The contradictions implicit in the Punjab accord have come into the open as the time for implementation of the first part has come uncomfortably close. According to the Rajiv-Longowal agreement, the capital project area of Chandigarh is to be handed over to Punjab on January 26; simultaneously “some Hindi-speaking territories in Punjab” are to go to Haryana “in lieu of Chandigarh”; the Mathew Commission was to give its award on the “specific Hindi-speaking areas of Punjab which should go to Haryana” by December 31, 1985; it has not done so; it is now expected to complete its labours by January 15, 1986. But there lies the rub. The commission has been given an impossible task; indeed, it is rather surprising that Mr. Justice Mathew should have accepted it. He is to determine the specific Hindi-speaking areas which should go to Haryana in lieu of Chandigarh. But he is to do so keeping in mind the “principle of contiguity and linguistic affinity with a village as a unit”. But what if the two criteria – contiguity and linguistic affinity – clash in the context of a village being treated as a unit, as they are said to in the case of Abohar and Fazilka, the general view being that the principle of contiguity favours Punjab and of linguistic affinity Haryana? In that case, Haryana cannot be given any territory “in lieu of Chandigarh”. And what if the two criteria converge in some places and do not in others? In that case, the confusion cannot be easy to resolve.
Mrs. Indira Gandhi was sensitive to this complication. That was precisely why she linked the handing over of Chandigarh to Punjab with the transfer of Abohar and Fazilka to Haryana. The Akalis were not prepared for such a bargain. In order to placate them, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi adopted the principles of contiguity and of the village instead of the tehsil being treated as a basic unit. But in order to hide the fact that he was ignoring Haryana’s interests altogether, he provided for the transfer of some territories of Punjab to Haryana. But those who hailed the accord and waxed eloquent against “the pernicious concept of a corridor” had only to look at the census map of the area in question to recognise that Mr. Rajiv Gandhi had tied himself in knots. The chief ministers of Punjab and Haryana have taken up what are called intransigent positions, the former insisting that Abohar and Fazilka cannot be handed over to Haryana and the latter proclaiming that Chandigarh cannot be given to Punjab unless Abohar and Fazilka are made over to Haryana and the Barnala government demonstrates its sincerity about the completion of the Sutlej-Jamuna link canal by August 15, 1986. The minister of state for home affairs, Mr. Arun Nehru, is reported to be trying to arrange an agreement between them. But on what basis?
There is strong opposition to the Sutlej-Jamuna link canal among the Sikhs in Punjab. The All India Sikh Students’ Federation has made an issue of it. It has successfully blocked work on the project. The Barnala government talks of the need to change its alignments. But the truth of the matter is that it is too weak to be in a position to honour the accord in this regard. This weakness is its greatest strength in its dealings with the Union government. Mr. Arun Nehru cannot push it unless he is prepared to see it come under a kind of pressure it says it is in no position to cope with. Mr. Nehru may not like the idea of having to acquiesce in the Punjab government’s de facto repudiation of an essential part of the Rajiv-Longowal accord. But that is inherent in the spirit of the agreement. It is a one-sided affair; it is tilted wholly in favour of the Akalis. Sant Longowal might have accepted a more balanced deal if the Prime Minister was prepared to be patient. He was not so prepared. The accord won him great acclaim. But the contradictions in it could not be quietly disposed of. They must now stare him in the face. Coming weeks are going to be tough for Mr. Gandhi and his key aides regardless of whether they were party to his decision to go in for the accord or not.