We have reason to be grateful to the US vice-president, Mr. George Bush. He has spared us promises the Reagan administration has no intention to live up to. He has, for instance, not said that it would cut off military assistance to Pakistan in case Islamabad acquires nuclear weapons. All that he has allowed himself to do is to restate the familiar position which is that the United States holds strong views on non-proliferation and that these views have been communicated to Pakistan. Similarly, he has not held out the assurance that his country will do all in its power to see to it that Pakistan does not use weapons supplied by it against India. Indeed, he has seen it fit to draw attention to the fact that this country too is purchasing weapons and that it too cannot give an assurance that these weapons will be used only against a specific power. This is an absurd comparison and it would be extraordinary if Mr. Bush does not know this to be so. For while the US case for supplying sophisticated military hardware to Islamabad is that a threat to Pakistan’s security has arisen as a result of the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, India’s case for acquiring comparable weapons system is that it has to match Pakistan’s and to an extent China’s military strength lest they are tempted to attack it once again. But the absurdity of the comparison is less pertinent than the fact that Mr. Bush should have made it. That further underscores the importance the Reagan administration attaches to its relations with Pakistan.
At the start of his visit to New Delhi last Saturday, Mr. Bush, however, made a statement which too he should have spared us. The United States, he said, recognised India as “a major, pivotal power.” The key word is not major but pivotal. For while recognition of India’s status as a major power is only a statement of fact, the use of the term pivotal must raise the question: pivotal to what and for whom? If the United States recognised India as a pivotal power even only in South Asia, Washington would feel obliged to engage in meaningful discussions with New Delhi in respect of its own policies towards countries in the region. Washington has shown no such consideration to New Delhi. The implication is obvious. America does not regard India as a pivotal power in this part of the world. This is understandable in view of this country’s steadfast refusal to subordinate its independence to the US anti-Soviet crusade, in other words, its refusal to be a “pivotal power” in this region. But why then the rhetoric. Perhaps that is part of the American personality. Perhaps we have been mistaken in taking such rhetoric seriously. Indeed, that spotlights another problem in Indo-US relations – the Indian search for US recognition of its status as if someone else can confer a particular status on a country.