On the eve of her departure for Saudi Arabia, on April 17, Mrs. Gandhi did indicate that she would be visiting the Soviet Union in June and the United States in July. The official spokesman cannot explain away this fact. He should not have tried to do so. It would have been far better for him to have acknowledged that she had later decided to postpone the two visits. As it happens, there are good enough, indeed strong, justifications for the postponement. As the whole world knows, Mr. Brezhnev is not in good health. He has come out of hospital but there is uncertainly about his well-being. He may well recover, as he has done several times in the past six years, sufficiently to continue to be in command. But the Brezhnev era is inexorably drawing to a close. Inevitably it raises the problem of succession. Understandably the Soviet leadership itself is beginning to mark time on important issues. It can, for example, be safely assumed that Mr. Brezhnev’s health is one of the factors which have persuaded the Kremlin to dilly-dally on President Reagan’s invitation for a summit meeting. The Russians are great believers in summitry, so much so that they did not cancel their invitation to Mr. Nixon despite his decision to bomb Hanoi and blockade Haiphong. They would have almost certainly grasped Mr. Reagan’s offer if they did not have compelling reason not to do so.
This, of course, does not by itself explain the decision to postpone the visit to the United States as well. But the two had got clubbed together as a result of the manner in which Mrs. Gandhi had made the announcement. This was unfortunate. The Prime Minister should never have made it appear that she was anxious to demonstrate that she was not leaning towards either super-power. This action was wholly uncharacteristic of her. She was perhaps ill-advised. Even otherwise, there was no justification for rushing the visit to the United States. In view of the long history of Indo-US differences and the recent US policy moves in the region, especially the one relating to the arming of Pakistan, it had to be carefully planned. In plain terms, it should have been obvious to Mrs. Gandhi and her advisers that the proposed visit could be fruitful only if extensive discussions at a sufficiently high level had paved the way for it. Apparently the Americans want reasonably friendly relations with this country. There is evidence to this effect. But there is still not enough evidence to show that they are reviewing their overall stance towards South Asia. One also wonders whether Mrs. Gandhi’s own aides had done their homework by the time she made the announcement on April 17. This amateurishness is not appropriate to so important and influential a country as India. The whole affair has been handled casually and therefore clumsily.