While there cannot be much doubt that the formation of the Akali Dal (Badal-Tohra) as a result of the split in the parent body will provide encouragement to the extremists and terrorists in Punjab, it will be rather premature to try to assess the long-term consequences of this development.
The single biggest difficulty in making any kind of assessment at this stage is that the lines between the two Akali factions, one headed by the chief minister, Mr. Surjit Singh Barnala, and the other by the former chief minister, Mr. Parkash Singh Badal, are not clearly drawn. Indeed, they are so blurred that it is not easy to say what the whole dispute is about.
On a surface view, this imposition can be quickly controverted. The Badal-Tohra supporters quit the Akali legislature party on May 2 in protest against police entry into the Golden Temple on April 30. But Mr. Barnala cleaned shoes of pilgrims in various gurdwaras for a whole week to “atone” precisely for that alleged offence to the Sikh community’s susceptibilities.
Then there is a traditional explanation. Which is that the Akali Dal has always been faction-ridden, that as such it was bound to split and that Mr. Badal’s personal frustrations only expedited the denouement. While there is some merit in this view, it is rather difficult to believe that Mr. Badal has been guided wholly by personal considerations at what is perhaps the most critical juncture in the life of his community since its armed struggle with the Moghul empire and Muslim invaders in the 18th century.
In any case, we are presently concerned not so much with the origins of the dispute as with the lack of any significant difference in the leaderships and policies of the two Dals. And when we say that the lines between the two are blurred, we are referring to this leadership-policy aspect.
Old Business
No honest observer of the Punjab scene can now deny that Mr. Barnala’s government is directly responsible for the present explosion of extremism and terrorism in Punjab. It released men who had been arrested precisely because they were extremists and terrorists. And, as everyone in the state knows, they returned to their old businesses as soon as they were free. The Barnala government gave many of them jobs in the police force itself as if to make sure that they possessed the necessary means to carry on their dastardly activities.
But we shall let that pass because we have been told again and again that Mr. Barnala had no choice on two counts. First, that he had to assuage the feelings of the Sikh community which had been badly bruised by “Operation Bluestar” and the subsequent “Operation Woodrose” whereby the army and paramilitary forces arrested and punished thousands of young men, especially in the border districts, on mere suspicion. Secondly, that the chief minister was landed with cabinet colleagues such as Mr. Sukhjinder Singh (a proclaimed offender) who relentlessly pushed him in that direction. But what about now?
There are in Mr. Barnala’s council of ministers and among his appointees to various chairmanships men who were proclaimed offenders under President’s rule. Human beings can, of course, change. But there is no evidence that these men have changed. Any number of instances can be cited to establish conclusively that they continue to interfere with the working of the law enforcement agencies at the behest of their extremist-terrorist patron-clients. Seven of Mr. Barnala’s ministerial colleagues recently issued a public statement bemoaning the defeat of the rival faction’s candidate, Simranjit Singh Mann, who is currently in jail on the suspicion that he was involved in various terrorist activities and possibly in the assassination of Mrs. Indira Gandhi as well.
It is not possible for us to say whether or not those who have formed the new Akali Dal (Badal) are men of conviction in the proper sense of the term. It is not possible for us to assess even the best known and the cleverest among them, Mr GS Tohra. His actions in the past five years can be equally well explained in terms of a quiet commitment to Khalistan, opportunism, cowardice or a combination of all three. But it is indisputable that many of those who have hung on to Mr. Barnala among the MLAs have done so for the sake of office and all that goes with it. They can be expected to desert Mr. Barnala if things get hot for him.
Dals’ Struggle
In opposition to the above assessment of the nature of the struggle between the two Dals, it will be argued that there is a significant difference between them. Which is that while the Barnala group is willing to cooperate with the Union government in ending terrorism in the state, the Badal-Tohra faction has moved into outright opposition to New Delhi. Presently this is doubtless the position. But Mr. Badal would have been as willing to cooperate with the Centre as is Mr. Barnala if he were the chief minister. In fact, even now he is supposed to keep a line open to the Bharatiya Janata Party (the former Jana Sangh) with which he had formed a coalition government in the seventies.
According to Mr. Barnala, the rival Akali Dal could not muster more than 45 delegates out of a total of 440 and 20 MLAs out of a total of 71 at its meeting at Anandpur Saheb on Saturday (July 5). The Badal-Tohra camp has claimed that 342 delegates attended the gathering. To us Mr. Barnala’s figures appear closer to the truth than Mr. Badal’s. But it is also difficult to believe that such experienced politicians as Mr. Badal and Mr. Tohra would have launched their Dal on the strength of such limited support unless the Badal-Tohra alliance has been operating under compulsions of which we are not aware. Indeed, if Mr. Barnala is to be taken at his word, they could have been fearing erosion of their support among the Akali MLAs. The chief minister has said that he has been receiving feelers from the dissident MLAs. In plain terms, they may have been desperate.
The finalisation of the split raises two questions. First, how should we respond to the Akali Dal (Badal)? Second, should the Union government seek to push the transfer of Chandigarh to Punjab on the plea that it would strengthen Mr. Barnala’s position and therefore the forces of moderation in Punjab?
The answer to the first question should be obvious enough. We should wait and watch. Before the spectre of the Badal-Tohra combine converting itself into allies of the extremists and the terrorists materialises, we should not invent it and allow it to haunt us. Like Mr. Tohra earlier, Mr. Badal has praised Bhindranwale. But Bhindranwale cannot be resurrected and even if he could be, the circumstances in which he could become the menace he did cannot be restored. The Indian state will not allow the Golden Temple complex to be converted ever again into headquarters of all kinds of gangsters. Without that precondition, a new Bhindranwale would be a criminal on the run.
The new Akali Dal could launch a morcha against both the Barnala government and the Centre. Such morcha will certainly divert the attention and energies of the security forces from the central task of tracking down the murder gangs that stalk Punjab. But it is unlikely to inflict a bigger damage. Contrary to the widespread talk of the hurt Sikh psyche, our view is that the Sikhs in Punjab are by and large fed up with the antics of the Akalis; they want peace. If this turns out to be the case, a morcha could flop; that would be a boon. It would expose Akali pretensions. Let us keep in mind the possibility that the passions might well have been spent in Punjab for the time-being and that even the apparently widening communal divide might turn out to be a temporary phenomenon.
In view of what has been said earlier, the answer to the second question should also be obvious. It is not the Centre’s business to take sides in an intra-Akali struggle. It should let the rivals slug it out among themselves. Even if the distinction between the “hardliners” (Badal-Tohra alliance) and the “moderates” (Mr. Barnala and his supporters) was sharper than it is, even then intervention by the Centre in favour of the latter could have been a risky proposition. It could have weakened their position. There is a negative anti-Centre streak in the Sikh personality which a ruler in Chandigarh should seek to cater to. This streak is not by itself anti-national and it is not secessionist. It is an expression of the Sikh pride. This pride, accompanied as it is by a form of aggressiveness poses problems. But its denial creates worse problems.
Law And Order
This does not mean that the Centre can abdicate its responsibility in respect of law and order in the state. It cannot. Indeed, it should not hesitate to take over the total responsibility for it if other options are exhausted, as they appeared to have been in the border districts a fortnight ago. Nor does it mean that the Centre should not push Mr. Barnala into doing his duty in respect of law and order if he is seen to waver as he has been seen to waver in the past. But a chief minister in Punjab, whether an Akali or a Congressman, must not be and must not be seen to be a creature of the Centre. If as chief minister, Mr. Darbara Singh, had not been paralysed time and again by interference by New Delhi, we might not have witnessed the tragedy we have witnessed in the state in the last three years. Plainly Mr. Barnala has to win his battle with his rivals on his own if he is to become a leader who can deliver results.
In any case, it is an illusion that you can buy peace by conceding to “moderates” what you would deny to “extremists”. In the existing circumstances, concessions as on Chandigarh would only vindicate the extremists.
The Times of India, 8 July 1986