Most of us in India use words rather carelessly or imitatively. So it is possible that the use of the concept of “sub-nationalism” in relation to the Sikh community which has begun to surface in the writings of some individuals in the columns of some newspapers belongs to this category.
A reference to history would suggest that this could well be the case. In the forties and fifties communist intellectuals and leaders spoke of many nationalities in India just because their Soviet mentors had talked of the nationalities question in the Soviet Union. There was hardly an educated leftist in India in that period who had not read, indeed memorised, Stalin’s little book on the subject.
And since not many of them had cared to familiarise themselves either with the brutal manner in which Stalin had dealt with fellow communists in Georgia (he was himself a Georgian) just because they had shown some weakness for a measure of autonomy, or with the tight grip the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) maintained on all republics, or with the deliberate policy of Russianisation which involved the settling down of millions of Great Russians in other republics and the compulsory introduction of the Russian language as the medium of instruction in all schools and colleges, they had no great difficulty in recommending the “right to self-determination” for Indian nationalities of their imagination.
The Sub-Nation
The communist formulation was based on consideration of language and culture, not of religion, though through a tortuous process of reasoning the CPI was able to lend support to the Muslim League’s demand for Pakistan. The proponents of Sikh “sub-nationalism” have not gone that far – at least not yet. Even so it may be useful to find out what precisely they have in mind and why they prefer to call the Sikhs a “sub-nation” instead of the far more familiar “community”.
The Webster third new international dictionary defines a sub-nation as “a sub-division of a nation often distinguished by community of culture and interests rather than by administrative dependency.” The Sikhs can be said to possess a distinct culture but not a “community of interests” different from those of fellow citizens in Punjab where they constitute a small majority and in other parts of the country where they are a small minority. The issue is,. however, not of the dictionary meaning of the term. It is one of popular usage. And in popular usage “sub-nation” is a polite euphemism for “nation” and its use is one step away from endorsement of the “right to self-determination” also a euphemism for the right to secede.
Putting this aside, however, it cannot be seriously denied that despite the intra-community conflicts of interests and even of personality say between Jat Sikhs and Mazhabi Sikhs in rural Punjab and between Jat Sikhs and Bhanas and Ramgarhias in urban centres, the Sikhs have come to possess a strong sense of identity. This would be common ground among most Indians regardless of whether they support or oppose the government’s recent action in ordering the army to flush out terrorists from the Golden Temple in Amritsar and other gurdwaras elsewhere.
On a careful consideration it would also be generally agreed that this strong sense of identity has been responsible for the widespread, though in objective terms wholly unjustified, feeling of discrimination among the community. And it alone could have brought together the four factors which, according to the white paper on Punjab, “combined to produce a complex web of violence and terror that threatened to undermine the social, political and economic stability not only of Punjab but the whole country.”
The white paper lists the four factors as: the agitations launched by the Shiromani Akali Dal in support of certain demands; a stridently communal and extremist movement which openly sanctioned violence; secessionist and anti-national activities with the declared objective of establishing an independent state for the Sikhs with external support; and criminals, smugglers, other antisocial elements and Naxalites who took advantage of the situation.
The authors of the white paper have dealt with this problem as if it was a sheer accident that the four factors got fused together to produce the upheaval we have gone through. There was an element of the accidental in the whole ugly business. The rise of Bhindranwale, for instance, with the active help for quite some years of prominent Congress leaders and the pusillanimity of the Punjab government in dealing with him when he was charged with being involved in the murder of Lala Jagat Narain in September 1981. But the accidental element could not have assumed the sinister importance it did if self-awareness among the Sikhs had not become as strong as it had. Indeed, the government would not have cowered the way it did before Bhindranwale if it was not afraid that it would hurt the susceptibilities of a significant section of the community if it allowed law to take its own course in this case.
Accidental Element
The government’s critics have not allowed for this concern on its part and have concentrated on its failure to do its duty and the Congress leaders’ support to Bhindranwale. This is a lopsided view of a complex problem. But that aspect of the matter need not concern us right now. It is more important for us to try and determine, if we can, the relative importance of the Sikh self-awareness and the accidental rise of Bhindranwale in setting into motion the disastrous course of events in Punjab.
While the ideologically inclined will inevitably attach far greater importance to the strong sense of identity among the Sikhs, the pragmatists will emphasise the role of the accidental element in the situation. On the face of it at least, a stronger case can be made in favour of the latter for the good and simple reason that three of the four factors cited in the white paper could have been brought together only by the accidental third – a stridently communal and extremist movement headed by Bhindranwale which openly preached violence.
The Akali Dal has never distinguished between religion and politics since its birth in 1920; it has conducted a number of agitations since independence; as in the past its present “morchas” would have ended in some kind of compromise if its leaders had not become prisoners of the extremists. Some Sikhs abroad and at home have talked of Khalistan for decades. As in the past, their talk would have petered out if it had not received sustenance from Bhindranwale and his gang. Criminals, smugglers and Naxalites too had operated in Punjab for years as in other parts of the country. Some kind of nexus had been established between smugglers and the Akalis as it had been between smugglers and other political parties, including the ruling Congress. But antisocial elements could not have threatened the stability of Punjab if Bhindranwale was not there to take them under his wings.
Modernisation Process
All this cannot come as a surprise to any serious student of problems of modernisation in developing societies. He would be sensitive to certain points. That while the modernisation process generates enormous tensions, these tensions do not explode on their own. That it takes a powerful personality to produce the explosion. That a properly managed administration can frustrate him and thus buy the necessary time in which it can attend to the long-term problems. Such administrative machinery, as the Union government itself has acknowledged, just did not exist in Punjab.
It would be a case of wisdom by hindsight if we were to claim that we were aware of the potential magnitude of the problem in Punjab before it blew up in our face in full fury early this year. We were sensitive to the existence of the four factors. But like others we too tended to treat them as if they operated independently of one another. Even so we have for long been emphasising the perils of the erosion of the machinery and authority of the state precisely because we recognised that tensions which are unavoidable in a rapidly changing society would tear the country apart if a state capable of holding them down did not exist. We adhere to this view which means that in our opinion the future course of events in Punjab would hinge more on the effectiveness of the state machinery than on the strength of self-awareness and the sense of grievance among the Sikhs.
The issues raised by the tragedy in Punjab, it need hardly be said, are extremely complex and we shall have to return to them again and again. Just now we might add that in a functioning democracy such as ours the sense of identity in a community is strongest where it is threatened by forces of change within and without. These forces are at work among the Sikhs in a big way. Or else the Sikhs would not have been the successful community they are in so many walks of life. By the same token extremism is a reaction to the powerful process of secularisation and integration with the rest of the society. In such a contest, the former might appear formidable in the short run but the latter has a better chance of winning in the long run provided the state holds and is able to manage the disruption which modernisation inevitably produces in the early stages.
The Times of India, 18 July 1984