Apparently, President Mitterrand means what he says. Apparently, there is no connection between the French decision to supply enriched uranium for Tarapur on the same terms as the US has done so far and the Indian move to buy the extremely costly Mirage-2000s. Indeed, it is indisputable that New Delhi had agreed to buy the French aircraft for its air force long before Paris finally accepted the proposal that it replace Washington as supplier of nuclear fuel for Tarapur. And having concluded that this aircraft best met its need, India could not possibly have spurned it even if France had not agreed to step into America’s place for the supply of enriched uranium. But it is difficult to believe that the French government would have abandoned the issues it at one stage raised regarding the sale of the nuclear fuel if it had not been guided by other considerations. France is a member of the London club of suppliers of nuclear equipment and materials and, as such, bound by its decisions. It has also made a public declaration that it will abide by the latest regulations of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which are much harsher than the ones which apply to Tarapur under the Indo-US agreement of 1963, as modified in 1971 under an agreement between them and the IAEA. It does not follow that India did not have a case when it argued that since France was moving into America’s place, it should supply nuclear fuel under the same old terms, or that in agreeing to do so, France has violated any specific agreement. But would it have done what it has if it had not been guided by the larger consideration of its overall relations with India? And what is wrong with being so guided? Which country is not?
Neither France nor India is seeking a special relationship. It would be naive for them to do so. Both are trying to widen and deepen the existing level of cooperation between them. This is legitimate and it makes good sense. President Mitterrand has spoken of “common interests” and a “convergence of views.” But Indo-French cooperation is essentially bilateral in nature and it is going to remain that way. Though there may be areas of agreement between the two countries, there are areas of disagreement as well. While President Mitterrand, for instance, believes that the Soviet Union has moved ahead of the United States in the military field and that America must seek to close this gap, Mrs. Gandhi broadly takes a different view. Similarly, while the French leader is sympathetic to Israel’s predicament, the Indian Prime Minister is highly critical of Tel Aviv. But all that is beside the point. India wants to update its technology, attract foreign investment and diversify its sources of military supplies. France is in a position to help it in all these fields. More important it is anxious to help because it finds such cooperation to be in its own national interest. This is the basis of the growing Indo-French friendship. Neither side needs to look for another.