Almost without exception, commentators have treated Islamic fundamentalism as if it is a wholly unique phenomenon, a phenomenon peculiar to the Muslims, with no similar movement anywhere else in the world. At the root of this view lies the proposition that states are guided by rational considerations of national interests and that they do not allow cultural and other value factors to influence them unduly.
The view originated in Europe. But it has survived the end of the era of European domination. This is truly extraordinary. For developments since 1945 have exposed the inadequacy of the even more basic European concept of the nation-state as the most legitimate basis of political organisation.
Not many countries which have become independent since the process of decolonisation began with India’s independence on August 15, 1947, can be described as nation-states in the classical West European sense of the term. Even little Sri Lanka is not a nation state because the Tamil minority is not assimilated to the Sinhala majority. In Africa, we have conglomerations of tribes arbitrarily grouped together.
And this is only one facet of the international reality, the other being the rise of the United States and the Soviet Union as super-states. They are, of course, superpowers in that they dispose of enormous power the like of which mankind has not witnessed ever before. Even the British empire at the height of its power and glory cannot bear comparison with the United States or the Soviet Union. But they are not only superpowers. They are also super-states anxious to preside over rival world orders.
Along with the concept of nation-states goes the concept of national interests. Since we have continued to use the concept of the nation state, we have also continued to assume that all states, including the United States and the Soviet Union, are guided primarily, if not exclusively, by their perceptions of their national interests. But the inadequacy of this proposition should be fairly evident in their case.
Enormous Treasures
The massive assistance the United States has given to a large number of countries is a phenomenon the like of which mankind has never witnessed before. The manner in which the United States worked for the rehabilitation of western Europe and Japan also does not have a parallel in the history of mankind. These actions can be explained in terms of America’s enlightened self-interest. But which nation-state has ever been guided by such a definition of enlightened self-interest?
And how do we explain the fact that the United States poured enormous treasures into South Vietnam to keep it non-communist? Surely it cannot be explained in terms of America’s national interest, however much we may stretch the term. It can be explained in terms of an obsession – the obsession with communism – and a failure – the failure to appreciate the difference between Vietnamese nationalism and Moscow-directed or Beijing-directed communism. But to do so is tantamount to admitting that the category known as national interests cannot explain America’s conduct in Indo-China.
In order to explain US actions in Indo-China, some Marxists “invented” vast oil deposits off the coast of South Vietnam and even argued that US prosperity depended on the arms industry which needed an outlet in Vietnam or elsewhere. Events have exposed the hollowness of this proposition. The US defence expenditure declined for a whole decade after 1971 and under President Reagan the conflict between economic health and increased defence expenditure has become all too obvious.
The Soviet Union has invariably explained its foreign policy in terms of its ideology and its self-proclaimed commitment to the cause of peace and national liberation. Many of us have tended to disregard these claims and link Soviet foreign policy with the old Czarist policies. But while it is true that Russia’s past has asserted itself to some extent through the Soviet reality, as was only to be expected, it would clearly be wrong to view the communist regime’s actions either at home or abroad in the old Czarist framework. The Soviet Union is not Russia under a different nomenclature. Russia was an empire and it did not possess a universal ideology. The Soviet Union is not an empire. It is a multi-nation state, though the Great Russian people try to retain their dominant position. And it possesses a universal ideology which influences its decisions.
World Order
Both superpowers, especially the United States, have been working towards a world order which must by definition supersede their national interests. From 1945 till the middle of the seventies, the United States was functioning as the nucleus of a world order which it sought to promote under its own auspices. GATT, the World Bank and the IMF were intended to be instruments for the establishment of that world order. And so were the consortia set up at the US initiative to assist countries like ours. The United States has given up the effort finally under President Reagan. But it is still not behaving quite like a nation-state. Witness the intensity of its opposition to the Soviet Union on grounds of ideology.
The Soviet Union has not been able to project itself as a nucleus of a world order largely because of the limitations and weaknesses of its economy which have made it impossible for it to extend aid to other countries on a substantial scale. But the Soviet Union has wanted to be the centre of a world order even if that order has been limited in scope, limited, that is, to communist countries and the communist movement.
Our perception has been that the post-war world has witnessed two apparent contradictory phenomena – the rise of the two superpowers and the emergence of scores of newly independent states. In reality, we have witnessed another extremely significant phenomenon. This is the phenomenon of non-European civilisations and peoples wanting to regain their cultural and religious identities. The phenomenon is extremely complex and cannot be discussed adequately in an article. Here it would suffice to say that modern history cannot make much sense unless we take cognisance of this phenomenon.
The proposition is self-evident in the case of the Muslims. The issue is not whether one approves or disapproves of Islamic fundamentalism, or whether or not one regards it as a viable proposition. The question is whether we can understand developments in the Muslim world in terms of the old concept of national or state interests without taking into account the strong desire of the Muslim peoples to recover their old religious-cultural identity. Surely the answer must firmly be in the negative.
Serious Obstacle
The Muslims, unlike the Indians and the Chinese, face a serious obstacle in that they are organised in different political entities whose interests and approaches must inevitably clash quite often. It is not an accident that the Arabs have not been able to come together in the fight against Israel despite Israel’s obvious tendency towards expansionism. But this weakness cannot detract from the fact that whatever the problems, the Muslim peoples are trying to regain and reassert their religious-cultural identity. The result may be a disaster, as it has been in Iran. But that is beside the point.
The Africans suffer from yet another handicap. They are not only divided among many states, but each state is divided along tribal lines. Yet the Africans do not want to be imitations of their former colonial masters. They want to assert their Africanness whatever it might come to mean in the final analysis. And though the drive towards unity has been blunted, the grouping continues.
The issue is confused in the case of India and China. In both countries, the modernisers have been in command – the secular, liberal democrats in India and the communists in China. In different ways, both have been emphasising the need for change and modernisation of their societies and economies and de-emphasising the role of religion (India) and tradition (China) in state affairs. But both have been jealous of their freedom. In China’s case, it has involved an extremely painful break with the Soviet Union, which Peking at one stage accepted as its model, and the communist movement of which Peking once wanted to be the centre. India has been spared this agony because it wisely refrained from so tying itself to any group or country from the very start of its career as an independent country. This determined bid for complete freedom of action has in both India and China a cultural component which is bound to assert itself as the influence of borrowed ideas and ideologies weakens.
All in all, contrary to the widespread view that ours is an age of pragmatism and cynicism, it may turn out that ideology plays a significant role in our lives. Ideology is, of course, to be understood in its wider meaning and not in narrow class (Marxist) terms. Such an approach may provide us new insights into what is happening in our own country and around us in the wider world.
The Times of India, 3 November 1982