While it is extremely difficult to assess the accuracy or otherwise of rival Chinese and
Vietnamese claims, some points can be made even if only tentatively. The Chinese have
advanced into Vietnamese territory. But if they had calculated, as they apparently had, that they would be able to withdraw their troops quickly once they had demonstrated their military prowess and “punished” the Vietnamese, they must have had to revise their plans. Indeed, there is evidence they have had to. The Lebanese ambassador clearly did not imagine that the Chinese were beginning to withdraw from Vietnam. Obviously he was so told. The decision had then to be reversed. It is also possible, even likely, that the Chinese have been able to advance into Vietnam precisely because Hanoi is known to have deployed only its militiamen on the borders and kept its regular formations well inside their territory. Some Western news agencies have circulated Chinese propaganda claims which must inevitably remind one of “body counting” by the Americans in Vietnam some years ago. As such no one is likely to be unduly impressed by them. The Chinese claims, like the American claims in the mid-’sixties, are too extravagant to be taken seriously. Witness, for example, the AFP report which quotes Chinese sources as claiming that they had “wiped out three Vietnamese divisions, killing or wounding around 10,000 men” between February 16 when the fighting broke out and February 18. If that, indeed, is the stuff the Vietnamese army and its leadership are made of, they could surely not have taken on and beaten decisively the world’s most formidable power which at one time had deployed an expeditionary force of half a million men in the southern half of their country. But even if the Chinese claims are given some credence and it is conceded that they have inflicted pretty heavy losses on the Vietnamese, it does not at all follow that they can in the course of the next few days or weeks order a unilateral cease-fire, as they could in India’s case in 1962, and be free to enjoy the political and diplomatic fruits of their military victory. The Vietnamese are not the kind of people who can be expected to accept such an “arrangement.”
Since the beginning of this conflict last week-end, there has been considerable speculation regarding possible moves by the Soviet Union which, under the treaty it recently concluded with Hanoi, is obliged to open discussions with it and assist it in the task of defending itself. The Chinese, according to some Western reports, have also evacuated several hundred thousand civilians from certain parts of their common border with the Soviet Union. It is difficult to say whether they have done so because they seriously expect the Kremlin to attack them or because they have concluded that this can serve as an effective propaganda gimmick both at home and abroad. But whatever the Chinese view or plan, it is a safe bet that the Russians will not take the extreme step of intervening directly in this war. The Soviet leaders are by temperament and training cautious. They have not sent their men for action outside their immediate sphere of interest in Central and Eastern Europe. Their military personnel have served only as trainers and advisers elsewhere. They cannot wish to precipitate a war with China, knowing, as they must, that they may not be able to limit it. The Chinese attack on Vietnam is a provocation for the Russians but not grave enough for them to go to war with Peking. They will lose face if the Chinese are able to “punish” Vietnam and then withdraw in comfort, as they could in India’s case in 1962. But the Russians do not face such a threat. On the contrary, once they are able to set in motion their formidable machine and begin supplying military hardware and ammunition to Vietnam, the Chinese may well find themselves face to face with a situation they will not know how to cope with. Vietnamese nationalism, valour, determination and military skills, underwritten by Soviet supplies, have defeated America in the past and can certainly deny a clean victory to China. In terms of human lives Peking can doubtless accept much heavier losses than Washington could. But it cannot possibly engage in a decade-long war, as the United States could. That would destroy its prestige abroad and in all probability undermine the position of the present dominant group in the leadership. China needs a quick and decisive victory, which the Vietnamese and their Soviet allies can do without. As such the Kremlin is not under any great pressure to do something dramatic soon.
The Times of India, 22 February 1979