For the second time in less than a month the Soviets have reaffirmed that they will not withdraw from Afghanistan unless all external interference in that country’s affairs by way of US, Saudi, Egyptian and Pakistani support for the rebels ends. Clearly, this is intended to put an end to speculation that the new Soviet leader, Mr. Andropov, may be more willing to look for a way out of Afghanistan than was Mr. Brezhnev. President Zia-ul-Haq gave an impetus to this speculation which was based in the first instance on unverifiable reports that as KGB chief, Mr. Andropov was opposed to direct military intervention in Afghanistan. President Zia made contradictory statements, one endorsing the rather untenable Western view that the Soviets regarded Afghanistan as a jumping-off ground for control of the Gulf and the other suggesting that Mr. Andropov’s line in his talks with him was a moderate one. This could have caused concern among the supporters of the Babrak Karnal regime in Kabul and adversely affected their morale. That is apparently why the Kremlin has thought it necessary to reaffirm its stand as spelled out in May 1980 and August 1981.
In reality, there has not been much genuine scope for speculation. Supposing, for the sake of argument, that as KGB chief, Mr. Andropov was in fact opposed to military intervention in Afghanistan, it does not follow that he would be willing to end it in a hurry. Great powers do not scuttle in that manner. Afghanistan is not the Soviet Union’s Viet Nam. Western estimates are that the Soviets have suffered around 12,000 casualties, which Moscow would find bearable. Western experts also agree that the rebels have shown no capacity to unite and that they have not made too many gains in the past three years despite all the external assistance they have received. And if there is a stalemate in the war, as would appear to be the case, Mr. Andropov is under no great compulsion to take an immediate decision either to step up the effort and send in more troops or to look for a face-saving device.
Mr. Andropov is clearly interested in restoring détente with the United States and has made a number of proposals and moves towards that end, so much so that the Reagan administration has begun to speak a more moderate and hopeful language. But the new Soviet leader cannot wish to be seen to be negotiating from a position of weakness, which is how any flexibility on his part on Afghanistan would be interpreted in Washington. US officials have said that Afghanistan is one of the key tests of Soviet sincerity. But it just cannot be the central issue. The top issue in a US-USSR dialogue must be the nuclear arms race.