In recent weeks it has become a commonplace that the Rajiv-Longowal accord is dead. Even the Sikh academicians who drafted it believe this is to be the case. So at least it has been reported.
We were perhaps the first newspaper in the country to proclaim on June 22 that the accord was dead and to demand two days later on June 24 that it be formally scrapped. We were then referring mainly to the fact that, in view of the Barnala government’s rejection of the proposed Desai Commission and the point that Venkataramiah Commission had made in respect of section 7:2 of the accord (relating to transfer of certain territories to Haryana in lieu of Chandigarh) and section 7:4 (relating to the general boundary adjustment between Punjab and Haryana), it was no longer possible for Mr. Rajiv Gandhi to transfer Chandigarh to Punjab because it no longer appeared possible to define territories which could be handed over to Haryana in lieu thereof. But the accord has failed in a far more fundamental sense.
It has failed because the resumption of the political process – initiated by the accord last July leading to the Akali victory last September – has not achieved what it was basically intended to do – to help ameliorate the law and order situation in the state. And there is nothing to show that continuance or maintenance of the Barnala ministry in office can in any way help in the restoration of any kind of normalcy in Punjab.
On the contrary, there are strong reasons to contend that the installation of the Akali ministry revived the morale of the extremists and the terrorists, that many of the men it released and employed in the police and other departments were extremists and that its ministers have continued to interfere with the working of an already communalised, corrupted and demoralised police force on behalf of their client-patrons. All in all, the presence of Akalis in office can only be said to have had a deleterious effect on the law and order situation in the state.
Another Aspect
There is, of course, another aspect of the problem which relates to the Sikh community’s attitude towards extremism and terrorism. The dominant view before the accord was that the Sikh community as a whole had been alienated from the government on account of ‘Operation Bluestar’ and the army’s subsequent actions in Punjab and that this alienation made it easier than it need have been for the extremists and terrorists to win new recruits and find the necessary support among the people for their own activities.
Our assessment was different. We believed that once it was clearly established that the Indian state meant business, the Sikh peasantry, as well known for its sense of realism and respect for power as for its valour, would begin to cooperate with the authorities in the restoration of normalcy. We did not take a simplistic view of the Jat Sikh personality just as we do not take a simplistic view of any other community’s response to a situation. We believed that, while it might be some time before the Sikh peasantry came to recognise the power realities on the ground and began to adjust itself to it, there was in any case no choice but to slog it out.
In the event, Mr Rajiv Gandhi went in for the accord. Apparently his two main assumptions must have been that the resulting elections would produce an Akali government which would be stable and be genuinely interested in restoring order, and that this government would be assured of the active cooperation of the Sikh population in fighting terrorism. That was also perhaps why he went out of his way to assure a landslide victory for the Akalis; he chose weak candidates for his own Congress party and did not provide them the necessary financial backing.
Both those assumptions have proved ill-founded. We have already noted the record of the Akali government; it is equally well known that one-third of the Akali MLAs led by such
stalwart as Mr G.S. Tohra, SGPC chief for 12 long years, and Mr. P.S. Badal, former chief minister, quit the party on May 2 precisely because the chief minister, Mr. Barnala, had done his elementary duty when he had ordered the police to go into the Golden Temple complex on April 30 after the holy shrine had been abused by a group to proclaim the formation of Khalistan; and there is little evidence to show that ordinary Sikhs have cooperated better with the Akali administration than with the previous ones; indeed, they cannot even if they are so inclined because they cannot trust the police force any more now than they could earlier because it is infiltrated by elements friendly to the extremists and would betray anyone who would give it information against them.
In view of the general drift of his policies, it was said in 1985 that one reason why Mr. Rajiv Gandhi went in for the accord was that he wanted to demonstrate that he was different from his mother and quicker to grasp an opportunity. This is psycho-history which is a tricky field and should therefore be avoided.
New To Politics
Mr. Rajiv Gandhi was, of course, new to politics. It is doubtful that he had taken time to acquaint himself even cursorily with the history and record of the Akalis. The pressures on him were perhaps also intolerable. As we know only too well, almost the entire top layer of the political community in the country was united in the belief that the cussedness of Mrs. Indira Gandhi and her desire to secure the Hindu vote for the then forthcoming general election were responsible for the breakdown of negotiations with the Akalis; it was keen that Mr. Rajiv Gandhi released Akali leaders and resumed talks with them.
Mr. Rajiv Gandhi’s partymen had been accused of having been involved in the ghastly anti-Sikh riots in the wake of his mother’s assassination. The desire to absolve himself of the taint must also have goaded him into clinching a deal with the Akalis. Friendly external powers too must have advised him not to allow “Punjab to become India’s Ulster”. Even so, we remain convinced that events would have taken a different course if Mr Rajiv Gandhi had then posed the right questions to his aides, especially Mr. Arjun Singh, then Punjab governor, who was clearly calling the shots, and insisted on verifiable answers to them.
These questions remain relevant because they have to be addressed in order to decide the future course of action.
If the external dimension of the Khalistan demand and the Akali morcha was a fact, as the government had insisted earlier, it would have been legitimate for Mr Gandhi to insist that his aides inform him of the nature of the connection and of the identity of the link men. We would doubt whether they can answer the second half of this question today. We need hardly add that the issue is important for future policy.
Similarly, since the evidence of Bhindranwale being in command of the gangs of assassins was rather thin – his role appears to have been to lend ‘legitimacy’ to their activities and to convert the Golden Temple into a symbol of anti-Centre resistance – it was obligatory for the Prime Minister’s aides on Punjab to find but what the terrorist organisational structure and chain of command in fact were when Bhindranwale was alive and certainly now that he was dead. And was there a link between the terrorist organisation, whatever its nature and shape, and the Akali morcha? If yes, what or who was the link?
We have very little doubt that this question, still relevant, was either never posed or never pressed. Instead, there is every reason to believe that Mr. Rajiv Gandhi bought lock,
stock and barrel the theory Akali apologists had been marketing assiduously with the help of the opposition. The theory was that all Akalis were basically moderate and reasonable men who were opposed not only to any kind of secession but also to violence and that the “poor fellows” had not been able to fight terrorism because Mrs. Gandhi, in her stupidity and greed for Hindu votes, had not conceded to them their legitimate demands.
Poser To Gandhi
It was, of course, not the business of the apologists out to bamboozle the nation to ask why then had Mr. G.S. Tohra, head of the SGPC, installed Bhindranwale in the Akal Takht. But it was Mr. Gandhi’s. similarly, while for the apologists, Sant Longowal was, of course, so terrorised of Bhindranwale and his gang that he could afford to see no evil and hear no evil while in the Golden Temple, Mr. Gandhi had to ask as to what had prevented him
suspending the morcha on the thoroughly legitimate ground that it had been taken over by dangerous men out to destroy the country and certainly the Sikh community. If the answer was that he lacked the necessary courage, how could he possibly be expected to lead the battle for reconciliation with New Delhi which could require far greater moral courage?
The question has ceased to be relevant in this form for the future. But the substance of the question remains pertinent if only because the same Mr. Tohra is once again playing a game. We do not know why and on whose behalf. It would be simple-minded to be sure that he only wants to bring down Mr. Barnala and install Mr. Badal in his place as chief minister. Mr. Tohra is not likely to be playing for such small stakes.
Mr. Arjun Singh engaged in secret negotiations with Sant Longowal and persuaded him and a small faction then close to him to go in for a deal. But the great issues raised by the Akali agitation and the murderous campaign accompanying it could not possibly be settled in secret between two groups of men. They had to be debated openly even if that involved the risk of no agreement for a long time. Secret negotiations could be justified only if Mr. Gandhi had decided to concede Khalistan and was trying to buy a face-saver and some time as Mr. Kissinger was doing in his secret parleys with the North Vietnamese in the early seventies.
Again the form has changed but the basic issue survives. The possible consequences of keeping Mr. Barnala in office need to be carefully debated.
In view of Sant Longowal’s subsequent assassination it would not look nice to raise the question of his status in his community. But before Mr. Gandhi chose him as his main
interlocutor and decided to turn the glare of media publicity on him, hardly anyone regarded him as a man of destiny. He had been put into the position he occupied by the Badal group, then at odds with the Tohra faction, and kept there by his passivity and lack of dynamism. Today Mr. Barnala is even more handicapped.
The Times of India, 18 August 1986