It is pointless either to commend or criticize the Union government’s decision to go ahead with the proposed elections in Punjab despite the assassination of Sant Longowal. It has no choice in the matter whatever some opposition leaders have said. An early poll was an unstated but integral part of the Rajiv-Longowal accord when the Sant was alive. His brutal murder by Sikh terrorists has made it even more so. For if it was necessary to test the level of support for the accord among the Sikhs in Punjab when the Sant was around and president of the Akali Dal, it has become all the more urgent to do so in the new context.
Going by the Union home minister’s statement in Parliament on Thursday, it would appear that the government has been guided by considerations of face. It would not, he has said, allow the impression to gain ground that elections would be postponed if someone is gunned down. But it would perhaps be wrong to interpret his statement literally. Perhaps what he wanted to say was that in case the government put off the poll there could be no guarantee that the terrorists would not kill some important leader or leaders whenever it was rescheduled. In any case, that is the reality. There can be no guarantee that the terrorists will not kill people next February or March. One has to be extraordinarily naive to believe that the authorities can stamp out terrorism in Punjab in the next six months. Which government has ever disposed of terrorists so quickly?
This is not the first time we are saying that an early poll is an inseparable part of the Rajiv-Longowal accord. We have said it twice before. But we have so far not spelled out the implications of this proposition. The time has now come to do it without equivocation. One implication we have already stated in the first paragraph, which is that it was necessary before the Sant’s assassination to test the level of support for the accord among the Sikhs and that it has become all the more the necessary to do so after his death. There are two other implications, one of them the result of the Sant’s ruthless elimination from the scene.
Magnitude Of Split
It has become necessary to test the Akali leadership’s own commitment to the letter and spirit of the accord in the new context. The final implication flows from it. The accord will lose its validity if it turns out that the post-Longowal Akali leadership is not committed to honouring it or that the Sikh community in Punjab is not particularly enthusiastic about it.
We cannot believe that Mr. Rajiv Gandhi and his aides are not sensitive to these points, especially after the fateful assassination on August 20. Clearly, in an attempt to send the message to the Sikhs that the agreement is in place as far as he and his government are concerned, he announced on Thursday the appointment of a commission which would determine the specific Hindi-speaking areas of Punjab which would be transferred to Haryana in lieu of Chandigarh. This is a proper move as a demonstration of the government’s own good faith. But there has to be an Akali quo for the government’s quid. The quid cannot and must not hold without the quo.
We do not wish to anticipate events. But the signs are not promising. While it is not a big disclosure that the Akali leaders are split, the magnitude and nature of the split, indeed splits, might surprise most people. In view of claims and counter-claims by the supporters of the two immediate contenders for succession to Sant Longowal, we do not want to try and assess whether or not Mr. Surjit Singh Barnala, one of the moving spirits behind the accord on the Akali side, commanded a majority among the jathedars who assembled at Gurdwara Kambowal in Sangrur district on Thursday. But going by some reports one point emerges loud and clear and it is a disturbing one. Jathedars from border districts which have been storm-centres of extremist activities did not side with him. They sided with Mr. Ajit Singh who is supposed to be close to the SGPC chief, Mr. Tohra, who has made no secret of his opposition to the accord. Again we do not wish to say whether or not these rather substantial cracks in the Akali facade can be or will be papered over. But it looks unlikely that the Akalis from the border districts will support the pro-accord leaders with any enthusiasm.
If these reports are accurate, this raises an important issue which should not be evaded. We should not dismiss the possibility that the jathedars from the border districts reflected the ambivalence of their constituents. It is, of course, possible that the fear of the terrorists apparently well entrenched in these districts influenced their vote. But that too cannot be much of a comfort to the country since that too can prevent the rise of an Akali leadership which is whole-heartedly committed to the accord and which seeks popular endorsement on that platform. Where, then, do we go from here?
An Old Story
The outbreak of an open power struggle in the Akali Dal on Thursday weakens the possibility of an Akali-Congress electoral alliance which a well-meaning “Special Correspondent” advocated in adjoining columns yesterday. The idea of such an alliance is, of course, not new. At one stage in the fifties, the Dal even merged with the Congress and a number of Akalis stayed on in that party when Master Tara Singh revived the Dal. Mrs. Gandhi, it is no secret, was not ill-disposed towards such a proposal in 1983 when Bhindranwale was trying to provoke Hindu-Sikh clashes in Punjab. Only, she did not know which Akali faction she could align herself with. Perhaps Sant Longowal had acquired the necessary stature to be able to push through such an alliance. Perhaps that was one of the calculations that persuaded the Prime Minister to go in for an agreement which was so vulnerable on so many points. That is, however, an old story now.
No Akali leader today commands sufficient influence with his colleagues and the community to be able to sell an alliance with the Congress to them. Indeed, the country shall be lucky if it does not witness a revival of an anti-Centre stance as the basis of an internal power struggle, overt or covert, in the Akali Dal. This places Mr. Rajiv Gandhi and the Congress in an extremely difficult position.
The Congress party in Punjab, too, is leaderless. It is not just split; it is fragmented. So total has been the nation’s preoccupation with the Akalis that no one has paid much attention in recent months to the shambles the Congress is reduced to in Punjab. Perhaps Mr. Rajiv Gandhi can manage to put this Humpty Dumpty together again but without the yolk and the white. But he cannot impart to it the strength and sense of purpose it needs to be in a position to manage the affairs of Punjab. In plain words, it cannot take over the responsibilities the Akali Dal under Sant Longowal’s leadership was expected, right or wrongly, to fulfil and which it is unlikely to be able to fulfil in his absence regardless of the outcome of the present power struggle in it and the forthcoming elections.
Rare Courage
On a surface view, we are arguing against ourselves. Having argued in favour of an early poll, we have moved on to point out that, whatever its result, it will not help resolve the problems in Punjab. The surface view is, however, not at all valid. We have not argued for early elections as such; we have only pointed out that the obligation to hold them is implicit in the Rajiv-Longowal accord and that it will make no sense to go ahead with the implementation of the government’s side of the contract if in the meantime the Akalis do not demonstrate their willingness and capacity to honour their side of the memorandum of understanding.
Reports regarding the possibility of an early poll, undoubtedly inspired by government and Congress party sources, began to appear long before the accord was signed. We did not take these reports seriously so much so that we did not even care to comment on them. We just could not believe that the Prime Minister would think that elections would be feasible in Punjab for quite a long time to come. But then we did know that an accord with Sant Longowal was in the works and would surface soon. This momentous development naturally has a logic of its own and places unavoidable obligations on both the government and the Akalis. We have tried to spell out these obligations as dispassionately as possible.
To be fair, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi faced a cruel dilemma. Having sent feelers to Sant Longowal which he was duty-bound to do in order to able to explore the possibilities of resuming the dialogue with the Akalis, it was not easy for him avoid signing an agreement once agreement became feasible. Even if he was not in a hurry to make history, he could not have wished to attract the charge that pursued Mrs. Indira Gandhi up to the time of her death and beyond. Sant Longowal was perhaps face to face with a similar dilemma. On the one hand, he must have known that no agreement, however good from the point of view of reasonable and not so reasonable Sikhs, would be acceptable to extremists and terrorists. And on the other, he too could not throw away the opportunity of concluding an agreement without risking an aggravation of the feeling of alienation among the Sikhs and against the Sikhs.
Their motives were without question most worthy and without question they showed a daring which is rare but necessary for those who wish to reverse the course of history. But history is made of elements which are not easy to handle, manipulate and control. Even so, the attempt must be made and cannot be given up just because difficulties, by no means wholly unexpected, have emerged.
The Times of India, 24 August 1985