The state is, without doubt, our most valuable possession. On its coherence and effectiveness depend not only our survival as one nation, our security and territorial integrity, but also our well-being. Without it, we would be sunk as so often in the past.
There is a corollary to this proposition, which is equally important. The Indian state, in order to be viable over the long run, must be democratic. India is too large and varied a country to be ruled for long without the willing consent of its people. The Soviet Union and China are also, it is true, large countries. But India is wholly unique. It is so varied that it does not even possess a majority community which can try and enforce its will on smaller communities.
On a surface view, the Hindus in India can play the same role as the Great Russians in the Soviet Union and the Hans in China. But the Hindus are, like the Europeans, a civilisation and not a coherent community. They are divided on the national scale by language, each language group having its distinct cultural ethos, and by caste within each cultural-linguistic region.
These differences are, in fact, so sharp that even friendly foreign observers have again and again expressed doubts over the prospects of India’s survival as one political unit. Apparently, they have failed to take properly into account our capacity for accommodation, the strength of the nationalist sentiment which interaction between the British Raj and the freedom movement produced, the ability of the Congress Party to represent at once the smaller constituents as well as the larger community, the role of charismatic figures like Mr Nehru and Mrs Gandhi, and the presence of all-India intellectual, commercial and industrial elites. But their misgivings have not been unjustified.
The break-up of Pakistan should serve as a warning. Pakistan broke up in 1971 because its military-bureaucratic elite failed to meet the aspirations of the people of what is now Bangladesh and there is a question mark over the future of what remains of Pakistan precisely for the same reason. India is not immune to violent separatist movements. It has faced such movements in Nagaland and Mizoram. But the alienation of a people can be as fatal to a state as a violent insurrection.
Limited
Since independence India’s own experience with authoritarianism has been too limited for its dangerous consequences to be etched on our minds. It was brief; it lasted barely 19 months – from June 26, 1975, to the third week of January 1977, when the election to the Lok Sabha was announced. And Mrs Gandhi was a most reluctant dictator, if she can be said to have been one. She was apologetic about the whole affair. Her repeated attacks on the Western press were an eloquent, even if an indirect, testimony to her uneasiness.
But despite the briefness and mildness of authoritarian rule, the evil consequences are fairly obvious. The emergency undermined the Congress Party. It destroyed mutual trust and respect between the leader and her colleagues. Only if we recognise the organisation’s key role in the success of the democratic experiment can we appreciate the enormity of the loss. In comparison with the parent body, the Congress (1) is an unorganised rabble. It has not inherited the culture, behaviour patterns and norms of the old Congress.
Another result of the emergency is that intellectuals as a class have come to distrust the executive to such an extent that it will not be unfair to say that they have lost their sense of perspective and balance. They continue to be totally opposed to Mrs Gandhi, though they know that there is no other truly national leader. In utter disregard of the limitations of the judiciary, they are trying to load on it functions which it cannot perform and is not entitled to perform. This excessive faith in the judiciary is an expression of their alienation from the system which cannot but vitiate the political atmosphere and lead to the isolation of those in office from their natural allies – the intelligentsia – in the programme of taking the country forward.
The proclamation of the emergency was itself the result of the breakdown of the national consensus. The Allahabad High Court’s judgement unseating Mrs Gandhi from Parliament was only the proverbial last straw that broke the camel’s back. The fact of the emergency buried the consensus fathoms deep.
The national consensus that emerged under Mr Nehru has been thought to have been the result of his policies of secularism, mixed economy and non-alignment. This is a reasonable assessment. But it ignores the importance of Mr Nehru’s personality.
Goodness
The point here is not that Mr Nehru was a great man which, of course, he was, but that he was a good man. Even his critics and opponents did not question his bona fides. They trusted him because they knew that he would be open and fair in his dealings with them. Dr Rammanohar Lohia ran a campaign against him personally. But Mr Nehru continued to treat him as a former colleague. This did not disarm Dr Lohia, but it helped preserve the atmosphere of civility between the ruling party and the opposition.
Mrs Gandhi’s critics have blamed her for the absence of that kind of atmosphere and her admirers have blamed the opposition parties for it. Both sides appear to have missed the central fact, which is that after the 1952 election, no one could question the ascendancy in the country of either the Congress Party or Mr Nehru. While his goodness and respect for norms and institutions made it easy for opposition leaders to reconcile themselves to this reality, these qualities would not by themselves have done the trick if his power base had not been seen to be secure, indeed impregnable.
Mrs Gandhi has not had any such advantage. The 1971 poll to the Lok Sabha could have done for her what the 1952 one did for Mr Nehru if the economy had not run into trouble on account of the failure of the monsoon that year itself and if someone could have looked after the Congress organisation on her behalf. But this was not to be. On the contrary, she allowed even her own position to be weakened as a result of her close association with Mr LN Mishra who, rightly or wrongly, came to be regarded as the symbol of corruption in the country. The consequences are too well-known to need to be detailed – the JP movement, the emergency, and the triumph of the Janata in 1977.
She has personally become unassailable since her landslide victory in the election to the Lok Sabha in January 1980. But her party is in such a ramshackle and fragile state that it cannot possibly command any respect in its own right. The actions and performance of several chief ministers and ministers have brought it further into disrepute.
Difficult
The task of placing the Congress (i) on a sound organisational footing is not an easy one. But its leadership, which means Mrs Gandhi, must accept the challenge and meet it if the future of democracy is to be secured. The country cannot do without strong and durable national part which can mediate between different regions and groups within itself. The old Congress performed this role. There is no foolproof scheme for energising the Congress (I). Every proposal involves some risk. But, on balance, it seems that it will be a good idea to go in for a fresh membership drive and organisational elections.
Today, the organisation is like an inverted pyramid. It is solely dependent for its survival and well-being on one individual. And as an inverted pyramid, it is threatening to crush that very individual under its weight. Indeed, one often wonders whether Mrs Gandhi is the supreme leader of her party or its chief victim. It is surely necessary to end this state of affairs. Like any form of human organisation, a party also needs abase, an infrastructure and a chain of command.
In a turbulent period like the one India is passing through, it is not easy to maintain the balance between the political authority, the official machinery, the legislature and the judiciary. But in our case, the proper balance has been disrupted to a dangerous extent in favour of the political authority. This has demoralised honest officials and encouraged corruption and inefficiency. This cannot but strengthen the trend towards arbitrariness and anarchy. We can ignore signals, like those sent out by Mr AK Chatterjee (an IAS officer in Bihar) and by the state IAS officers’ association s subsequent resolution, only at our peril.
Mr Chatterjee has refused promotion because in his view political interference has reduced the bureaucracy to utter impotence, and the association has not only endorsed his action but also called upon the Bihar state government to take urgent steps to redress the situation. This is the first instance of its kind and there can be no doubt that such instances will grow if steps are not taken immediately to restore to the services the dignity and importance they have enjoyed.
Democracy is much more than elections and rule by the elected representatives of the people. In fact, that can quickly lead to tyranny. Democracy means, above all, the rule of law. And this calls not only for an independent judiciary, but also an efficient administration. Its autonomy is as vital as that of the judiciary. We have undermined it and, in the process, virtually destroyed the administration. We have to reverse this process if we are serious about preserving the Indian state.
The Times of India, 7 October 1981