The Akalis have little to show for one year of their rule in Punjab. But they are not wholly to blame for this poor record. In a sense, they are as much victims of circumstances as the people in the state. It is true that they are largely the architects of the circumstances we are referring to; their morcha, which Bhindranwale was able to exploit for spreading the cult of violence, was primarily responsible for vitiating the atmosphere in Punjab. But that cannot detract from the fact that the Akalis did not have much room for manoeuvre when they came to power a year ago. Thus they had no choice but to release hundreds of young men who had been arrested on charges of extremism during Presidents Rule. This was bound to lead to a revival of terrorism in the State and it did. But the Akalis had won a landslide victory on a platform which included the release of those dangerous men and they could not go back on that pledge. And they could not have secured the kind of support they did if they had not held out such a promise.
This is not to justify the failure of the Akalis to measure up to the responsibilities of office, but to explain why it was wrong for anyone to expect them to behave differently. The Akali morcha and the violence accompanying it had a logic of their own, which an election, whatever its outcome, could not possibly annul. It has often been said that the massive turnout of voters, despite a call for boycott by the extremists, was an indication that the vast majority of the Sikhs wanted a return to normalcy. This was probably the case. But the relevance of this point for determining the policies of the Akali government has been far from clear. For the Akalis could not ignore the extremist minority, however small; such a minority almost always sets the pace; the Akalis had been prisoners of that minority and could not realistically be expected to win their freedom, even if they were so inclined; that they were so inclined was at least open to question, in view of the manner in which they had persisted with their morcha after Bhindranwale had seized the initiative from them and given the agitation a murderously anti-Hindu turn. It was our awareness of these points regarding the Akalis that had persuaded us to oppose the Rajiv-Longowal accord. Similarly, it was a foregone conclusion that the Akalis would split, that the dissident faction would openly side with the extremists and that even the Akalis in office would continue to obstruct the police in the fight against the terrorists. What could not be predicted – by us, at any rate – was that the Akalis would earn the notoriety of being more corrupt than any previous set-up in the State. But the irony of the situation is that despite all this, it is not easy to recommend that the Barnala ministry be dismissed. That may become necessary if ministers wanting to get rid of Mr. Ribeiro as the Punjab police chief have their way. Otherwise the country has to be willing to ignore a lot in that State.