It is still a matter of speculation whether differences over Afghanistan figured prominently in President Zia-ul-Haq’s decision to dismiss Prime Minister Junejo. But there can be no question that President Zia has all along been determined to place his nominees in office in Kabul and that he proposes to use his newly resumed powers to pursue this objective. That much is obvious from his interview to an American news magazine called Insight. He has said that the Geneva accord marks the end of only one phase in the “struggle for freedom” in Afghanistan and he has expressed the confidence that the mujahideen would get support from the United States so that they can accomplish their task successfully. In plain terms, he has put the Soviet leadership on notice that he means business and that he enjoys US support. As it happens, the well-known American industrialist, Mr. Armand Hammer, has disclosed that President Zia withdrew his objections to the Geneva accord only after he had been assured by the US of continuing support for the mujahideen. Mr. Hammer served as an intermediary between Washington and Moscow on the one hand and Washington and Islamabad on the other. This settles two issues and not just one. First, Pakistan decided to accept the Geneva agreement despite Soviet refusal to disband the PDPA regime in Kabul and install the mujahideen in its place not so much because Prime Minister Junejo was so inclined as because President Zia was able to secure the necessary assurance from the Reagan administration. Secondly, even as the United States was appending its signature to the Geneva agreement requiring it to stop military assistance to the mujahideen, it was committing itself precisely to maintain that aid.
President Zia has thrown down the gauntlet which Mr. Gorbacbov can refuse to pick up only at the cost of considerable loss of face. He would need to back his warning to Pakistan, which he has already issued publicly, with concrete actions. That, however, is only one aspect of the game President Zia is engaged in. He is addressing himself as much, if not more, to the Pakistani people as the Afghan refugees, the Soviets and the Americans. He is telling his people that he alone has the courage and the ability to settle the Afghanistan issue in a “suitable” manner. And there can be little doubt that his prestige in Pakistan will rise if he manages to win in Afghanistan. He is taking grave risks. The adventure can boomerang on him. But he is playing for high stakes. He is seeking to perpetuate himself in power in Islamabad. If this assessment is reasonably accurate, we can at best expect carefully managed elections in Pakistan, that is, elections the outcome of which has been determined in advance. The interim government, when it is formed, may provide a clue to what the General has up his sleeves. Meanwhile, it would be a safe bet that he would go in for a poll only if he is able to so arrange the political scene that he gets the kind of “democratic” government that serves as a front for him. The absence of any agitation over Mr. Junejo’s dismissal cannot but encourage him in his enterprise.