It is difficult not to be disturbed over the turn of events in Jammu and Kashmir. The breakdown of talks for an electoral alliance between the Congress (1) and the National Conference creates a potentially, even if not necessarily, a dangerous situation. For no possible outcome of the resulting competition for the support of the electorate can be free from some risks. Let us suppose for the sake of argument that the National Conference does as well in the Kashmir valley as its leader, Dr. Farooq Abdullah, expects. This will create several problems. It will bring into sharp focus the fact that the state is divided along communal lines. It will weaken the Congress (l)’s claim to be a national party commanding a significant measure of support among all sections of the Indian people in all parts of the country. The party, it is true, has suffered setbacks in other states, Andhra being the most recent example. But in view of the composition of its population (97 per cent Muslim), the Kashmir valley is a different proposition. Let us visualize, equally hypothetically, that the Congress (I) fares well in the valley. This can create another set of equally knotty problems. Dr. Farooq Abdullah has already demonstrated that, like his father, he is ready to play on the sentiment of the Kashmiri Muslims by maligning the Centre in order to stay in office. If he loses power to the Congress (I) in a fair and free election, he is likely to pursue the demagogic course with a vengeance and thus strengthen the forces of extremism which are quite active in the state. Indeed, he can be depended upon to do so.
The third possible outcome of a National Conference Congress (I) tussle is that both fare reasonably well in the valley. This is the least risky of the possible results provided, of course, the two parties agree to go in for a coalition after the poll. But mutual distrust which the election campaign will certainly accentuate might make that extremely difficult. And in the confusion resulting from this conflict the Jamaat-i-Islami might well strengthen its position to a point where Dr. Abdullah might, like the moderate Akali leaders, find himself forced to accept its dangerous slogans and programme. Thus from whatever angle one examines the prospects, one cannot but conclude that the leaders of both organisations should make another effort to find out whether they can discover a basis for cooperation even at this late stage.
In this connection, it has to be said that Dr. Farooq Abdullah has been less than reasonable. He cannot seriously believe either that the events leading to the formation of the Congress in the state can be made into non-events or that a party which rules at the Centre can be persuaded to limit its activities to the predominantly Hindu Jammu. He may or may not be aware of the fact that he is speaking a language identical with Mr. Jinnah’s before partition. But that is the unpleasant truth. He would be well advised to take note of another reality. He lacks the charisma and skill of his father and cannot, without exposing the state to grave risks, play the tricky game which the late Sheikh did. He has a compulsion of sorts – competition from the Jamaat-i-Islami for the favour of the Muslim electorate. But it cannot be said to be strong enough to justify his stance.