The Reagan administration has suspended, if not withdrawn, its offer of nuclear cooperation with China. It is an extremely significant development even strictly in terms of bilateral relations. After the patch-up on the question of American arms supply to Taiwan and the obvious diminution of at least China’s public hostility towards the Soviet Union, as reflected in the key speeches at the recent 12th party congress, this provides a clear indication that the honeymoon between Washington and Beijing is more or less over. This honeymoon could not have been genuine in view of the sharp differences in their approaches, compulsions, and objectives and the obvious desire of each to use the other to advance its objectives. Since their anti-Soviet rhetoric could not possibly bridge these differences, it was not particularly difficult to predict the end of the make-believe honeymoon. Our scepticism regarding the strength and durability of Sino-US friendship has been reflected in these and other columns. Even so, a frank admission on the part of Washington as well as Beijing of serious problems in their relations is a major development which deserves to be noted as much by us in India as by the others in the Soviet Union and elsewhere.
The US administration has clearly not acted in a huff. Before taking the decision to suspend nuclear cooperation with China, it has fully satisfied itself that the Chinese are clandestinely assisting Pakistan in its nuclear programme which is intended to enable Islamabad to acquire nuclear weapons. Else, Mr. James Malone, a US assistant secretary of state, would not have said that China’s relations with Pakistan are a complicating factor in Sino-US relations. Having so satisfied itself, the Reagan administration has had no choice other than what it has done. But it cannot claim to have fully discharged its obligations under America’s own non-proliferation act which obliges Washington not to extend economic or military assistance to a country which is trying to acquire the capability to go in for nuclear weapons. It was in pursuance of this act that the Carter administration ended its relatively small economic aid programme to Pakistan. The Reagan administration reversed this policy on the twin pleas that Islamabad had given a categorical assurance that Pakistan was not engaged in an effort to acquire a nuclear weapons capability and that its (US) military assistance would give Pakistan a sufficient sense of security to persuade President Zia-ul-Haq and his colleagues to give up their nuclear weapons programme. On Washington’s own admission now, Islamabad is continuing its effort to develop a nuclear weapons capability. It, therefore, owes it to itself and to the American people to end its military-cum-economic assistance to Pakistan.
We have been consistently opposed to US military aid to Pakistan for a variety of reasons which do not need to be repeated. Yet, we can understand the logic behind it, however wrong we may regard it to be in America’s and Pakistan’s own long-term interest. We cannot say even that much in respect of the Chinese assistance to Pakistan’s nuclear programme. It is truly baffling. Mr. Malone has said that it is likely that Chinese-enriched uranium has gone to South Africa (perhaps through some third country) and Chinese heavy water to Argentina which, too, is said to entertain the ambition to acquire nuclear weapons. This would suggest that the Chinese do not mind proliferation of nuclear weapons. That may well be the case. But that cannot explain the assistance to Pakistan. This is not a case of an odd shipment of nuclear material; China, according to the Americans, is assisting Pakistan to develop the facility to enrich uranium which will give the latter the capability to manufacture nuclear weapons. Why? No convincing explanation is possible in terms of the general view of Sino-Pakistan relations. The two governments are friendly to each other, but they are not allies. And even an ally does not extend such assistance to a weaker ally. Witness the fact that the US withheld nuclear secrets from Britain, which British scientists had helped develop, and that Moscow preferred breaking with China to sharing nuclear secrets after having promised to do so. Obviously, the relations between China and Pakistan are much closer than most of us in India have suspected and the Chinese and the Pakistanis are pursuing some plans about which we are in the dark. This raises disturbing questions for Indian policy-makers and indeed for US policy-makers as well.