As the fourth round of border talks open between India and China in New Delhi today (October 24), it is possible to perceive a certain movement in Beijing’s foreign policy which may in the long run help the two countries reach a settlement on the border issue, and indeed, to achieve a measure of cordiality in their relations. In sum, it appears that, as in the domestic sphere, the present Chinese leaders have begun to display a greater sense of realism in their foreign policy than either they or their predecessors had done in the past.
It is obviously too early to say whether this realism will continue to prevail. For all we know, China may once again return to its old style whereby it made sudden and dramatic changes in its foreign policy. This danger should not be under-estimated because at the heart of it all lies the resolved contradiction between the demands of nationalism and the internationalist ideology of communism.
Two myths have dominated the thinking of most China watchers in the last three decades. First, it has been assumed that the Chinese have successfully Sinified Marxism-Leninism. Secondly, it has been taken for granted that they have harnessed the communist ideology to the cause of Chinese nationalism. Both these propositions need to be re-examined. In my view, they are wrong.
Mao Zedong, as is well known, appointed himself as a member of the communist pantheon. So the ideology was suitably rechristened as Marxism-Leninism-thought of Mao Zedong. He also introduced some “innovations” in communism such as the kangaroo courts, stoning to death of alleged counterrevolutionaries and certain forms of torture. And he tried to force the march of history when he launched the so-called “great leap forward” so that China could achieve in terms of economic development in a few years what other nations had taken centuries to achieve. But all this could not possibly be said to have led to a Sinification of Marxism-Leninism. Indeed, the doctrine is so alien to Chinese culture and personality that a reconciliation is just inconceivable.
Wrong Foreign Policy
This issue is, however, less pertinent for the purpose of the present discussion than the other one which is whether China has followed a foreign policy which can be called as being truly nationalistic, that is a foreign policy which has been designed specifically to promote the country’s best interests. My contention would be that it has not; additionally I would argue that the confusion has been the result of its ideological commitment.
Mao was, of course, a nationalist of a sort. He did not accept the Communist International’s (read Soviet) overlordship of the Chinese communist Party before the revolution and, like Tito, he did not allow Stalin to infiltrate and manipulate it after the revolution. But at least up to the time of the open break with the Soviet Union in the early sixties he saw China as part of the communist bloc led by Moscow and not as part of the third world struggling to achieve, preserve and expand its freedom in relation to the two superpowers. As such, he accepted, by implication if not by direct statement, for China a position subordinate to that of the Soviet Union.
A great deal can be said in defence of this stand. The US was hostile to communist China. It was supporting the KMT regime on Formosa. China needed Soviet assistance for its security as well as economic development. But Mr. Nehru could have justified India’s alliance with the United States on similar grounds, especially after the Chinese occupation of Tibet. But he did not. On the contrary, he decided to fight US attempts to establish bases around the Soviet Union and China. The reason was simple. Mr. Nehru was a nationalist. If Mao was also one in the same sense, he too would have reacted in a similar way. After all, like other western nations, the Soviet Union was also an imperial power.
It can be argued that Mao expected to share with the Soviet Union leadership of the communist movement. He must have been very naive indeed if he in fact nursed such a hope. Great nations do not share leadership with others. His own experience with the Comintern and Stalin should have convinced him that the Kremlin would never concede equality to China, not to speak of sharing leadership with it. He, of course, tried after the death of Stalin. The result was the break between the two countries.
In the ’sixties China swung to the other extreme. It tried to split communist parties and to take over the leadership of the breakaway factions and it decided to open a dialogue with the United States. But to what end? Obviously to weaken the Soviet Union and reduce its influence? But was it not a case of going from one extreme (symbolized by two slogans “Learn from the Soviet Union” and “A third road does not exist”) to the other (“Soviet hegemonism is the greatest threat to world peace”)? Was it also not an expression of the weakness of Chinese nationalism?
Seeking Protectors
This assessment runs counter to the almost universal view of communist China and the Chinese people. The assumption has been that, like imperial China, communist China has also seen itself as the “middle kingdom” and that the Chinese are a very proud people. The second proposition need not concern us here. As for the first, the “middle kingdom” complex was not much in evidence in China’s relations with the Soviet Union up to the time of the break. Moreover, it cannot possibly be equated with nationalism. A proud people under a proud leadership do not look for protectors. China under Mao did; India under Mr. Nehru did not, not even after the Chinese attack in 1962.
In opposition to this assessment, it can be argued that Chinese nationalism has come into play in determining Beijing’s policies towards the sub-continent and southeast Asia. But it is a perverted kind of nationalism. China has not gained anything as a result of its hostility towards India and Vietnam. If anything, it has obliged both New Delhi and Hanoi to develop and maintain specially close relations with the Soviet Union.
Nationalism is not chauvinism, particularly in our era, the principal feature of which is the attempt by the two superpowers to dominate the world. As India at the time of its independence in 1947, so China at the time of the revolution in 1949 had to define its place in a world sought to be dominated by the US and the USSR. Mr. Nehru assessed the world scene and decided that India could best promote its own independence and the independence of other Afro-Asian nations by staying out of the cold war. This was anti-imperialism of the kind appropriate to the post-war would. Mao, on the other hand, decided to join the Soviet bloc. He apparently could not even grasp the fact that a third road existed. Clearly he saw the worldwide struggle as being between communism and imperialism and not between nationalism and imperialism of different varieties. He under-estimated the power of nationalism and he was, perhaps unwittingly, willing to subordinate Chinese nationalism to Soviet policy, if not interests.
Chinese nationalism could, of course, not be denied. At the conscious level, Mao was not even wanting to deny it. So it asserted itself but it did so in a distorted form. It could not be otherwise as any student of psychology would know. So Mao first tried to make Soviet power sub-serve Chinese ends. And when he failed, as he was bound to, he unleashed a campaign against the Soviet Union and those of his colleagues whom he suspected of being favourably disposed towards Moscow or being critical of his anti-Sovietism and utopianism (the so-called cultural revolution) and then he turned to the United States for support against ‘Soviet hegemonism”.
Self-definition Of Role
History would have taken a very different and a much happier turn if China had opted for non-alignment in 1949 which is what a truly nationalist leadership of China would have done. Something like that appears to be taking place now. China is keen to maintain good relations with the United States but it is showing interest in improved ties with the Soviet Union. Beijing has called off the meaningless ideological feud with Moscow and is trying to work out other mutually acceptable and advantageous arrangements. It would be idle to debate whether or not this amounts to a policy of non-alignment. The significant fact is that for the first time since the revolution in 1949, China may be seeking something like a balanced relationship with the two superpowers.
One can call it pragmatism and explain it in terms of China’s disillusionment with the United States on the issues of arms supplies to Formosa, transfer of technology and so on. But it is possible that the confusion that crept into China’s foreign policy in 1949 with Mao’s statement that “a third road does not exist” and has persisted ever since in one form or another may be ending. One cannot be sure. But the pointers are hopeful. To put it in a nutshell, it does appear that China is beginning to see itself as a developing country and not a great revolutionary power mandated by heaven to usher in socialism. This issue of self-definition of itself by China has been and remains a critical issue.
As any student of Sino-Indian relations will know, India got caught in two sets of cross-fires – China’s conflict with the Soviet Union on a host of issues and the internal power struggle in Beijing following the failure of the “great leap forward” strategy. This is not to suggest that a border dispute between the two countries could not have arisen independently of these developments. It could have, once the Chinese had moved into Tibet and had decided to build the Sinkiang-Lhasa highway. But in all probability it would not have assumed such a virulent form.
It would be wonderful if the Sino-Indian border issue could be delinked from the Sino-Soviet dispute. But that does not look possible. The resolution of the dispute has come to depend on reasonable Sino-Soviet relations which mercifully have begun to appear possible.
As for the internal power struggle, Mao is dead and the “gang of four” is in jail. But we do not know who in the present leadership took what position towards the Soviet Union and India in the past and who has modified his position and how. So we have to be cautious as we explore the possibility of normal relations with China. “Nationalist” China will also pose problems for us. But we can cross that bridge only when we come to it.
The Times of India, 24 October 1983