To begin with, we must confess that we might not be adequately informed about developments in Jammu and Kashmir. So it is possible that the Congress (I) leadership might be justified in taking a grim view of them. But from the outside the situation in the state looks to us very different from the one in Punjab. Indeed, in Punjab too it may be more appropriate to speak of forces of disruption than of secession. Some individuals have doubtless raised the slogan of a separate Khalistan, a predominantly Sikh state to be formed on the pattern of Pakistan. But by and large the Akali extremists do not appear to be secessionists. Basically they are trying to shift the power balance further in their favour. In real terms – economic and administrative – the balance has been tilted heavily in favour of the Sikh community since the establishment of the Punjabi suba in 1966. But demographic position – a 48 percent Hindu population and heavy concentration of Sikhs in a limited number of constituencies – has meant that the principal political organisation of the community has not been able to enjoy the monopoly of political power to which it aspires.
This is an illegitimate aspiration. It runs contrary to the basic principles of democracy and provisions of the Constitution and the tactics that the Akalis, the moderates as well as the extremists, have adopted in pursuit of their objective are highly dangerous. These can spell disaster for the country, including the Sikh community, indeed especially for the Sikh community. Even so, those in charge of the country’s and the state’s affairs may be well advised not to treat extremism as separatism. The distinction, if it is valid, as we believe it to be, should be recognised and kept in view in working out and implementing the necessary measures. The problem is extremely complicated. One must be naive to believe that a clear-cut and quick solution to it is possible. Law and order has, of course, to be enforced. Without it, the state can fall apart with consequences that are too dreadful to mention. But it is not just a law and order problem. The situation in Jammu and Kashmir is different. The majority community there is assured of political power. So overwhelming is its majority that no party can ever hope to get into office without the support of a significant section of it. Its identity is amply protected by religion, language and culture. So it cannot feel threatened on that account whatever happens in the political field. And that too is not all. The state enjoys a special status under Article 370 of the Constitution and it has a constitution of its own. Unlike in Punjab, the problem in Jammu and Kashmir is essentially the product of history. India’s offer of a plebiscite in the face of Pakistani aggression and subsequent concessions to Kashmiri particularism have combined to encourage a section of the Kashmiri population to adopt an ambivalent attitude towards the Union and to subject the Centre to a form of blackmail. This is short hand. But it does not involve too much distortion of the reality. Thus while it is doubtful whether even Muslim fanatics would in fact wish to merge the state with Pakistan, it is an established fact that even Sheikh Abdullah found it expedient to hold out some kind of threat, veiled or unveiled, to the Centre.
Most Indians have accepted the resulting strange relationship between the Union and the state. So much so when earlier this year Mrs. Gandhi decided to contest the elections to the state legislature and thus to challenge the National Conference’s claim to monopoly of influence in the Kashmir valley, there was a lot of criticism of her decision. We supported this decision, arguing that the stage was past when a national organisation should not even attempt to seek support among the Kashmiri people just because they were mostly Muslims. To us the opposite argument advanced, among others, by a number of other newspapers and journals appeared to be a kind of communalism, a dangerous, if indirect, statement that the Kashmiris were not quite Indians just because they were Muslims. We were heartened by the result which gave well over 20 per cent of the vote to the Congress (I) in the valley. We also regard it as a positive development that unlike his father, Sheikh Abdullah, the present chief minister, Dr. Farooq Abdullah, is not limiting his activities to the state apparently because he nurses wider ambitions. This is as good an indication of the integration of Jammu and Kashmir into the Indian Union as anyone can expect.
But it would be naive to believe that the process is complete. It is not. Certain consequences follow. Jammu and Kashmir cannot yet be treated as another Indian state. The Centre has to exercise a measure of restraint in dealing with it. The Congress (I) must not give the impression that it is out to topple the ministry. The state government is, of course, obliged to maintain law and order, assure a sense of security among the minority community, especially in the valley and curb extremism which is being promoted in the name of religion. If it fails to meet its obligations and is seen to have so failed by most Indians, the Centre will be duty bound to deal with it in an appropriate manner. But it is not a state where the Congress (I) can in fairness to the nation pursue its tactics. As will be seen, we are using the terms “Centre” and the Congress (I) as if they are interchangeable. They have so become for all practical purposes today. Which is unfortunate. Those in command of the Union government should not confuse the two roles and they must not forget that their first duty is to the nation and not to the party. In their first capacity they must seek to establish cordial relations with the state government in Srinagar even if, as Congress (I) leaders, they are at odds with the National Conference.