From the scanty reports that are available, the US vice-resident, Mr. Bush’s visit to Beijing does not appear to have helped resolve, or even significantly narrow down, the differences between the two governments on the question of American arms supply to Taiwan. This is not surprising. The issue is too complicated to be easily settled. In response to Chinese pressure, the Reagan administration has for the time being deferred the delivery of sophisticated aircraft to the island but it has refused to accede to their demand that it fix a date by which it will end all military supplies, including spares for the existing equipment, to Formosa. The demand goes against President Reagan’s pledge of support to Taiwan. But that is not the only obstacle in the path of an agreement. While in theory America acknowledges that there is only one China of which Formosa is a part, in reality it remains committed to the survival of Formosa as an independent political entity. Similarly, it has supported the various proposals the Chinese have made to Formosa for peaceful reunification but in full knowledge of the fact that the KMT regime on the island will never even consider them. In plain terms, the US policy is to ensure that in the foreseeable future the Chinese are not tempted to seek to annex Formosa by force of arms. That inevitably calls for delivery of appropriate weapons. And President Reagan’s pledge and personal inclination apart, there are other strong and long-term reasons why Washington is not likely to reverse this policy. The Japanese consider the survival of the island as an independent entity vital for their security and neither they nor the Americans are sure that the Chinese will not one day make up with the Soviet Union.
Like his predecessors beginning with Mr. Nixon, architect of the policy of friendship with China, President Reagan has sought tocover up the differences over Formosa with the talk of the need for “strategic cooperation” in the face of “grave challenge from the Soviet Union”. This approach on Mr. Reagan’s part is understandable because since the late sixties the Chinese have bought it. Indeed, Chairman Mao Zedong and his successors have based their foreign policy on this assumption of common Sino-US strategic interests. But there has not been unanimous support for it among the Chinese leaders. This fact has become all too obvious of late, compelling Mr. Deng Xiaoping to soften his attacks on the Soviet Union and even expand economic cooperation with it and its East European allies. Indeed, it is possible that he has adopted a tough stance on the question of US arms supply to Formosa in order to cope with criticism of his overall foreign policy. The Americans have their own reservation. It is unlikely that they will ever arm China in a big way. The project would be too costly; it could aggravate Sino-Soviet and Soviet-US tensions; and there can be no guarantee that a US-armed China will toe the American line.