Any discussion of America’s South Asia policy must of necessity begin with Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in December, 1979. For it is open to question whether even the right wing and avowedly anti-Soviet Reagan administration would otherwise have decided to rearm Pakistan in disregard of India’s protests.
We in India have tended to take the view that Pakistan occupies a central place not only in America’s fight against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan but also in its larger plans for the Gulf. We have, therefore, concluded that the US would have rearmed Pakistan even if the Soviets had not moved into Afghanistan.
We have also argued that Soviet intervention in Afghanistan took place in the context of the US decision to establish a rapid deployment force for use in the Gulf, upgrade facilities at Diego Garcia and acquire bases in the India Ocean region – Kenya, Somalia and Oman – and of the possibility then that it might occupy southern Iran. We have, therefore, by and large drawn the inference that the Soviet action in Afghanistan was essentially defensive.
There is clearly merit in both these propositions which reasonably well-informed Americans do not dispute, though they point out, quite legitimately, that our first proposition ignores the ties between Pakistan and Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and Oman and the possibility that Islamabad would have sent its military personnel there in exchange for financial support even if the United States was not pursuing an activist policy in the region and had therefore not undertaken to rearm Pakistan. But the pertinent fact is that it is impossible to meet an American interested in foreign policy issues who is prepared to accept continuing Soviet presence in Afghanistan.
Shock To Psyche
As is the American style, the case against Soviet presence in Afghanistan is presented in moral terms. The Soviets, according to them, are guilty not only of occupying a sovereign and neutral country which has done them no harm but also committing a virtual genocide in that they bomb civilian targets and have driven out over four million Afghans – three million into Pakistan and around one million into Iran. American interlocutors are, of course, not willing to remember that the United States was guilty of similar crimes in Vietnam. And they are hard put to it to defend their charge of expansionism against the Soviet Union on account of its intervention in Afghanistan. But all that is immaterial and is quickly put aside so that the point can be made that India should use whatever influence it commands in the Kremlin to persuade it to withdraw its troops in Afghanistan.
American are united on the issue of Afghanistan as they are in their support for Deng Xiaoping’s China. This is best illustrated by the fact that liberal Democrats joined with rightwing Republicans in Congress to allocate $250 million for the CIA’s programme of support for the mujahidin and other covert measures while the administration had asked for less than one-half of the amount. Selig Harrison, who continues to argue that there can be no military solution to the Afghanistan problem and to favour a negotiated settlement, is reduced to a voice in the wilderness.
We in India can doubtless continue to criticize the Americans for their cold war and militaristic approach towards Afghanistan. But it is at least equally important to try and find out why the Americans are reacting the way they are.
To begin with, we should recognise that the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was as big a shock to the American psyche as the North Korean invasion of South Korea in 1950 and the Soviet decision to provide arms to Egypt and Cuba in the fifties and then to Somalia and Ethiopia in the sixties and seventies. Also we cannot realize the nature and magnitude of these shocks unless we recall that soon after the end of World War II, the Americans had drawn around the then Soviet bloc a line on the map which the Soviets were not to be allowed to cross and that this is essentially what the cold war and the frequent US military build-ups have been about.
Two Obvious Points
The Americans have, of course, not been able to enforce this line. It was breached in China soon afterwards – in 1948 and 1949 – and the Soviets have certainly expanded their influence in third world countries, often with the help of military supplies, ever since. But Americans have spared little effort to beat back this advance. They have never accepted and they are wholly unwilling to accept now that as a superpower the Soviet Union feels entitled and is entitled to worldwide influence.
Afghanistan has been particularly shocking for the Americans because this is the first time that Soviet troops have moved out of the Soviet bloc for combat duties. And they are determined that Soviet troops must go back. They are prepared to pay the cost – in weapons and money – and they do not care if the struggle continues for years and if it puts an intolerable strain on Pakistan.
India figures in their calculations in this regard, though we have not paid enough attention to it. Two points are obvious.
First, the United States has been keen that India conclude a no- aggression pact with Pakistan not because that would enable Islamabad to shift its troops from the eastern to the western border, but because it believes such an agreement would reassure the Zia regime and strengthen its resolve and capacity to stand up to the Soviet pressure if Moscow builds it up in retaliation against the continuing Pakistani support for mujahidin activities in Afghanistan.
When President Zia-ul-Haq sprang the no-war declaration proposal on us in 1981 we in India generally took the line that he was trying to assuage critics of US military aid in Congress. It did not even occur to us that he could also be acting under US advice and that the advice could be part of a larger design. Recent events suggest that this was indeed the case.
Secondly, Americans want India to use the stature it enjoys in the non-aligned movement, especially now by virtue of the India Prime Minister being its chairman, and the influence it commands in Moscow by virtue of its friendly relations, to push the Soviets towards a decision to withdraw from Afghanistan.
Losing The Race
The general American view is that so far India had not been forthcoming partly because Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was basically anti-American and pro-Soviet and partly because it has been critically dependent on the Soviet Union for its military supplies. While the assassins have taken care of the first difficulty, the Reagan administration appears willing to take care of the second to the extent necessary and possible.
The United States does not expect to replace the Soviet Union as the main source for sophisticated weapons for India. For one thing, no government in New Delhi would wish to make such a switch. For another, the United States cannot possibly match Soviet terms in respect of price, credit and reproduction rights and cannot risk Pakistan’s and China’s displeasure which would come into play if the supplies to India exceed a certain fairly low level.
Americans know that the Soviets have been edgy since Mrs. Gandhi’s assassination and want to make it sure that this anxiety is justified. Like many individuals elsewhere, they believe that Mr. Rajiv Gandhi does not suffer from his mother’s and grandfather’s “hang-ups” and that he would be willing to respond appropriately within limits if he is properly handled and given something he seriously wants. The promise of limited military supplies is clearly tailored to suit this situation – to weaken the Soviet pull by demonstrating it to the Indians that an alternative source for military hardware might be available and to assure Mr. Rajiv Gandhi that the United States is well disposed towards him.
It is widely believed in India, as in other countries, that Soviets are beginning to lose the race to Americans in respect of conventional weapons on account of their relative backwardness in the computer and high-tech fields. Americans wish to take full advantage of this belief.
Many Americans have also convinced themselves that in developing countries, including India, political influence, to vary Mao Zedong’s famous statement, grows out of the barrel of a gun. Since they want political influence in India, they seem ready to play the card they have not found it possible or desirable to use in the past. How far India should go along is another proposition.
The Times of India, 17 April 1985