The Congress vice-president, Mr. Arjun Singh, has only stated the obvious. Mr. Pranab Mukherjee’s case was closed the day he was expelled from the party for six long years, the so-called working president, Mr. Kamlapati Tripathi’s, two letters to Mr. Rajiv Gandhi notwithstanding. This was evident from the fact that while Mr. Mukherjee was expelled, his alleged collaborators – Mr. A.P. Sharma, Mr. Sripat Mishra and Mr. Prakash Mehrotra – were only suspended. Clearly, Mr. Mukherjee’s “crimes” were far more serious than theirs in the eyes of the party chief and his advisers, whoever they are. These “crimes” have not been spelt out and perhaps would not be spelt out except through inspired leaks of supposed investigations into charges of corruption against him relating to the period when he was finance minister in Mrs. Indira Gandhi’s government. After all, the “democratic” culture of the party has not changed under the new dispensation. But Mr. Mukherjee’s principal “crime” is well known.
Having been dropped first from Mr. Gandhi’s cabinet and then from the party’s parliamentary board and working committee, he was trying to acquire some clout in the only way open to him, that is by bringing together some of the Indira “loyalists” who were feeling similarly neglected or humiliated. This Mr. Gandhi was not prepared to tolerate, especially in view of the mounting criticism of his policies. Mr. Mukherjee has, of course, compounded his “crimes” since by making speeches which are openly critical of Mr, Gandhi and his principal aides. But even if he had chosen to keep quiet, the door would have remained closed on him unless, of course, he was willing to engage in “self-criticism”, Soviet-Chinese style.
Mr. Arjun Singh’s statement adds to Mr. Tripathi’s embarrassment. It shows not only that Mr. Gandhi does not care for the pleas of the “working president”, but also that he allows the vice-president to make the relevant pronouncement. But Mr. Tripathi is used to ignoring such slights. It must have been the first time in his self-proclaimed career of service to the Nehrus that he has engaged in anything like factional activity at the Centre which has not been blessed in advance by the boss. He should not find it difficult to live down this aberration just as having made the point that dissidence is not going to be tolerated in New Delhi, Mr. Gandhi cannot find it difficult to ignore it. Indeed, Mr. Gandhi can even afford to be generous. In response to Mr. Tripathi’s pleas, he can even forgive Mr. A.P. Sharma and Mr. Sripat Mishra.
The action against Mr. Mukherjee cannot boomerang against Mr. Gandhi in the manner his public insult of the then Andhra chief minister, Mr. Anjaiah, did some four years ago. Mr. Mukherjee has attracted a measure of support in his home state, but he cannot become the symbol of Bengali resentment against the Centre as Mr. N.T. Rama Rao could in Andhra. Bengali particularism is adequately represented by the CPM. And the Congress party in the state is too fragmented to rally behind Mr. Mukherjee to any worthwhile extent. All in all, he faces a very trying period ahead. These, incidentally, are good enough reasons why Mr. Gandhi can refuse to pardon him and thus make an example of him. In a sense, it is also necessary for Mr. Gandhi to follow this course. He has to cover up the fact that by including as many as 11 more Indira loyalists in his council of ministers in his latest cabinet reshuffle, he has conceded the legitimacy of the complaint of Mr. Mukherjee and other members of the former Prime Minister’s praetorian guard.
Even before Mr. Tripathi sent his first letter to Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, which perhaps precipitated the disciplinary action against Mr. Mukherjee and the other three, there was no good reason to believe that the Prime Minister faced the genuine possibility of effective dissidence and challenge in the Congress parliamentary party. Two points may be made in this connection. First, those who were engaging in “dinner diplomacy” or dropping critical remarks about Mr. Gandhi in the central hall of Parliament were almost without exception guided by personal considerations, that is almost all of them were anxious to be given an office, however empty of power. Secondly, the CPP is a party only in name; it no longer represents a political culture; it consists of individuals who are incapable of engaging in factionalism. Factionalism is possible only in a relatively united organisation; it is inconceivable in an atomized non-organisation. But before the Tripathi-Mukherjee episode, the illusion of the possibility of dissidence existed. That illusion cannot survive now.