In deciding to ignore Congress on the question of the sale of upgraded F-16s to Pakistan, the US administration has demonstrated that it is prepared to go out of its way to accommodate the Zia regime. The reasons for it are obvious enough. Pakistan figures prominently in America’s strategic design in the region and Washington has convinced itself that Islamabad will play the role it has been assigned only so long as General Zia-ul-Haq or some other general is in power there and that a return to a democratic set-up will create complications for it. The Pakistani generals are aware of this reality and that is why they were able to insist that the agreement on the sale of F-16s be revised to provide for the kind of sophisticated avionics which F-16s for Israel carry. Pakistan provides thousands of well-trained military personnel to various Gulf countries. Their role in Saudi Arabia is particularly significant. Though neither Riyadh nor Islamabad is willing to provide the details, it is widely believed that about 15,000 Pakistani troops are deployed in Saudi Arabia. Six thousand men are reported to have been sent there only a couple of months ago. As is only too well known, the Reagan administration has been particularly concerned that pro-western regimes in the Gulf, particularly the one in Saudi Arabia which contains the largest oil reserves, are not destabilized or overthrown as a result of upsurge of radicalism there. And it is willing to pay the price Pakistan demands for its support to these regimes.
But it does not follow either that there is a convergence of interests between the United States and Pakistan or that the former has no reservation about the policies the latter is pursuing. Afghanistan is clearly one issue in respect of which differences have developed between the two governments. Pakistan still serves as a conduit for the supply of arms to the Mujahideen. But it does so on a fairly controlled basis so that it does not attract too much Soviet displeasure. Equally importantly, the Zia regime makes no secret of its search for an agreement with the Soviet Union which can enable the refugees to go back to Afghanistan. Surely the US authorities who wish to raise for the Soviets the cost of their military presence in Afghanistan cannot be happy with this approach. Indeed, they may even be apprehensive that Islamabad may conclude an agreement with Moscow which will amount to what they call a sell-out. There also exist sharp differences between the two governments on Pakistan’s attempt to develop the capability to make nuclear weapons. Washington claims to be in possession of incontrovertible evidence which shows not only that Pakistan is attempting to go nuclear but also that it is receiving valuable assistance from China. This is a matter of the gravest concern for the Americans not so much because a Pakistani bomb may lead to an Indian bomb, as because they cannot be sure whether Pakistan will not make nuclear weapons available to a friendly Arab country such as Saudi Arabia. It is difficult to say what the Americans propose to do either in respect of Pakistan’s Afghanistan policy or its bid to manufacture nuclear weapons. But it is obvious that for the moment they consider Pakistan’s role in south-west Asia important enough to justify their indulgence towards it for the supply of highly sophisticated weapons.