It is difficult to believe that a serious hitch has developed over the delivery of F-16s by the United States to Pakistan. Islamabad has powerful friends in Washington, especially in the Pentagon, who continue to believe that it is a useful instrument in the promotion of their country’s interests in the region. They have assigned it three roles – a conduit for arms to the Afghan mujahideen so that the cost to the Soviet Union of its military presence in Afghanistan can be raised, a source of supply of well trained officers and men for the defence of pro-Western regimes in the gulf, and a replacement for the once trusted Iranian ally. There is no indication that the Reagan administration has modified its position on these issues. Similarly, whatever President Zia-ul-Haq’s assessment of the importance of his regime and country for the United States, particularly in the context of the intensification of the cold war in the gulf region, it is, on the face of it, unlikely that he would risk Washington’s displeasure. He is playing his cards deftly. Thus he has managed to maintain reasonably good relations with the Soviet Union and to open a dialogue with Mrs. Gandhi as well. But he needs the assurance of solid US support in the pursuit of his complex policies. And while there is concern in America on Pakistan’s clandestine nuclear weapons programme, the Reagan administration is willing to put this “little difficulty” aside in the fond hope that it will go away. All in all, therefore, the chances are that if some problem has indeed arisen over the supply of F-16s, it will be resolved either before or during President Zia’s forthcoming visit to Washington.
There is an awareness in the United States that General Zia and his administration remain highly unpopular in Pakistan, that his efforts to establish the so-called Nizam-e-Mustafa has not endeared him to his people; and that a deep anti-American current runs just below the surface in that country. The better informed Americans also know that while the Pakistanis may be aggrieved because in their view Washington did not stand by them in their armed conflicts with India in 1965 and 1971, the real source of trouble is the US support for Israel. They are in fact concerned that the anti-US sentiment may get strengthened in case there is no progress towards a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Reagan administration is not ready to impose its proposals on Israel. And it is difficult to meet an informed American who believes seriously that Mr. Begin will oblige President Reagan or that Mr. Begin can be replaced by someone more amenable to Washington’s pressure or that President Reagan has the necessary time at his disposal to push his scheme through. He has at the most a year to accomplish this heart-breaking task. By this time next year the presidential election campaign will be on and once that happens, the Democrats are going to plump for the Jewish vote making it well nigh impossible for the administration to put pressure on Israel. But for the moment these misgivings are being quietly pushed under the carpet. The US-Pakistan relationship is not stable but both value it enough to keep it going.