It will be ridiculous for anyone to suggest that Mr. Kosygin has pushed India into endorsing the Soviet demand for an “immediate, unconditional and total withdrawal” of Chinese troops from Vietnam. Mr. Morarji Desai had doubtless followed his call for the withdrawal of Chinese troops from Vietnam last month by a similar plea in respect of Vietnamese forces in Kampuchea (Cambodia). But he never linked the two. If that could have left some room for doubt regarding New Delhi’s stand, it should have been removed by Mr. Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s description of Chinese action in Vietnam as “aggression”, especially because he has not used this expression in respect of the Vietnamese action in Kampuchea. And who does not know that India has always taken the position that whatever the merits or demerits of a case, no country should be allowed to reap the fruits of aggression. Thus the demand for an “unconditional and total” Chinese withdrawal from Vietnam has been implicit in the Indian stand all along. Indeed, in view of the fact that this country itself has been a victim of a similar so-called “punitive” attack by China in 1962, it could not possibly have taken another position. All this, however, does not mean that not much importance need be attached either to Mr. Kosygin’s visit or to the joint statement regarding the Sino-Vietnamese war. Both are important. For, it is significant that India has joined the Soviet Union whom the Chinese regard as their enemy number one in demanding the withdrawal of their troops from Vietnam. That is a very different proposition from the statements Indian leaders have made on their own, though the contents are more or less the same. Peking will be making a mistake if it rushes to the conclusion that this country has decided to gang up with the Soviet Union against it. But it will also be making a mistake if it fails to draw the appropriate lesson which is that Indo-Soviet friendship remains firm and that New Delhi does not seek normal relations with it at the cost either of those ties or of some other country in the region.
In different circumstances the reference in the joint communiqué to the Indian Ocean could have been regarded as innocuous. But in view of the US decision to step up its naval presence in the gulf region and make that presence a permanent feature of its deployment, it cannot be so regarded. The call for early resumption of Soviet-US talks on making the Indian Ocean a zone of peace is in a sense meaningless because in the new context these just cannot produce any worthwhile result. Indeed, it can be taken for granted that in course of time the Kremlin will feel called upon to match the US naval presence in the region. This competition is bound to intensify and there is not much we or anyone else can do about it. But the call for Russo-American talks is significant in that it gives the Soviet Union a propaganda handle to beat the United States with. This the Indian leadership should have sought to avoid not because it need be scared of causing offence to the United States as such but because it should be pragmatic and wary of being involved in superpower conflicts which are either not of direct interest to it or about which it can do precious little. That apart, India has reasons to be pleased with Mr. Kosygin’s visit. It has widened the scope for Indo-Soviet co-operation, especially in the economic field.
The Times of India, 15 March 1979