It is truly extraordinary that Mrs. Gandhi should have sent a letter to Mr. Andropov through a CPI leader, Mr. Yogendra Sharma. Indeed, if Mr. Sharma had not personally confirmed that he had carried such a letter, we would have found a report to that effect incredible. It can be argued in Mrs. Gandhi’s favour that she did not write in her capacity as Prime Minister to Mr. Andropov in his capacity as president of the Soviet Union. The point is well taken, but only on a superficial view. For if Mrs. Gandhi wrote as president of the Congress (I) to Mr. Andropov as secretary-general of the Soviet Communist Party, the assumption on her part would be that there is a “fraternal” relationship between the two parties. As far as the country knows, no such relationship exists or has ever existed between the CPSU and the Congress. In fact, none can exist so long as the Congress (I) remains the nationalist organisation it is and does not seek to replace the CPI as an advocate of “proletarian internationalism”. So we are back to square one. In what capacity did Mrs. Gandhi write to Mr. Andropov?
If we assume for the sake of argument that Mrs. Gandhi acted as president of the Congress (I), we are face to face with a number of other questions. Why did she choose an active communist leader to act as her courier? How could he feel free to disclose the contents of the letter to the so-called foreign desk of the CPI? Possible answers to these questions would suggest that Mrs. Gandhi, or someone else on her behalf, was in touch with Mr. Sharma who has been pressing within the CPI a policy line favourable to her, that the letter was in all probability intended to strengthen his position in his party, even if it was not written at his own suggestion, and that he was allowed to show it to his party-men precisely for that reason. By this reckoning, Mr. Sharma was more than a courier. He was the Congress (I) president’s representative to Mr Andropov. It will be interesting to find out whether the Soviet leader in fact received Mr. Sharma, or whether Mr. Sharma as Mrs. Gandhi’s representative had to content himself with discussions with some academicians. And who advised Mrs. Gandhi to act in this manner?
But let us push these issues, however important, aside for the time being and pose two central questions. Does Mrs. Gandhi seriously believe that the Soviet leadership will wish and is in a position to order the CPI to follow a line convenient to her? And why is she so exercised over the CPI’s stand? The answer to the first question must obviously be in the affirmative. Why else would she have written to Mr. Andropov? But having earlier failed to convert Mr. Brezhnev to the desirability and possibility of such an intervention on his part, she had to have special reasons to convince herself that Mr. Andropov would both be more forthcoming (obliging) and effective. An awareness of possible Soviet calculations and developments within what is left of the world communist movement would have left her in little doubt that such a conclusion was unwarranted. Like other powers, the Soviets have begun to think of post-Indira India. In that India, a left front with the two communist parties in it can be useful to them. Mr. Andropov does not have the necessary authority to order the CPI or any other party, even if he was so inclined. The CPI can agree to fall in line only if it is willing to sever ties with the CPM – ties it has developed with considerable effort and without which its very survival could be in jeopardy. More arguments can be adduced to show that Mrs. Gandhi was ill-advised to approach Mr. Andropov. But that might not be necessary.
This leaves us with the second and in a sense the more important question. Unfortunately, the answer is difficult to find. The CPI is a small formation, to use currently fashionable Marxist jargon. It does not have at its disposal many battalions (safe constituencies), not to speak of divisions (states or regions where it is a dominant force). In fact, that is the main reason why it has accepted what in effect amounts to junior partnership with the CPM. So it cannot be of much use to Mrs. Gandhi in electoral terms, which consideration is supposed to dominate her thinking these days. In any case, the CPI can be an asset of whatever size to her only if she is thinking of a possible alliance, or at least an electoral understanding, with it. Is she, considering that the cost can be quite unacceptable? Why then the concern? Perhaps Mrs. Gandhi values the leftist image more than it is justified by the country’s political realities. This is a weak answer. But a more convincing one is elusive.