It is as well for New Delhi that the new Kampuchea government has not yet approached it for recognition. But it soon will. And that will present Indian diplomacy with one of the toughest tests in a long time. The level of its representation apart, this country has applied one yardstick in all such cases which is whether the government concerned is reasonably firmly in control. By this criterion the new government in Pnom Penh qualifies for recognition. India has not in the past examined the credentials of governments asking for recognition in that it has never asked itself the question whether or not a particular regime has come into existence as a result of foreign assistance and whether or not the regime is still dependent on that assistance. As such it will be departing from its established practice if it now poses to itself such questions in respect of the new set-up in Pnom Penh. Similarly, New Delhi has never in the past bothered to find out whether or not the new regime is likely to contribute to “stability and co-operation” in the region. It has done so in respect of the conflict in Kampuchea. But mercifully it has been cautious enough to leave enough room for manoeuvre for itself in case it settles for early recognition.
New Delhi is faced with concrete problems as well. The minister for external affairs, Mr. Atal Behari Vajpayee, is now scheduled to visit China next month. And for Peking Kampuchea is a test case in the negative sense of New Delhi’s sincerity in wishing to improve relations between the two countries – in the negative sense because while India’s non-recognition for the time being may not quite convince the Chinese leadership of its sincerity, early recognition will convince it to the contrary. There should be no illusion in that regard. For Peking, the new set-up in Pnom Penh is the creature of Vietnam which it regards as being the Cuba of South-east Asia, that is a Soviet satellite. This is an absurd proposition. The Vietnamese are too nationalistic a people to serve anyone else’s purpose. But the Chinese will not see recent developments in Indo-China in that light at least partly because independent of the Soviet role in the region and Vietnam’s recent treaty with Moscow, they cannot welcome the rise of a major power centre in an area so close to their country. But by the same token, India has a long-term stake in friendly relations with Vietnam and, therefore, reason to accord early recognition to the regime in Pnom Penh. New Delhi cannot disregard either Hanoi’s potential to checkmate Chinese ambitions in South-east Asia or the sensibilities of the Kremlin which has a record of helping this country in every critical situation since the early ’fifties. New Delhi has to square these contradictory compulsions and it is not going to be easy. In the circumstances it will be well advised to enter into discussions with members of ASEAN who are most directly concerned with developments in Indo-China and co-ordinate its decision with theirs.
The Times of India, 12 January 1979