The former Afghan King, Zahir Shah, has indicated, for the first time publicly, his willingness to play a role in the resolution of his country’s extremely complex problems. In his interview to The Independent, London, he has not spelt out a blueprint. Indeed, he cannot do so for the obvious reason that the situation in and around Afghanistan is far too complicated to permit a clear-cut formulation. In sum, he has suggested that “a jirga, representing all the elements that constitute the Afghan nation, should be convened in order to form a united organisation which would have the support of the majority of our people” and serve as the basis for the establishment of a government of consensus in Kabul. But when should the proposed jirga be convened? Before, during or after the withdrawal of the Soviet troops? Who is to be in charge of Kabul meanwhile? The present Soviet-backed Najib set-up or the coalition which the Peshawar-based mujahideen groups favour but seem incapable of producing? Who is to take the initiative in organizing the jirga? The present Kabul regime or the mujahideen or Zahir Shah himself?
This, however, does not detract from the importance of the statement. By itself it strengthens the moral position of the traditionalist (tribal-oriented) mujahideen groups (mistakenly called “moderate”) in Peshawar who are opposed to the Islamic fundamentalists. The fundamentalists are as hostile to the tribal socio-economic-political structure in Afghanistan as the Marxists were in the earlier phase of their rule in the late seventies. Inevitably the fundamentalists cannot but resist the jirga proposal and any attempt to bring back Zahir Shah whose presence in Afghanistan can be meaningful only in the context of a possible restoration of the old order to the extent possible in the social disruption that has taken place in the past 10 years. And surprising though it may appear, the present PDPA leadership in Kabul is, as a result of its bitter experience and of the compulsions, arising out of the Soviet decision to withdraw its troops, willing to accommodate itself to the former King’s jirga proposal. Indeed, this is the plain implication of Dr Najibullah s decision to order “elections” in Afghanistan from April 5 to April 11. Thus, in a sense, there is a meeting ground between Zahir Shah, the traditionalist mujahideen in Peshawar and the PDPA in Kabul. But in view of the former King’s and the traditionalist Mujahideen’s understandable hostility towards the PDPA, co-operation among them is highly unlikely at least at this stage.
In plain terms, a Soviet withdrawal, under whatever terms and conditions it takes place, cannot settle the issue of the future set-up in Afghanistan. Again, this assessment is independent of whether or not an agreement on the two outstanding questions – the composition of the interim government in Kabul and the stoppage of Soviet military assistance to the PDPA set-up and of American to the mujahideen at the same time – is reached. A fierce struggle for primacy not only at the centre but also in the regions is unavoidable in Afghanistan in the wake of the Soviet withdrawal. The evolution of a consensus by peaceful means is out of question. The near total disruption in the past decade and the induction of arms and money by outside agencies on a vast scale have made an armed struggle for supremacy inevitable. It is impossible to predict the outcome because no one is in a position to assess the correlation of forces objectively. No one can, for instance, say with any measure of assurance whether and to what extent the regime in Kabul can depend on its army once the Soviet troops withdraw. Similarly, no one can assess reasonably accurately the level of support the fundamentalists and the traditionalists in Peshawar enjoy among the local commanders within Afghanistan. All in all, the future of Afghanistan is wholly uncertain. That is precisely why we have been arguing for a hands-off policy on New Delhi’s part and let those who have sown the wind reap the whirlwind.