Pakistani claims that a negotiated settlement of the Afghan problem in none too distant a future is possible have begun to look credible. This change in perception is the result of the US State Department’s confirmation of reports that the Jamaat-i-Islami section of the Peshawar-based Mujahidin “have worked put some sort of cease-fire with the Soviets” and that “it seems clear from all reports that there is no current fighting in Panjshehr valley”. The terms of the cease-fire, which has apparently been operational since last March when the foreign ministers of Pakistan and Afghanistan conducted negotiations in Geneva indirectly with the help and under the auspices of the UN, are not known. But it is without doubt an important development. It shows that the talks in Geneva went so well as to persuade Islamabad to call on the Jamaat-i-Islami faction of the guerrilla leadership to suspend fighting and Moscow-supported Afghan armed forces to hold its hand in Panjshehr valley at a time when they are pressing their offensive in other parts of the country. The State Department’s statement is significant on another count. The Mujahidin under the influence and leadership of the Jamaat-i-Islami are the most ideologically committed among the guerrillas. If they can be persuaded to fall in line, Pakistan would have no great difficulty in dealing with the other groups who in any case are not as well armed and financed as the followers of the Jamaat who have received special treatment at the hands of the Zia regime in view of its own Islamic orientation and its affiliation with the Pakistani Jamaat-i-Islami.
Pakistan’s calculations and motivations are in a sense obvious. Islamabad has apparently come to terms with the reality that it is just not possible to force Soviet troops out of Afghanistan and that if they leave at all, they will do so under a negotiated agreement which leaves in Kabul a regime acceptable to Moscow. It also appears to have been convinced that continued fighting between the Soviet and Soviet-backed Afghan forces and the guerrillas can only lead to the flight of more and more refugees into Pakistan and thereby create serious short-term as well as long-term problems for it. Islamabad would understandably want Afghan refugees now said to number around three million to go back to their country because their continued presence can in the long run strengthen the demand for Pushtoonistan among its own people. Having persuaded the Reagan administration to sell it highly sophisticated military equipment, including upgraded F-16s,the Zia set has good reason to try to ease tensions on its western/border. But there is a catch in this plan. The Kremlin cannot afford to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan so long as it is not assured that the pro-Soviet regime can survive more or less on its own strength and it may be a long time before it is so assured. The set-up in Kabul has a pretty narrow social base and can be overwhelmed by hostile forces within Afghanistan without much external support. It is difficult to say how the Soviets propose to cope with this problem in case they seriously intend to withdraw their forces even if gradually. It is equally difficult to say whether Washington has endorsed, or is at least willing to acquiesce in, Pakistan’s approach. A refusal on its part to do so can only strengthen Soviet reluctance to leave Afghanistan.