While Israel has stepped up the pressure on West Beirut, it has not yet launched the threatened final assault. It is being restrained above all by the Reagan administration. The Israeli forces will, of course, suffer heavy casualties if they attempt to take the city by force. But the strength of this constraint can be exaggerated. Mr. Begin and his defence minister, General Sharon, are prepared to pay the price for driving 5,000-6-000 Palestinian guerillas out of West Beirut and Lebanon itself and the people of Israel are with them. A number of Israelis are, it is true, wholly opposed to the invasion of Lebanon because they do not believe that the elimination of the PLO from the whole of Lebanon – not just from territories close to the Israeli border in the southern part of the country – is absolutely essential for their security. Indeed, even officers and men in the Israeli armed forces share this view, as is eloquently testified to by the recent resignation of a distinguished officer of colonel’s rank. But Mr. Begin’s opponents are a relatively small minority in Israel, not accounting for more than ten per cent of the population. And Mr. Begin is not likely to be over-concerned about the outrage the invasion of Lebanon has provoked all over the world. But he, too, cannot brush aside the US administration, especially after President Reagan has spoken as sharply as he has both publicly to his own people and privately to Israeli leaders. For all that we know, the State Department may indeed be considering sanctions in case Israel mounts the final assault on West Beirut.
It is difficult to assess the possible cost of a full-fledged Israeli attack on West Beirut to the United States. So far, friendly governments in the region like those of Saudi Arabia have refused to heed pleas for sanctions against it. And most of the American policy-makers feel that the regimes have a reasonable chance of surviving a wave of anti-Americanism which the destruction of the PLO enclave in West Beirut and much of the adjoining Muslim localities might provoke. But the situation is dicey. As such, the Reagan administration has powerful reasons to do all in its power to restrain Mr. Begin. There is, however, a limit beyond which the Israelis may not be willing to worry about US interests. They have already demonstrated that they will keep up and even raise the pressure on the PLO. Therefore, if an agreement is not reached soon enough on the evacuation of the guerillas, the Israelis may go over the brink. An unequivocal acceptance by the PLO leadership of Israel’s right to live in peace can help the US restrain Tel Aviv and find an agreed solution to the present crisis. Mr. Arafat has moved in that direction; but with several reservations and qualifications. He has, for instance, made the PLO’s acceptance of UN resolution 242 contingent on the application of several other UN resolutions. This equivocation can, in the circumstances, prove dangerous. Israel is not likely to be cheated of the fruits of its victory for long.