As anticipated in these columns last week, the problem regarding the installation of certain electronic equipment on six F-16s to be delivered to Pakistan immediately has been resolved in its favour. The Reagan administration has yielded to Islamabad’s pressure perhaps partly in view of President Zia-ul-Haq’s visit. But answers by a senior official of the State Department in this regard last Thursday also suggest that Washington is reluctant to accept the Pakistani view that the provision of the avionics is part of the original agreement and that there may be some difficulty about the schedule for the supply of the remaining 34 F-16s. It will be obviously premature to infer that the United States is having second thoughts regarding the size of its commitments to Islamabad. But, such a possibility should not be dismissed out of hand, especially in view of the State Department official’s statement that the Reagan administration would “like to hear what President Zia has to say about his recent travel” to South-East Asia, Beijing, New Delhi and Moscow where he had an “unexpected” 45-minute-long meeting with the new leader, Mr. Yuri Andropov. On the face of it, such discussions arc a routine affair between friendly countries. Their leaders inform one another of their talks with third parties. Diplomatic channels are not considered an adequate substitute for such discussions. But the use of the word “unexpected” by the State Department official in respect of the Andropov-Zia meeting is rather interesting. This would be particularly so if the Reagan administration has concluded that a thaw is taking place in the Sino-Soviet relations.
President Zia is pursuing a clever policy which is not very different from the one his former foreign minister, Mr. Agha Shahi, was recommending to Washington’s great annoyance. This policy involves keeping open the option of friendly ties with the Soviet Union. And it was precisely to close this option that the Reagan administration had agreed to give Pakistan aid amounting to £3.2 billion. Islamabad’s worries and therefore priorities are bound to be different from Washington. While the former must above all be interested in ensuring the return of the Afghan refugees and not provoking the Soviets too much by allowing too many arms to go to the Mujahideen, the latter is interested in raising for Moscow the cost of its military presence in Afghanistan to a point where it begins to hurt badly. So far the two governments have managed either to slur over the differences or to manage them. But they are there. They will not disappear as a result of President Zia’s visit, though it will be absurd to rush to any conclusion at this stage.