The Geneva discussions on Afghanistan under U.N. auspices have taken a bizarre turn, with the Soviets suggesting that the US need not co-guarantee the agreement and the Pakistanis insisting on such an American guarantee. So it is not possible to say whether or not a formal agreement will be reached in coming days. On the face of it, the only obstacle is the continuing US insistence on a so-called symmetry in respect of arms supplies. In plain terms, the American position is that Moscow must end military assistance to the present regime in Kabul as it stops arms supplies to the Mujahideen. So far the Soviet leadership has refused to accede to this demand on the plea that its ties with the government of Afghanistan date back to 1921 and the United States has no right to meddle in these bilateral relations. But this is a technical point. The more pertinent fact is that the Soviet Union has a lot to lose and nothing to gain by obliging the Americans in respect of Afghanistan. From the latest developments, it appears that the Kremlin has recognised this fact.
As far as Afghanistan is concerned, the US has done its worst to hurt the Soviet Union; it can do no worse. It steadily stepped up the quantity and quality of its weapons supply to the Mujahideen to a point where the Kremlin had no choice but to accept that it just could not win against the guerrillas. But since Mr Gorbachov has finally decided to withdraw his forces from Afghanistan even in the absence of an agreement in Geneva, there is nothing more the Americans can do to add to his woes. They can, of course, keep up their military supplies to the Peshawar-based groups; according to the Washington Post supplies worth $200 million are already in the pipeline. But to what end? The Mujahideen in Peshawar have always been deeply divided except on the single issue of the struggle against the Soviet presence in Afghanistan; this superficial unity has already cracked up following the Soviet announcement on withdrawal; further military supplies may well aggravate the divisions between the fundamentalists and the traditionalists erroneously called moderates; the fundamentalists themselves belong to four distinct groups and are likely to fight over the snaring of the US bounty because each group must now seek to strengthen its position vis-a-vis the others.
Most of the US aid has gone to the fundamentalist groups. But it is by no means certain whether this was the American or the Pakistani preference; President Zia-ul-Haq has been in need of the support of the fundamentalist Jamaat-e-Islami at home. In any event, it is by no means certain that Washington would wish to help the fundamentalists capture power in Kabul. It cannot possibly be insensitive to the possibility that they might make common cause with the Islamic Republic of Iran which is the only regime in the history of Islam which can be called theocratic. The fundamentalist Mujahideen are of course mostly Sunnis. But the significance of the Shia-Sunni divide among the fundamentalists should not be exaggerated. Ayatollah Khomeini’s appeal cuts across this divide, as should be evident from the Islamic upsurge in Egypt and the Maghreb. Thus, for all we know, the Americans may well wish to wash their hands off Afghanistan once the withdrawal of Soviet troops begins.
The Americans would, of course, want to ease the dilemma Islamabad faces. It is, however, far from clear how they can do so. Indeed, the Pakistanis themselves would be hard put to it to spell out what they would want their American friends to do. The Pakistani objectives areobvious enough – peace in Afghanistan so that the refugees can go back and the process of their rehabilitation can begin. And how is this objective to be achieved? By continued support to the guerillas? That could make sense if the Mujahideen were not so divided, if the control of the leaders in Peshawar over the local commanders within Afghanistan was not so loose and if the tribals on both sides of the Durand Line were not so notoriously fickle in their loyalties. The Pakistanis cannot possibly believe that the Soviets would not only quit but also set up in power in Kabul those who would be positively hostile to them, or indeed, that the Soviets can perform the miracle of establishing a durable Afghan government of the Mujahideen even if they were willing to dump their friends in Kabul. And would it not be rash to take it for granted that a fundamentalist hegemony in Kabul would suit Islamabad in the long run? Thus it is permissible to take the view that the Soviets can now sit back and let the Americans and the Pakistanis do the running.