In the wake of the Congress (I) defeat in Andhra and Karnataka, it was necessary for Mrs. Gandhi to send out two signals to the people who still believe in her and are willing to support her. The first signal should have been that she was willing to heed the message which the people of the two southern states had sought to convey to her through the ballot box. And the second that she had not been thrown off her balance by the blow and would be able to work out a coherent plan of action. Instead, she has shown signs of being confused and unsure of herself. That much is clear from the way she has handled the Union Cabinet reshuffle and the election of the new leader of the Congress (I) legislature party in Maharashtra.
To begin with, Mrs. Gandhi had to understand the basic causes of the defeat in Andhra and Karnataka. Apparently, she and her advisers, whoever they are, have tried to do so. But they appear to have come up with a solution which would suggest that they have either failed to get to the heart of the problem or that they do not quite know how to deal with it.
A great deal has been written and said about the ill-effects of over centralization of authority in Mrs. Gandhi in respect of both government and party matters. Evidently even senior Congress (I) ministers have shared the view that her style of leadership has become counter-productive. It is also true that the manner in which Mr. Rajiv Gandhi insulted the then Andhra Chief minister, Mr. Anjiah, at the Hyderabad airport on the strength of being his mother’s son, definitely offended the sensibilities of the people of the state who were already disgusted by the obsequiousness of all Congress (I) aspirants to office. And there can be no doubt that Mr. NT Rama Rao exploited this sentiment. But was this the main cause of the debacle?
Constant Feuds
Obviously not. In fact, there was no one main cause for the defeat. There were several causes – the selection of one wrong chief minister after another, constant feuds in the party making it impossible for the government to function, the absence of a leader who could produce even a semblance of order in the Congress (I), Mrs. Gandhi’s unwillingness or inability to back firmly those she herself had placed in office and so on. If one wishes to sum it up all in one sentence, one would say that the Congress (1) lost in Andhra because it had given the state a corrupt and incompetent government – both points are important – and because its leaders had made a spectacle of themselves. They had shown themselves to be men who possessed neither dignity nor integrity. The people in Andhra would not tolerate them.
Such a party was bound to alienate further the better educated and economically more advanced sections of society which had already been moving away from it, and it did. This is evident from the fact that the Congress (I) lost heavily in the more prosperous coastal belt and retained its hold only in the most backward parts of the state. This fact may be sought to be obscured by the talk of the alienation of Muslims and Harijans. On a surface view based on a crude guesswork the theory may be justified. But it will be interesting to try and find out which sections of Muslims and Harijans have gone away from the Congress (I). The chances are that a careful scrutiny will reveal that it is those who are beginning to do well who have deserted the Congress (I). The strong are always the first to throw away the umbrella under which they have sought protection. Such sections have to be cultivated.
If there is some scope to dispute the accuracy of this assessment in respect of Andhra in view of the distinctly regional character of NTR’s Telugu Desam, Karnataka should clinch the issue. There Mrs. Gandhi had not changed one chief minister after another; Mr. Rajiv Gandhi had not insulted Mr. Gundu Rao in the presence of thousands of people; and a regional party has not swept the poll. There the Congress (I) has lost because a decent and a reasonably well-informed Kannadiga could not swallow the crudity and effrontery of men who dominated the government and the party after the exit of Mr. Devraj Urs as chief minister in 1980. Behind Mr. Gundu Rao, himself not a pretty sight in view of his reputation, stood men whom the people suspected of being smugglers, rapists and crooks.
Clean-up Drive
The lesson should have been obvious. Which is that the Congress (I) leadership, if it has to survive, has to launch a drive to clean up the augean stables which the party has become. Such an effort would call for an even stronger and more resolute Mrs. Gandhi than ever before. She showed herself to be just that when she called for the resignations of her ministers but only to engage in a half-hearted directionless action which could not have made any impact. On top of it came the decision to replace Mr. Babasaheb Bhosale as Maharashtra’s chief minister and to find a successor to him.
What should have been Mrs. Gandhi’s first priority? To give the state a reasonably clean and competent government or to demonstrate that she was no longer interested in imposing a chief minister on it? In rational terms, the first should have obviously been her main concern. But, no, she was more keen to prove that she would leave the matter to the Congress (I) legislature party. As things turned out, the state legislators made a reasonably good choice and the observers sent from Delhi handled the confusion sought to be created by Mr. Antulay rather well. Even so, it was a close shave: Mr. Vasantrao Patil could well have lost. Indeed, there is some indirect evidence to suggest that Mrs. Gandhi and her entourage were reconciled to his defeat.
On the face of it, the reason why Mrs. Gandhi was prepared to take serious a risk in so important a state as Maharashtra is obvious. She does not any longer want to be held responsible for the poor performance and reputation of chief ministers. But her decision raises some other disturbing implications – that she will not seek to curb dissidence and that she will not mind if a chief minister manages to keep his party legislators pleased by handling out largesses to them as Mr. Antulay, Mr. Gundu Rao and some others have done. And does she seriously believe that she can escape responsibility for the actions of Congress (I) chief ministers, however they are selected?
The commentators may be exaggerating when they say that the “I” within the bracket in the Congress (I) is more important than the original name, but not much. The people have elected non-entities and unworthy men because of their trust in Mrs. Gandhi and they are going to hold her responsible for the actions of Congress (I) chief ministers and ministers. They are not likely to be impressed by her new found love for devolution of responsibility and therefore of authority. Indeed, it is not easy to believe that she is serious about devolution of authority. Will she in fact not take a hand in the formation of the new ministry in Maharashtra?
Restoration of Status
This is a plea for acceptance of responsibility, not for centralization of authority which can lead at once to non-use and abuse. It has long been obvious that Mrs. Gandhi has taken too much on herself and that the result has been disastrous. Senior ministers wait for her to settle all issues, important and unimportant alike. This has virtually paralyzed the administration in New Delhi. So the need for devolution of authority is clear. The question is: how is it to be done?
If Mrs. Gandhi is indeed serious, she has to begin in New Delhi. The key institutions over which she herself presides – the cabinet, the Congress (I) parliamentary board and working committee, and the AICC – have all fallen into desuetude because they are no longer manned by men of stature and they no longer decide anything on their own. They just wait for her to tell them what she expects them to do. These institutions need to be restored to something of their former status.
It is also difficult to think of another prime minister in any worthwhile country who has so little assistance. For years, there has not been one man or woman of ideas around Mrs. Gandhi. It baffles Indians as well as foreigners that she is able to function at all in today’s complex world. The White House in Washington has a staff of around 800 men. How many experts does Mrs. Gandhi lean on? The result is that crucial decisions are taken on the basis of hunch and hearsay. The cost to the nation must be pretty heavy.
It has not occurred to the advocates of decentralization that the establishment of a competent setup to assist the Prime Minister is also a form of devolution of authority. An effectively functioning cabinet can reduce the need for such a set-up; it cannot eliminate that requirement of modern government.
Democracy is a highly complicated form of government. It is impossible to practice it without effective leadership. This is particularly so in societies such as India undergoing rapid change. Leadership is also not a simple function which can be reduced to some simple slogans. It calls for balancing diverse and even contradictory demands. There can be no escape from this exacting demand in so heterogeneous a society such as ours. That democracy is not mobocracy applies as much to us as to any other country.
The Times of India, 2 February 1983