There can now be no doubt that Pakistan faces a major crisis. We may indeed be witnessing the beginning of its disintegration for the second time. Any number of Pakistani leaders have predicted this dire consequence for the “land of the pure” in case the people in Punjab do not join in large enough numbers the current agitation for the restoration of democracy. For the people in Sind, already driven to desperation, are bound to find the slogan of Sindhi nationalism particularly attractive if they feel let down and isolated.
It can legitimately be argued that Pakistan’s crisis (as in 1971, leading to the emergence of Bangladesh as a sovereign republic) is the result of the manner in which its ruling military-bureaucratic elite has managed its affairs. There is merit in this proposition. If General Zia-ul-Haq was as clever as he thinks he is, he would have looked for a political solution long before the present explosion of popular resentment, especially in Sind.
But if Sindhi nationalism becomes a fact to reckon with, it will also demonstrate (as in 1971) that Islam cannot serve as the basis of Pakistani nationalism even within the present much-shrunken Pakistan. This need not surprise any serious student of contemporary affairs. After all, Pakistan itself has broken up once before and Arab-Muslim nations have failed to come together in the face of repeated Israeli aggression and expansion.
This much would be common ground among most Indians. Even “Friends of Pakistan” would find it hard to argue that the people that country are inspired by a vibrant nationalism. But it is about time we widened the scope of the discussion and raised the issue whether religion, any religion, can serve as the basis of nationalism.
Two Nation Theory
Before partition, not many non-Muslims bought Mr. Jinnah’s two nation theory. In fact it is doubtful whether he himself was fully convinced of the validity of his brief (he was a lawyer to the tip of his toe). But after partition, many of us bought it, even if unwittingly. For while some Indians have espoused the cause of what they call Hindu nationalism, many more have behaved as if Pakistan had come to stay not only as a state but also as a viable national entity with a distinct identity of its own.
This latter belief was inevitably shaken in 1971 when, following a popular uprising, East Bengal broke away from Pakistan. There were of course, some Indians who felt that an independent Bangladesh was New Delhi’s handiwork. But essentially their contention amounted only to saying that, without India’s assistance, the people of Bangladesh would not have prevailed over the coercive apparatus of the Pakistani state. The fact of the near total alienation of the people there from Islamabad could not be in question. Nor could the fact of their feeling that they were a distinct linguistic-cultural entity entitled to a considerable measure of autonomy within Pakistan if possible and to independence without it if accommodation was not possible.
It is still more interesting that even after the rise of Bangladesh as an independent country on the basis of a nationalism founded on language and a culture rooted in that language, a number of Indians held strongly that the remaining Pakistan would prove far more cohesive. Apparently, they calculated that the Pakistani ruling elite would learn the necessary lesson from the bitter experience of Bangladesh and would seek to accommodate the aspiration of linguistic-cultural minorities (Sindhis, Baluchis and Pathans) and allow the democratic process to function. But at the heart of their conviction regarding the viability of the remaining Pakistan lay the belief that the concept of Islamic nationalism would work there. This assumption is now open to question.
To avoid unnecessary confusion, I may add that this is not an argument against partition. The emotions of Indian Muslims throughout the land had been whipped to such a pitch by 1946 that partition had become unavoidable. And if, by some mischance, some scheme had been concocted to avoid that disaster, as Gandhiji tried desperately to do, the result in all probability would have been a worse disaster – a civil war accompanied by the consolidation of two irrevocably hostile communal blocs. The cry of “Islam in danger” could not have been defeated in a so-called united India.
Internal Contradictions
The Pakistani rulers, of course, tried to use this slogan after independence as well. In this effort they were greatly assisted by the dispute over Jammu and Kashmir. But they could not succeed for this simple reason that once Pakistan had come into existence, its internal contradictions were bound to come into play sooner or later. As it happened, they became obvious soon enough. By 1948, the people in East Pakistan had come out in opposition to the ruling elite’s programme of imposing Urdu on them.
These contradictions could perhaps have been pushed into the background if the Indian state had proved either too weak to resist the attempt to grab Jammu and Kashmir or otherwise too wobbly. It was a stroke of genius on Mr. Jinnah’s part to unleash Pathan marauders in Jammu and Kashmir. Only, the Indian leadership acted in a manner which he had not anticipated because it was so uncharacteristic of it. It decided to resist. By the logic of its earlier performance, it should have offered to “negotiate” with Mr. Jinnah.
Incidentally, General Ayub Khan fell into a similar trap of his own making in 1965. Like Mr. Jinnah, he too tried to grab Jammu and Kashmir. Like Mr. Jinnah, he too had a surprise in store for him. Indeed, “little” Lal Bahadur Shastri’s response was even more daring than Mr. Nehru’s. He ordered his troops to march into Punjab. But in one basic respect General Ayub Khan’s calculation was as sound as Mr. Jinnah’s. If he had succeeded in seizing Jammu and Kashmir, and thereby in demonstrating that India was a sick giant ready to fall apart, he would have given Pakistan a new elan and a fresh lease of life. Failure led to the opposite result – the break-up of Pakistan six years later.
Interested individuals can read this as a disguised criticism of Islam. But that will be misplaced. My contention is not just that only Ghazi Islam rooted in the concept of jihad (holy war against infidels) – and not Islam qua Islam – can be cast in a political role, but that this is true of all religions. The faithful must not only feel threatened by the followers of another religion, but must also be confident of victory. This may be especially true of Islam, if it is in fact the case, as Western scholars hold, that Muslims regarded their early victories as conclusive evidence of Allah’s partisanship for them. But it is true of all religions in varying degrees.
Resurgence of Faith
Israel clinches the issue. It would have been reduced to an insignificant state if the Arabs had either not challenged it – in 1948, 1967 and 1973 – or had defeated it. By challenging it, they helped emphasise its religious character, and by falling to beat it, they strengthened the conviction of the Israelis and their Zionist supporters that they were indeed Yahweh’s chosen people.
Mercifully for us, a sufficiently large number of Indians have not bought the concept of Hindu nationalism. Perhaps Hinduism is too loosely structured, if it can be said to possess a structure at all, to fill such a bill. Perhaps the Hindus are too tolerant a people to look for a permanent enemy in another faith. Perhaps the divisions among them along caste and language lines are too deep-rooted to be erased. Whatever the reason, the result has helped us to avoid a dangerous pitfall.
A bit of theory may be pertinent here. Nationalism calls for the erosion, however steady and gradual, of old loyalties and their replacement by new ones. And these loyalties call for the replacement of old primordial symbols from the world of religion and ethnicity by new ones such as equality, liberty and fraternity. A political community can, and in fact must, in order to be viable, embody these new symbols; a religious community just cannot. Its roots are different. They are located in heaven and not on Mother Earth.
The issue is not whether or not nationalism is desirable, but whether it can be rooted in religion. The answer must be in the negative. All nationalisms are by definition secular. Their concerns are secular and their means of achieving their goals are secular.
Since World War I and especially since the rise of Nazism in Germany in the thirties, some of the most outstanding intellectuals have decried nationalism as one of the principal sources of tension and conflict in our age. This concern has greatly increased on account of the arrival of nuclear weapons which can destroy all life on earth. As a reaction, there has been a resurgence of faith all over the world. Man feels forlorn and desolate without the protection of relations. But despite all talk to the contrary, nationalism remains the dominant political force in our world and it is not likely to lose its importance. Religion, if properly utilized, can reinforce a particular nationalism. It cannot substitute for it.
The Times of India, 21 September 1983