The Union government has understandably been reticent on the issue of US willingness to sell arms, including the F-16 aircraft, to this country and even to allow co-production of F-5Gs here. India’s previous experience of trying to acquire US weapons has been far from happy. The conditions which Washington stipulates in respect of arms sales to countries outside its alliance systems remain unacceptable. And it is only natural that New Delhi should be sensitive to Moscow’s susceptibilities. The Soviet Union has been extremely helpful in regard to military supplies since 1962 when it first agreed to sell MIG-21s to this country. Its prices have been highly competitive – about one-half of the West’s for similar equipment. It has extended good credit terms – loans at a 2.5 per cent fate of interest and repayments spread over 12 and now 17 years. By and large it has been willing to deliver whatever weapons system New Delhi has shown interest in. Occasionally there have been problems in regard to the supply of spare parts but these have not been unmanageable.
The Americans are aware of these facts. Indeed, they would have been surprised if India’s initial response had been more positive. Why then have they made the present moves? It is not easy to answer this question at this stage because very little information is available. Take the case of F-5G. Northrop developed it in the expectation of being able to manufacture it in Taiwan in continuation of F-5E. This possibility has now been blocked at least for some time, if not for ever, in view of Washington’s willingness partly to heed Chinese objections. So Northrop is looking for another possible partner and finds India attractive. But that cannot be good enough reason for the White House to give the go ahead signal even if its present incumbent wants to help the California-based Northrop. And what is the reference to the trilateral arrangement whereby Northrop will sell the aircraft co-produced in India to a third country? Is Formosa the third country Northrop has in mind? Surely again, the Americans cannot be urging India to improve its ties with China and at the same time try to involve it in a deal which will gravely complicate its dealings with Beijing. There may be other possible buyers. But who are they and what guarantee can there be that the US administration will not seek to block these sales on political grounds as it did in the case of the Swedish Viggen for this country? So one would need more details regarding the American offer to be able to assess its merits or demerits.
On the face of it, the F-16 offer appears to be a more straight-forward affair. India has been objecting to the delivery of these aircraft to Pakistan on the ground that this will endanger its security, especially in view of the fact that it does not possess and is not likely to possess a comparable fighter-bomber, the French Mirage-2000 it proposes to buy not being an answer to F-16. Washington has refused to accept the Indian view. So it is possible that the US administration has decided to make the offer to India mainly to meet this argument and that in fact it does not expect this country to go in for this plane. But this need not be the whole truth. It is plausible that the US administration feels that India wants this aircraft and it is willing to provide it. Two points may be made in this connection.
First, F-16 is a deadly weapon. The Israelis have destroyed around 85 MIG-21s and MIG-23s against the loss of two F-16s in the recent encounters with Syria. American commentators themselves do not believe that MIGs are so inferior to F-16 and think that Syrian ineptitude is perhaps primarily responsible for the debacle. But there can be little doubt that F-16 is a superior aircraft and its possession will give Pakistan an advantage which India will need to negate. Secondly, the US administration has convinced itself that India leans towards the Soviet Union primarily because it depends on Moscow for arms. Since Washington is keen to weaken this relationship and thereby increase the Soviet Union’s isolation in Asia, it may well be willing to incur Pakistani displeasure. This places India in a fix which the official spokesman’s statement that Mrs Gandhi will not discuss the arms issue with President Reagan cannot resolve. Indeed, a new situation has arisen and New Delhi shall have to deal with it carefully and with due deliberation. This will be especially so if Mrs. Gandhi’s visit is successful. An improvement in what the Americans call the atmospherics will accentuate rather than diminish India’s dilemma as far as the arms issue is concerned.