Regardless of whether the charge of moral turpitude against the Maharashtra chief minister, Babasaheb Anantrao Bhosale, is justified or not, it has put Mrs. Gandhi in an embarrassing position.
Partly she has only herself to blame for this denouement. When she was looking for a successor to Mr. AR Antulay, she is known to have laid down two conditions which greatly narrowed her choice She stipulated that Maharashtra’s next chief minister must be a Maratha and an “original faithful”, that is one of those who had stuck to her at the time of the second Congress split in 1978.
Neither condition was necessitated by the circumstances. The Marathas had shown no capacity to unite under one banner either within the ruling Congress (I) or outside it. The Congress (I) in the state did not face a challenge serious enough to oblige it to pay special attention to the susceptibilities of the Marathas. And there has not been the slightest evidence to suggest that the “original faithfuls” are in any way more loyal to Mrs. Gandhi than the “late-comers”.
In reality, the issue in the Congress (1) has been different. This would become obvious if it is recalled that since the proclamation of the emergency in 1975 the parent organisation (the Indian National Congress) had been divided not on the question of Mrs. Gandhi’s leadership but Mr. Sanjay Gandhi’s and that those who finally left her in 1978 did so on his account and not on hers.
There can be genuine differences of opinion on Mrs. Gandhi’s conduct of the party’s and the country’s affairs during the emergency and her actions between March1977, when she lost office, and January 1980, when she returned to it. But it will be irrelevant to raise this issue in the present context wherein the main question is whether there is any bona fide reason for her to prefer the “original faithfuls” for appointment to high offices. Most observers would agree that, if anything, she has reasons to follow the opposite course.
No Compulsion
Many of the “original faithfuls” belonged to the Sanjay brigade. They had not grown up in the grand old party and imbibed its political culture. They were products of a convulsion in the early ’seventies in the larger society, the Congress party and Mrs. Gandhi’s personal life and fortunes as a result of a variety of factors such as economic stagnation, an unprecedented rise in prices, the JP movement and the Allahabad high court’s judgement. As such they represent a break with the tradition in which Mrs. Gandhi herself has grown up and cannot provide a bridge between the past and the future. They might have been useful when she was in the wilderness. But most of them lack the skill, experience and aptitude for managing the country’s affairs.
All in all, Mrs. Gandhi was under no compulsion to restrict her choice in Maharashtra. But there her mistake ends and the failure of others begins. Contrary to the widespread impression, she did not spring a surprise on her senior colleagues on this occasion. Some of them knew that the choice had narrowed down to two or three persons and that Mr Bhosale was one of them. Yet none of them tried to acquaint himself with his background and convey it to her. If it is, indeed, true, as has been suggested by some reporters and commentators, that Mr. Antulay recommended Mr. Bhosale, then the suppression of information was in all probability deliberate. It is wholly unlikely that he would not have known that Mr Bhosale faced a serious charge which, whether accurate or not, would debar him from being appointed chief minister.
But the failure of others to inform Mrs. Gandhi was not at accident. Such is the atmosphere in the Congress (I) that it did not occur to anyone to look into Mr Bhosale’s antecedents after Mrs. Gandhi had indicated her preference for him. The top men in the party do not regard it their duty to give her their frank opinion. Apparently, they do not care if wrong decisions hurt her, the party and the country so long as they do not incur her displeasure and can hold on to their own chairs.
This is a sure recipe for disaster. The Congress (I) must be rescued from the opportunism and cynicism into which it has sunk if the democratic order has to survive in the country. It is open to question whether this task can be accomplished and whether Mrs. Gandhi possesses the necessary aptitude and determination to accomplish it. But it should be self-evident that no other party is ready to replace the Congress (I) even if the latter disintegrates and forfeits the confidence of the people in her lifetime or afterwards and that no one other than Mrs. Gandhi can undertake the surgery the Congress (I) requires.
Rare Phenomena
Miracles do take place. Nature provides for them as history provides for revolutions. But both are rare phenomena. While, therefore, it is possible that a truly national organisation will emerge if the Congress (I) ceases to be such a party, the chances of that happening do not appear bright, at least on the present reckoning. Even one of the two best organised cadre-based parties and perhaps the most promising one recognises this to be the case.
Two points stand out in Bharatiya Janata Party’s assessment of its prospect in what has come to be known as the Vrindavan document. First, the BJP fears that it can be overshadowed if other non-communist opposition parties manage to unite. It does not rate high the possibility of such unity. But clearly that is less pertinent than its apprehension that such a development can jeopardise its chances of replacing the Congress (I). This shows that all its claims notwithstanding, the BJP leadership is basically unsure of itself and its hold on the people.
Secondly, it does not even entertain the hope of being able to challenge the regional parties – the Akali Dal in Punjab, the National Conference in Jammu and Kashmir and the AIADMK and DMK in Tamil Nadu, for instance. It concedes in advance that if it is to rule the country from New Delhi, it will need to do so in alliance with three regional parties. In other words, despite its determination not to merge with other non-communist parties and by and large to go it alone in its bid for power, its approach to the problem of governance of India is coalitional.
This is obviously a realistic view as far as the BJP is concerned. Indeed, it is possible to argue that it is being unduly optimistic in placing its present electoral support level at 15 to 18 per cent and in believing that it can replace the Congress (I). Indeed, a party which, for whatever reason, is not able to command substantial support among the Muslims and Sikhs cannot claim to be a genuine replacement for the Congress (I).
For, the rise of such a party will almost certainly strengthen greatly the demand for separate electorates and perhaps make it difficult to resist. Separate electorates flow from the logic of coalitional politics. It is hardly necessary to spell out the possible consequences. But leaving that aside for the time being, in view of the country’s experience with Janata rule and that party’s speedy break-up, only the naive can welcome the prospect of a coalitional government in New Delhi. India needs a truly national party – one with substantial influence among all communities and in all regions – to rule it if it is not to be reduced to a confederation in course of time.
Equal Strength
Most of us have grown up under the influence of the British example and taken it for granted that a healthy democracy requires two parties of more or less equal strength which can alternate in office. This is essentially a sound proposition. But India is not the only major democracy which has remained critically dependent on one party for over three decades. Japan is in the same boat. Indeed, while in India the Congress has been out of office in New Delhi once for almost three years, Liberal Democrats have ruled Japan without a break since General MacArthur gave the country a Constitution after World War II. And no one can possibly suggest that Japan is not a healthy democracy.
India has two apparently contradictory requirements by virtue of being a fragmented society. On the one hand, it needs several parties which can bring disparate groups into the political process and subject them to its integrating alchemy and, on the other, it needs a truly national party and leadership which can rise above its social, ethnic, religious and linguistic divisions and ensure that in the balance the political process serves as a force for unity rather than disunity. The situation of one-party dominance, with the others serving as pressure groups on the ruling organisation, has fulfilled both these requirements reasonably well under both Mr. Nehru and Mrs. Gandhi.
It is highly doubtful that India can produce two genuinely all-India parties. The realistic view would be that either we have one such party or none. In plain terms, if either Mrs. Gandhi does not try and reshape the Congress (I) to give it a coherent organisational structure or she fails in her effort, the country will face chaos. Our history does not justify the optimistic view that such a chaos will lead to a new order without external intervention. Mrs. Gandhi can begin by encouraging her colleagues to be more candid and forthright in the expression of their views, and by insisting that they perform and live by certain norms of public life which can win them the popular respect they lack today.
The Times of India, 17 March 1982