Interesting developments are taking place in the field of ideology in China. Some weeks ago some ‘intellectuals’ in Beijing (Peking) were allowed to express the view that despite some ‘distortions’ since Stalin’s death in 1953, the character of the Soviet Union had not changed and that it remained a socialist country. This was a clear repudiation of Chairman Mao Zedong’s (Mao Tse-Tung’s) thesis that the Soviet Union had reverted to the capitalist path and it would not have seen the light of the day unless it had the backing of the top leadership. The new assessment made the charge of “social imperialism” against Moscow somewhat incongruous and the Chinese were logical enough to drop the use of this pejorative phrase from their mass media. They continue to accuse it of ‘hegemonism’. But ‘hegemony’ only means leadership or at best domination by one country of other countries and not exploitation which imperialism of whatever variety must imply. This was followed over a fortnight ago by the rehabilitation of Li Li San, one of the Moscow-trained communist leaders who had dominated the Chinese Communist Party from its establishment in the early ‘twenties to the mid-thirties when Mao seized control of the organization. Li Li San had died during the so-called cultural revolution. His rehabilitation could, therefore, be interpreted as part of the continuing denunciation of the “gang of four”. But it was equally feasible that the Chinese leadership had a larger objective in rehabilitating him. Now The People’s Daily, Beijing, has carried an article to say the nine ‘commentaries’ which had marked China’s ideological break with the Soviet Union in 1964 were incorrect. These ‘commentaries had traced the development of the Sino-Soviet conflict and charged Moscow with having adopted a ‘revisionist’ course. It is no secret that Chairman Mao was closely associated with the preparation of these ‘commentaries’ even if he had not drafted them in the first instance.
All this clearly removes the basis from the Chinese side of the two-decade-old ideological conflict with the Soviet Union. The Soviets have not been slow to respond. A commentary in Pravda by Igor Alexandrov, a well-known pseudonym which often conveys Soviet thinking at the highest level, has called for a new effort to settle the differences between the two countries. It, of course, does not follow that the stage is set for a rapprochement between Moscow and Beijing. There are other serious differences between them. Chinese, for instance, continue to take a very dim view the Soviet support for Vietnam, especially in respect of Hanoi’s role in Kampuchea, the virtual takeover of Afghanistan, the presence of over a million heavily armed Soviet troops on their own border, the growing Soviet power in the Pacific and the Indian Ocean and so on. And they are not about to give up either their territorial claims on the Soviet Union or the gains of the improved relations with the United States and Washington’s Japanese and West European allies.
But many of the old issues which queered the pitch for the two countries in the ‘fifties and the ‘sixties are now dead. The Chinese, for example, had then sought Soviet support on the Quemoy-Matsu issue (they bombarded these islands belonging to Formosa in the ‘fifties) and were furious when this support was not forthcoming. They were similarly aggrieved ever the Soviet refusal to live by its promise to provide them with a sample nuclear bomb and over their border dispute with India. Chairman Mao then opposed Mr. Khrushchev’s search for improved ties with the United States and the West favoured a tough approach. All that is old hat now. Beijing has virtually abandoned its plan to seize Formosa by force. It wants normalization of relations with India. It is itself seeking economic and military assistance from the US, Western Europe and Japan.
What conclusions are we to draw then? No firm conclusions yet. It is clearly premature to do so. It will be advisable to wait till clearer indications are available from Beijing. There are too many possibilities for us to opt for one or two. It is, for instance, possible that the Chinese are adopting a more pragmatic and non-doctrinaire approach towards the Soviet Union as they have done towards other countries. It is equally plausible that they are trying to strengthen their bargaining position vis-à-vis the United States and Japan. It cannot also be ruled out that they are trying to reduce tension with Moscow in order to buy time for strengthening their defence capability and their economy. All that we can say right now is that the Chinese leadership is in ferment and that its statements and actions need to be watched with more than the usual care.