct and strong military presence in the area could secure their interests.
Linked Up
But now the Soviet presence in Afghanistan and the US naval power in the Indian Ocean have got linked up. The Americans may not agree to withdraw from the Indian Ocean even if the Russians agree to pull out of Afghanistan. But the non-aligned cannot even hope to get a hearing in Washington so long as they are not in a position to say that the Russians are seriously interested in getting out of Afghanistan. The reverse is equally true. The Kremlin, whatever it might say for the record, will not budge on Afghanistan so long as the US build-up continues in the Indian Ocean, especially around the Gulf.
Add to all this the problems arising out of Vietnamese military support for the Heng Samrin regime in Kampuchea and the Chinese assistance to the Khmer Rouge and we have a measure of the complexity of the issues facing the non-aligned conference. South-east Asia, too, has once again become a cockpit of super-power rivalry. For while the Soviet Union is backing Vietnam, the United States is supporting Thailand which has been providing sanctuary to the Khmer Rouge guerillas and allowing Chinese arms to flow freely to them.
It is unbelievable that anyone can be so cynical as to support the Khmer Rouge which when in power had openly engaged in genocide. But it continues to be recognised as the “legitimate” government of Kampuchea by a majority in the UN. There is some talk of ASEAN countries switching support to the moderate faction headed by Sonn Sann, once prime minister under Prince Sihanouk. But this is a non-starter. The choice before ASEAN is either to go on supporting the Khmer Rouge or to recognise the present regime and allow it to stabilise itself in the calculation that this will one day persuade and enable the Vietnamese to withdraw their troops.
Much depends on China and the United States. Indeed, the Chinese attitude is critical. America under President Carter had virtually mortgaged its Vietnam policy to Beijing and there is little evidence so far that President Reagan will take a saner view and seek to normalise relations with Hanoi. And China is to open to persuasion, at least not yet.
The non-aligned conference can skirt the issue. It can agree to keep the seat for Kampuchea vacant and thus avoid splitting its ranks. Perhaps it has no other choice. But this will be an exercise in escapism arid expose the ineffectiveness of the non-aligned movement in coping with real issues.
Absurd
In moral terms it would be absurd to equate the Vietnamese presence in Kampuchea with the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Whatever their calculations, the Vietnamese have saved a whole race from decimation, if not extinction. The Russians have no such humanitarian act to their credit in Afghanistan. In a sane world, therefore, those who call themselves non-aligned should take a more sympathetic view of the Vietnamese action than of the Russian one. But while the Soviet power, by overawing its neighbours, persuades them to be realistic in their expectations and approach, Vietnam is sought to be squeezed and bled white. But there is not much India can do in this matter. It can only hope that ASEAN governments and their Chinese and American backers will see reason in their own long-term interests and accommodate, and seek accommodation with, Vietnam.
The Soviet-US contest has become truly global for the first time. Every continent has finally been drawn into it as never before. In this new and unfamiliar context it is tempting to talk of returning to the first principles of non-alignment as defined in Belgrade in 1961. But that is not likely to add up to much. Countries that are still genuinely non-aligned and those who recognise the looming dangers should find effective means of stepping up their co-operation, especially in the economic field. The world scene has changed vastly since the ’fifties when the non-aligned movement was born. It cannot survive on the old basis in any meaningful sense of the term. There is no obvious answer to the painful dilemma. We have to try hard to find one. The forthcoming conference will have served a useful purpose if it marks the beginning of such a search.
The Times of India, 4 February 1981