Sant Longowal has publicly returned to the old Akali theme that the Sikhs are a qaum. This statement spotlights, as nothing else could, the psychology of the men who are currently leading the agitation in Punjab and in the process poisoning Hindu-Sikh relations and, indeed, exposing the state to the risk of communal riots.
The Sant, it is true, has refused to say whether, in his view, the Sikhs constitute only a sub-nation or a full-fledged nation in search, like the Jews before 1948, of a territory and a state they can call their own. But by referring to the pre-partition period when the Akalis claimed that the Sikhs were a nation and, therefore, entitled, like the Muslims, to a homeland, he has left no room for doubt regarding his basic stand.
It does not follow that the Akalis are preparing to raise the secessionist banner. On the contrary, it will be safe to say that they want a settlement, with the Union government. But why, on what basis and for what purpose?
The reasons why the Akalis are prepared to accept a settlement with the Centre are not very different from the ones that persuaded them after partition to whittle their earlier demand for independence in favour of a Punjabi Suba. In 1948 they were realistic enough to realize that they could not raise the slogan of the “Panth in danger” because the other Sikhs would not find it legitimate, that there no longer existed in India a third party which could exploit communal tensions to split the country, and that on their own they were not strong enough to frighten the Union government into surrender. Those who may find this as being too stark a statement of the Akali position in the late ’forties would do well to read the writings of leading Akali spokesmen. They would be shocked.
The Akali leaders have so far been intransigent. Even the Hindu-Sikh clashes in Patiala, perhaps the first in history, have not persuaded them to return to the path of reason. It would thus appear that they will accept a settlement only on their terms. The more the Union government is seen to be keen to accommodate them, the more unreasonable they are likely to become. Mrs. Gandhi and her advisers should take note of this possibility, though they cannot afford to give up the attempt to find a way out of the present impasse.
Aim Is Power
One cannot be too sure on the question of tactics. For all we know, the Akalis may decide to change their approach and accept a reasonable settlement of their specific demands. But they will do so only as a temporary expedient and that too in the calculation that it will facilitate their accession to office and power. It is power they want above all. But power to do what?
On the face of it, this is an irrelevant question. In the final analysis all politics is about power and the Akalis are in the business of politics. But the Akalis are not an ordinary political party. They are not even an ideological party in the secular sense of the term. They are a religious-political formation. They may find it expedient to speak in the name of the Punjabi language. But they are not a Punjabi counterpart of DMK and AIADMK in Tamil Nadu and Telugu Desam in Andhra.
For the Akalis, as for the Muslim Leaguers before partition, politics cannot be separated from religion. And, unlike the League which was led not by a mullah but by a highly Westernized Mr. Jinnah whose goal was not a state which would preserve the so-called Muslim way of life but a State where the Muslims could prosper in the absence of competition from the Hindus, the Akali leadership is firmly in the hands of Sants who at best have a nodding acquaintance with the modern world.
It is in this context that the controversy over script should be viewed. In secular terms the Sikhs had much to gain and little to lose if they had accepted the Devnagri script. It would have been consistent with the effort to integrate different groups into one nation and it would have strengthened Sikh-Hindu relations in that it would have allayed the fears of the Hindus that the Akalis wanted to rule over them. But the Akalis feared that acceptance of the Devnagri script would dilute the sense of separate identity of the Sikh community which they had fostered for decades. They, therefore, insisted that Gurmukhi had to be the script for the Punjabi language.
The Akalis faced a genuine dilemma. While in independent India, they could not possibly demand a separate sovereign state of their own, they were keen that the Sikhs retained their separate identity. And they calculated that if they could have a Punjabi-speaking state in which they were the majority, they would be able to ensure that the Sikh community did not gradually get assimilated with the Hindus. The insistence on the Gurmukhi script was part of this approach.
Gurmukhi Demand
The Akali leaders were aware that the Hindus were opposed to a Punjabi Suba because they feared that the proposed state would be dominated by the Sikhs. The Akali leaders could also be in no doubt that their insistence on the use of the Gurmukhi script would add to the anxieties of the Hindus and, therefore, stiffen their opposition. But seen from their perspective, they had not much choice; they had to press their demand for a Punjabi Suba and insist on the Gurmukhi script whatever the cost which became evident in 1951 when the Punjabi Hindus declared Hindi to be their mother tongue which, of course, it was not.
This raises the issue whether things could have worked out differently (for the better) if the Hindus had not disowned Punjabi as their mother tongue. In one sense, yes: in another sense, no. If the Hindus had not disowned the Punjabi language, the basis could have been laid for the emergence of a Punjabi personality like the identity of the Sikh community.
Sikh intellectuals have differed on whether their faith is closer to Hinduism or Islam. The issue has not been resolved among them. But this debate is less pertinent than the fact that what distinguishes a Sikh from a Hindu is not so much his faith, including the divine status of the 10 gurus, as the external symbols, the famous five Ks – Kesh (untrimmed hair), Kada (iron bangle), Kirpan (small sword), Kachha (shorts) and Kanga (comb) and that these symbols are being eroded by the modernisation-westernisation process which is on among the Sikhs on a far bigger scale than among the Hindus and the Muslims. For they are a highly progressive and dynamic community.
Clearly the Sikh sense of identity is relatively weak. Two factors account for it – the close Hindu-Sikh social relations whereby till some decades ago it was quite common for a member of a Hindu family in Punjab to become a Sikh, the readiness of the Hindus to accept the 10 gurus and their teachings as part of their own faith. And this feeling of insecurity is greatly increased by the modernisation-westernisation process. The willingness of the Punjabi Hindus to make common cause with the Akalis on the question of a Punjabi Suba and the script could not have eliminated this feeling of insecurity.
Value Of Secularism
There is another problem the Akalis face. This relates to the nature of the Indian State. While they must value the secular non-discriminatory nature of the Indian State inasmuch as they have derived great benefits out of it, they are not prepared to pay the price, which is that they cannot mix religion and politics. Not to speak of the country as a whole, this issue cannot be evaded within Punjab itself. The Hindus constitute 48 per cent of the population and no government can possibly manage the affairs of the State without their cooperation.
The description of the Akali psychology should make it amply clear that the Union government is landed with a problem which is as complicated as the one in Assam and apparently even more explosive in its possible implications. So it goes without saying that New Delhi has to handle it with great care. But a continuous show of weakness can only encourage the Akalis to remain intransigent. While it may not be a bad idea to buy time and wear out the agitators, this strategy can succeed only if, as in the past, the Akalis are made to recognise that there can be no compromise on the secular character of the Indian State and the Union government cannot be pushed around.
An enormous damage has been done to the cause of peace in the State by the endless infighting in the ruling Congress (I) party. With highly influential men in New Delhi ranged on the side of the dissidents, it was inevitable that the Akalis should conclude that the Congress (I) leadership will one day sacrifice the chief minister, Mr. Darbara Singh, and thus unwittingly eliminate the one nationalist Sikh leader who is capable of joining the issue with them. Fortunately, Mrs. Gandhi has overcome her earlier wavering on this issue and come out strongly in favour of Mr. Darbara Singh. He should now be backed fully above all to ensure law and order in the State. Once that is assured, the Akali threat may begin to appear manageable. It cannot be made to disappear overnight. By its very nature, national integration is a prolonged and painful affair. But if law and order can be preserved in Punjab, it should be possible to avoid a worsening of the problem and to live with it.
The Times of India, 18 May 1983