Some western newspapers have carried reports to the effect that a new consensus may emerge among top Chinese leaders favouring a tough stance towards the United States. These reports suggest that following criticism of his previous pro US stand by, among others, Mr. Hu Yaobang, the party’s general secretary, Mr. Deng Xiaoping has agreed to reassess the entire relationship later this year. The Guardian, London, quotes a Chinese foreign policy specialist as having said “Sino-American relations are at a crossroads. The pile-up of problems – arms sales to Taiwan, textile disputes, broken promises on technology transfer, arguments about trade and commercial questions have people in the leadership asking whether it is even worthwhile to try to solve them all, or whether it might not be better just to rewrite our foreign policy without the United States”.
In view of the secrecy that generally surrounds debates in China, it is difficult to vouch for the accuracy of these reports. But there can be little doubt that the Chinese leaders have reasons to be unhappy over the US response to their concerns. Indeed, they have made no secret of their annoyance since the patch up on the question of US arms sales to Taiwan last year. As such it stands to reason that they should wish to reassess their relations with America. The key question, however, is not whether they are angry with Washington which they are, but whether they have much room for manoeuvre in the existing world situation. This does not necessarily rule out a dramatic shift in their policy. They have made such shifts in the past – in the ‘sixties, for instance, when Mao first launched an anti-Soviet campaign and then initiated moves which led to the normalization of relations with the United States not so much in response to their country’s foreign policy requirements as in response to the compulsions of domestic power struggles. Mao, as is well known, was facing tough opposition to his economic policies in the late ‘fifties when he laid the groundwork or a full fledged ideological assault on the Soviet Union. Even so, the discussion on the options open to the Chinese has to proceed on the basis of the existing world situation.
China is seeking to improve its relations with the Soviet Union and is likely to continue to do so. But it cannot make common cause with Moscow against Washington unless it is willing to review its entire south-east Asia policy and accept Vietnam as a major regional power. This Beijing is not likely to do. Even otherwise, there is no basis for a Sino-Soviet strategic consensus which can enable it to adopt a tough stance towards the United States on a long-term basis. In fact, a deterioration in Sino-US relations beyond a point will seriously weaken China’s bargaining position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Unlike India, China has not so far accepted the self-evident proposition that in a world dominated by two super-powers, a country not aligned with either must maintain reasonable relations with both in its best interests. Instead it has acted on the assumption that it can shift the power balance or, more accurately, redress a power imbalance by moving towards one super-power or the other. This assumption has turned out to be false. One wonders whether the Chinese leaders know this to be the case or still suffer from the illusion that they hold the balance and can tilt it either way. On the answer to this question depends partly the answer to the question whether they will wish once again to make a dramatic change in their foreign policy.