Two developments have taken place in connection with the recent elections to the Delhi Metropolitan Council and the Delhi Municipal Corporation which call for attention, though it is still difficult to assess their importance. Indeed, at this stage it is not even possible to say whether or not the two developments are inter-connected.
It is by now widely accepted that a significant section of Muslims not only abstained from voting for the Congress (I) but voted for the Bharatiya Janata Party (a refurbished version of the former Jana Sangh) and that a substantial number of RSS volunteers did not work for the BJP. This much is certain. Beyond that we enter the area of intelligent inference and speculation based on hearsay. While all this is useful and, in the circumstances, perhaps unavoidable, one has to be cautious and treat such conclusions as one reaches as being tentative.
On the question of the Muslim vote, there is a difference between the assessment of the Indian Institute of Public Opinion based on a pre-poll sample survey of 200 Muslims and The Times of India report based on interviews with candidates in constituencies which have a significant Muslim population and political activists. While the first suggests that a minority of Muslims are likely to have voted for BJP and other non-Congress (I) candidates, the second indicates that a majority of the Muslim electorate might have moved away from the ruling party.
Jamaat’s Option
This is an important difference but not all that important. For the institute’s pre-election survey showed that as many as 34 per cent of Muslim voters had decided to opt for the BJP. This is by itself a staggering figure.
Who were these Muslim voters? In all conscience, it is difficult to be sure. But one leading political scientist, who happens to be a Muslim, tells me that they were supporters of the Jamaat-e-Islami. A New Delhi weekly, which takes a keen interest in such matters, endorses this view. This does not clinch the issue. But there is at the moment no rival theory in the field, at least to my knowledge.
But this theory only complicates the task of finding a plausible answer to the second question which is why have Muslim voters opted for a political party which they have by and large regarded as being communal and indeed anti-Muslim. It excludes the only two reasonable explanations one can think of, the first being that Muslim voters wanted to punish the Congress (I) for the UP and Gujarat governments’ handling of the riots in Meerut and Baroda, and the second being that they accepted at its face value the BJP’s claim to being a secular party. For in order to punish the Congress (I), it was not necessary for them to turn to the BJP. And supporters of the Jamaat-e-Islami are not likely to accept the BJP’s credentials so easily.
It is, of course, true that during the emergency there were reports that the then Jana Sangh and Jamaat-e-Islami leaders had forged bonds in jail. And after the end of the emergency in March 1977, some articles had appeared which suggested that there was some truth in the earlier reports. But the impression so far has been that this understanding did not last. So while it is possible that it will again be argued by interested parties that some unnamed or specific foreign agency has once again brought about understanding between the BJP and the Jamaat, it is difficult to give credence to this proposition.
Being in the dark on the preliminary questions, it would be idle to speculate whether the development in the capital marks a new turn in the voting behaviour of the Muslim community, or whether this is a temporary aberration as in 1977, or whether the Muslim electorate will again return to the Congress (I) as it did in 1980.
Muslims in Delhi are, of course, not alone in having moved away from the Congress (I) this time. The same phenomenon was witnessed in Andhra and Karnataka in the recent elections to state legislatures. But in those states Muslims have not voted for the BJP. NTR’s Telugu Desam is a different proposition from the BJP and so is the Janata Kranti Ranga.
We are in a similar situation on the second development in Delhi – the refusal by a substantial section of the RSS to support BJP candidates. There is little by way of hard evidence on the basis of which one can reach any worthwhile conclusion.
The fact of the “rift” is indisputable. The evidence was littered all over the Union territory. In constituency after constituency, RSS volunteers stayed away from the BJP’s election campaign. They just did not show up. When asked by their friends and acquaintances, they are said to have evaded the question. In fact in certain constituencies they are believed to have worked for Congress (I) candidates allegedly acceptable to them as individuals. This is, however, mere hearsay which has not been substantiated.
Rift Over Tickets
This “rift” has naturally led to a search for answers. A New Delhi English-language daily has, for instance, carried a report to the effect that there was a rift within that BJP among the moderates and the hardliners, clearly a euphemism for those with RSS connections, over the distribution of party tickets for election to the metropolitan council and the municipal corporation, with the party president, Mr. Atal Bihari Vajpayee, offering the latter 50 per cent of the seats and they insisting on 90 per cent. But who spoke for the “hardliners”?
Mr. Vajpayee’s resignation as president of the BJP was bound to fuel speculation. He would have the people believe that he resigned merely because he wanted to own the responsibility for the party’s defeat in the election and thus avoid unnecessary recrimination. But this will not wash. The question of owing up responsibility could not arise unless someone was questioning either the selection of candidates or the election strategy or both. Once again we enter the area of darkness because we cannot identify the individual or individuals who could have challenged Mr. Vajpayee’s selection and strategy.
In the event, Mr. Vajpayee has withdrawn his resignation at the request of other members of the national executive of the BJP. This could have been easily anticipated. The BJP does not possess another leader who can match Mr. Vajpayee’s appeal and he is known to enjoy the limelight. Simultaneously the national executive has also adopted a resolution which expresses concern over the growth of communal tension in the country and urges all members to do all they can to fight communalism.
The resolution is in conformity with the BJP’s claim to be a secular party which does not discriminate against any Indian citizen on the ground of religion or caste. It also makes sense in the context of the party’s attempt to secure the support of the minorities. But in the present circumstances it will not be too off the mark to see in this resolution an endorsement of Mr. Vajpayee’s general line and his handling of the elections in Delhi.
This, however, raises more questions than it answers. Does it mean, for example, that the party is reconciled to a parting of ways with the RSS? Does it believe that it can forge ahead without the support of the RSS? Can it on its own retain the support base the RSS has provided it so far? Or alternatively, is all this a mere facade behind which the old link with the RSS will be preserved and even strengthened?
RSS Objective
And what about the RSS itself? Is it prepared for a final break with the BJP? Has it reversed its previous view that in order to promote its objective of Hindu nationhood, it needs a political platform? Was the refusal of a large number of RSS cadres to support BJP nominees a case of sulks or of an expression of the organization’s claim that it is not a political body? Who took the decision? Mr. Deoras, the RSS chief, or local shakha organisers? Was there a decision at all? Or was every RSS volunteer allowed to decide for himself? Or is the RSS trying to widen its options? Does it find Mrs. Gandhi’s approach to Pakistan more acceptable than Mr. Vajpayee’s?
It is tempting to try and answer these and other relevant questions on the basis of hearsay. But it would be more honest to admit that we are in the dark. Indeed, it is quite likely that the BJP and the RSS leaders have not taken firm decisions and do not know where they are heading for. This uncertainly must be galling for those to us who are used to looking for straight answers to straight questions. But a social, economic and political change of revolutionary dimensions as is taking place in our country must of necessity lead to uncertainly and confusion. Nothing is in place in India. So the facts of today can become the non-facts tomorrow. We have to wait and see whether the developments we have noted represent a trend and whether this trend will harden or fizzle out.
The Times of India, 16 February 1983