It will be a long time, if ever, before we discover whether the timing of the Iranian decision to invade Iraq has been influenced by the earlier Israeli action in Lebanon. But the two developments have vastly complicated the task of policy makers in the United States and the generally pro-Western Gulf countries. When Iranian troops stormed into Iraqi territories and came within a shooting distance of the critically important oil port of Basra, the Reagan administration felt it necessary to indicate its willingness to act in defence of its friends in the region. Perhaps it took an unduly pessimistic view of Iraq’s military capacity to hold the Iranians. Perhaps it could have waited before announcing that it “will consult with other Gulf nations on appropriate steps to sustain their security” and in proposing joint exercises, a euphemism for enabling American forces to acquire the necessary experience of operating in those countries. But this is wisdom by hindsight. Indeed one cannot even now be sure that the US acted prematurely. For it remains to be seen whether the Iraqis will continue to do as well as they have done so far. And it is clear that panic would have gripped the rulers in Gulf countries if the Iranians had managed to take Basra or even to consolidate their initial gains. Washington had to take some steps in advance to prevent such panic. Or so at least it felt. The danger has abated. But it may not have disappeared. Iran is going through a revolutionary upheaval. Ayatollah Khomeini is a determined adversary. As such, the Iranians are not going to give up their bid to overthrow the present regime in Baghdad and, if possible, put in its place a Shia-dominated set-up.
The rulers in the Gulf cannot possibly be insensitive to the threat this poses to their very survival. They must be hoping and praying that the dyke in the shape of Iraq is able to hold the tide of the Iranian version of Islamic fundamentalism. But they cannot ignore the possibility that the dyke may be weakened, if not breached. This must induce them to lean even more heavily on the United States for their security than they have in the past. But they cannot admit this to be the case and cooperate openly with Washington in the military field. Even before the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, with the help of weapons supplied by the United States, it was difficult for them to do so for fear of adverse popular reaction. That is precisely why the Reagan administration’s attempt to forge a so-called anti-Soviet “strategic consensus” with the Gulf rulers failed. The Israeli invasion of Lebanon must make it even more difficult for the Gulf regimes to be seen to be in alliance with the United States. At the same time, their need to seek cover under the US umbrella has never before been so pressing. This is a dilemma they cannot easily resolve.