It is not at all surprising that President Brezhnev has flatly turned down the West German Chancellor, Herr Schmidt’s plea for a gradual withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. This was a foregone conclusion even before Herr Schmidt reached Moscow. In view of the continuing fragility of the Karmal regime in Kabul on the one hand and intensification of the guerilla activities on the other, the Soviet Union is just not in a position to pull its forces out of Afghanistan. Its calculations may have gone awry. This is certainly the case if the Kremlin had believed that a massive deployment of force and punitive raids on villages harbouring the Mujahidins would suffice to undermine the morale of the people and the rebels sufficiently to enable it to produce at least a semblance of order in most of the country. This is also the case if Moscow had convinced itself that the balance of forces in the region was so favourable to it that the United States and its allies would either be unwilling or unable to reach substantial assistance to the guerillas. As such the Soviet leadership may even feel that it has made a mistake in allowing itself to be dragged into Afghanistan in such strength and may even wish to get out. But it can do so only if it is willing to abandon the desire to have a pro-Soviet regime in Kabul and suffer a loss of face. There has been no indication that the Soviet leadership is so willing. Its losses in Afghanistan have been relatively small. Its allies have been acquiescent even if President Ceausescu has been expressing doubts privately. The parents of young soldiers who are being kilted in Afghanistan may resent that the authorities have endangered the lives of their sons. But generally the Soviet people are blaming the West for the trouble.
The men in the Kremlin would love to stabilise their hold on Afghanistan at the smallest possible cost to their country. That is why they persuaded Mr. Babrak Karmal to put forward certain proposals for a political solution. When none of the countries concerned took these proposals seriously, they announced their decision to withdraw some of their troops. The intention clearly was to convince the world that they were sincere in their protestations regarding a political settlement. India, among others, welcomed the move. But it was difficult to square it with reports that the guerillas had greatly stepped up their activities, that some more units of the Afghan army had crossed over to them, and that the regime was finding it difficult to recruit young men. Since the well-advertised limited withdrawal took place on the eve of the Venice summit, the move came to be interpreted as a device to aggravate the well-known divisions in the Western camp. The theory made sense in view of President d’Estaing’s recent meeting with President Brezhnev and Herr Schmidt’s forthcoming visit to Moscow. Indeed, Moscow took care to inform President d’Estaing of the proposed withdrawal in advance so that he could claim credit for it in Venice and hold it out as evidence of Soviet good faith. But there were some flaws in the theory. The withdrawal would inevitably encourage the guerillas and their supporters. A possible positive impact on West Europeans would be nullified if the Kremlin felt obliged to reinforce its forces in Afghanistan. Soon the divisions among the principal Western allies were not sharp enough for Moscow to exploit in the short run. Above all, it was not at all clear whether the Soviet Union had more to gain by demonstrating its military power and its willingness to use it as in Afghanistan or by holding the olive branch to the West Europeans.
The move would fall in place if the Western assessment regarding the nature of the withdrawal is accurate. Mr. Drew Middleton, military affairs specialist of the New York Times, has, for instance, written: “ Heavy weapons units tanks, air defence missiles and surface-to-surface missiles are leaving and being replaced by the infantry essential to Soviet success in a guerilla campaign.” The Soviet Union, it is well known, is depending a great deal on helicopter gunships to bomb guerilla positions in the hills and there are too few roads in Afghanistan to permit it to use tanks on a significant scale. The accuracy of this assessment apart, the general Western position appears to have hardened. The Times, London, has, for example, reported that at the Venice summit the British aired the question of supplying arms to the Afghan “freedom fighters”. It adds: “There were persistent rumours that such aid was discussed in the corridors here, and even that an ad hoc group, composed of the United States, Britain, Turkey and West Germany, had been set up to look into it.” And the Sunday Telegraph, London, has listed weapons which have begun to reach the Mujahidins.