It is open to question whether, despite their best efforts, opposition parties will succeed in putting Centre-state relations among the top items on the country’s political agenda. For one thing, the issue appears to be too abstract to arouse popular passions. For another, it is not easy to offer a solution which can meet the nation’s contradictory needs.
The white paper issued recently by the Karnataka state government on the office of governor illustrates the second point. While it leaves little room for doubt that this office has been abused in the interest of the ruling party at the Centre, it does not even attempt to suggest a solution.
As far as the people, including most members of the articulate intelligentsia, are concerned, the issue has been confused because true to our Indian tradition the discussion has been conducted by and large in terms of abstract principles. Thus it has been made to appear that the question in debate is whether a governor should function essentially or primarily as a representative of the Centre or as the head of the state administration. And so has arisen the cliché that a governor wears two hats.
Like all clichés, this one confuses the reality. The source of the trouble is the blurring of the distinction between the Centre (President in the language of the constitution) and the Union government on the one hand and between the Union government and the ruling party on the other. The Centre must clearly stand for the Indian state which is an on-going entity and of which the Union government of the time is an agent. The distinction is not easy to draw in a new democracy such as ours but it is an important one. It follows that in its dealings with state governments, the Union government should be guided by its appreciation of the interests of the Indian state and not of the party or parties which it represents.
Partisan Governors
The difficulty in our case, as it emerges clearly from the instances cited in the Karnataka white paper, is that quite often the Union government has been guided by wholly partisan considerations and that the governors in question have acted not as representatives of the Centre but virtually as functionaries of the ruling party.
Dr. JR Siwach more or less clinches the issue in his book Politics Of President’s Rule in India (Indian Institute of Advanced Studies, Simla). Two of the points he makes deserve special attention.
First, whenever a Congress government, or a government supported by it from outside, or a government in which it was a major partner, has fallen or has been about to fall, the assemblies, instead of being suspended, have been dissolved either under article 174(2) (b) as in Travancore-Cochin (1954), Kerala (1970), West Bengal and Bihar (1971), or under article 356 as in Andhra (1954), Pondicherry (1968), West Bengal (1968 and 1971), Manipur (1969) and Orissa (1973) unless this (collapse of government) happened soon after elections as in Haryana, UP and Madhya Pradesh (1967) and Bihar (1969). In none of the cases in the first category were opposition parties given an opportunity to try and form government.
Secondly, whenever a recommendation for dissolution under article 174(2) or under article 356 was made by a non-Congress outgoing chief minister or a non-Congress chief minister having a doubtful majority, it was rejected in all cases where the Congress was keen on forming the government. Mr. Siwach cites the examples of Rao Birendra Singh in Haryana and Sardar Gurnam Singh in Punjab (1%7), Mr. Charan Singh in UP (1968), Mr. Bhola Paswan Shastri in Bihar (1968), Raja Naresh Singh in Madhya Pradesh (1969), Mr. Hitendra Desai in Gujarat and Mr. Karpoori Thakur in Bihar (1971).
Abuse Of Constitution
As if these examples of partisanship are not telling enough, the Karnataka white paper cites instances in which governors have recommended imposition and lifting of President’s rule to suit the convenience of the Congress party. These make quite an impressive indictment.
On March 12-13, 1967, Dr. Sampurnanand, governor of Rajasthan, recommended imposition of President’s rule after Mr. Mohanlal Sukhadia had expressed his inability to form a government. New Delhi, of course, “obliged”, knowing full well that the opposition parties claimed to be in a position to form a government and that they had been denied a chance. President’s rule was duly lifted on April when Mr. Sukhadia had bought (not to put too fine a point on it) the necessary support. He was sworn in as chief minister, on that date.
As governor of Bihar, Mr. Nityanand Kanungo recommended extension of President’s rule for another six months on February 17, 1970, and reversed his recommendations three days later. He was aware that the support claimed by Mr. Daroga Prasad Rai was unstable and indeed indicated so in his report to the President. Yet he called upon Mr. Rai to form a government.
Mr. Gopala Reddy behaved in a similar manner in UP to form a government.
Believe it or not, this too is not the end of the story. Governors have recommended and the Centre has imposed President’s rule to give the Congress party time to resolve its internal feuds – Punjab (1951 and 1966), UP (1973 and 1975), Andhra Pradesh (1973), Gujarat (1974) and Orissa (1976).
The Karnataka white paper elaborates two of these cases. Mr. HN Bahuguna resigned as UP’s chief minister on November 9, 1975. On the governor’s recommendation, President’s rule was proclaimed on November 30. It was lifted on January 12, 1976, by which time Mrs. Gandhi or perhaps Mr. Sanjay Gandhi was able to decide on Mr. ND Tiwari as the successor. Similarly, Mrs. Nandini Satpathy resigned as chief minister of Orissa on December 16, 1976, apparently because she had lost the confidences of Mr. Sanjay Gandhi who was known to dislike all “leftists”. President’s rule was imposed because the Congress leadership was not able to make up its mind on the successor. It was lifted 13 days later when Mr. Binayak Acharya was sworn in as chief minister.
It is hardly necessary to say that these examples represent gross abuse of the constitutional provisions whereby the Centre can take over the administration of a state or states to tide over an emergency. The constitution provides for such a takeover when in the opinion of the governor the governance of the state can no longer be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the constitution. Whatever one’s view of the adequacy or inadequacy of these provisions, of the role of governors under them and of the proper relationship between the Centre and the states, no one can possibly accept as legitimate the use of emergency powers for covering up the failure of the ruling party’s leadership to manage its internal affairs.
It is not relevant for the purpose of the present discussion to say whether Mrs. Gandhi (or Mr. Sanjay Gandhi) should have decided to remove Mr. Bahuguna and Mrs. Satpathy from the offices of chief ministers of UP and Orissa. But surely she (or he) could have kept these decisions in abeyance so long as they had not selected the successors. It passes understanding why she (or he) did not do so. But the action speaks of a cavalier attitude to the requirements of the constitution. And the willingness of the governors in question to indulge in this kind of chicanery speaks, to put it rather plainly, of their lack of self-respect.
Finding Stable Base
There are, of course, contingencies which too literal an interpretation of the constitution on the basis of the text and what was said by its framers during the debates in the constituent assembly may not cover. Punjab is a case in point. The Darbara Singh ministry there had not lost the confidence of the legislature when it was dismissed and the state placed under President’s rule. Indeed, the opposition had not even tabled a no-confidence motion against it. Yet it cannot be argued that the Centre has abused its powers in this case. On the contrary, it would be a reasonable view that its continued failure to act would have meant an abdication of responsibility. But let us face another unpleasant truth which is that the Congress (I) government in New Delhi could act in this manner in Punjab without risking a public outcry precisely because the government in the state happened to be a Congress (I) one.
So where do we go from here? One can repeat suggestions which honourable and respected individuals have made in the past. They will, of course, be ignored as they have been so far. But equally pertinent is the fact that no one can possibly devise a constitutional scheme which can meet the country’s many complex and contradictory requirements. One can at best hope that the constitutional forms will be preserved so that the nation can bungle along till it finds a stable base on which its democratic institutions can rest. Much else beside the Centre-state relations is in disarray. Only the naïve can believe that neat solutions to our problems exist and can be implemented or enforced.
The Times of India, 12 October 1983