Once again the Akali and the SGPC leadership has beaten a retreat in the face of the extremist challenge. This is the obvious implication of the decision by the five head priests to shift the venue of the proposed “sarbat khalsa” oh February 16 from the Akal Takht in Amritsar to Takht Kesgarh Sahib in Anandpur Sahib. As in the case of the previous retreats beginning with the decision to leave the extremists in control of the Golden Temple complex and allow them to go ahead with the demolition of the Akal Takht in the last week of January, this one has been justified on the ground that the Akali and SGPC leaders wish to avoid violence. There is some merit in this proposition. An attempt to hold a “sarbat khalsa” at the Akal Takht would without doubt have led to violence. The extremists would have sought either to disrupt the gathering or to gain control of it and get it to endorse their resolutions (Gurmat in their terminology). But a “sarbat khalsa” is not an end in itself; it must be followed by action.
The necessary action is not difficult to spell out. If the Akali and SGPC leaders do not intend to surrender to their opponents completely, their plan must involve a determined bid to push out the extremists from the Golden Temple complex and to prevent them from going ahead with their move to capture other gurdwaras. Surely that cannot be a non-violent affair. So the Akali and SGPC leaders have at best bought time. Two points need to be made in this connection. First, the price has been high since the retreat has reinforced the widespread impression that the Punjab chief minister, Mr. Barnala, and the SGPC chief, Mr. Tohra, and their colleagues are men of weak nerves and that they will never take on the extremists. Secondly, the time bought can only be short. If they do not act after they have secured the necessary “gurmat” from the “sarbat Khalsa” next Sunday, Mr. Barnala and Mr. Tohra would have forfeited their claim to the leadership of the Sikh community, the Akali victory at the polls last year notwithstanding.
That would open a new dangerous chapter in the history of Punjab and indeed the country. The situation could be more tricky and difficult to cope with than the one which culminated in “Operation Bluestar” in 1984. While it is inconceivable that Mr. Barnala and Mr. Tohra are not cognizant of the danger ahead, it is open to question whether they have worked a strategy to eliminate it. Indeed, their repeated efforts to negotiate a deal with the extremists suggest that they might not even be aware of the true face of the extremists and the powerful forces backing them.