As things have worked out, Mrs. Gandhi will now be visiting the United States ahead of the Soviet Union. This is obviously not deliberate. Circumstances beyond her control account for it. As such it would be wrong to see in this order of visits an attempt to shift the emphasis of India’s foreign policy. But the move has been received enthusiastically by many Indians.
There has existed a sizeable pro-US lobby in India since independence. Anti-communists of all varieties have, for example, consistently favoured close ties with the US regardless of its policies towards this country. They were temporarily silenced in the mid-fifties when Washington not only sided with Pakistan on the Kashmir issue but decided to arm it in a big way. They were, however, not convinced that their advocacy was misplaced. Indeed, the desire to compel Mr. Nehru to correct what they felt was a pro-Soviet imbalance in his foreign policy accounted partly for the ferocity of the campaign highly respected individuals like Mr. Jayaprakash Narayan and Acharya Kripalani launched on the Tibet issue in the fifties and early sixties.
Ill Conceived
This pro-US sentiment was reflected in the Janata prime minister’s and external affairs minister’s talk of “genuine non-alignment”. The talk was ill-conceived, implying as it did that Mrs. Gandhi had followed a pro-Soviet policy in disregard of the national interest. But it was not an exercise in anti-Sovietism and anti-communism. Mr. Morarji Desai and Mr. Atal Behari Vajpayee favoured continued co-operation with the Soviet Union and did nothing to hurt it in any way. And they got on reasonably well with both the CPM and the CPI. It was clearly a mistake to interpret their approach in cold war terms. They were giving expression to a deeper yearning of a lot of Indians.
Indeed, we cannot be sure whether even in the fifties and the sixties we were justified in equating the pro-US sentiment with anti-Sovietism and anti-communism just because its leading and articulate exponents such as Mr. Minoo Masani were anti-communist. In any case, it seems evident in retrospect that by the time the Janata came into power in 1977, the pr-US sentiment had ceased to be a product of anti-communism and anti-Sovietism.
The emergency had contributed to it in two ways. First, Mr. Sanjay Gandhi blocked for communists and pro-communist leftists access to the corridors of power and initiated a reversal of economic policies which had favoured ever-expanding public sector, nationalisation of key industries and major banking institutions, and a regime of controls. Secondly, the curbs on liberty, especially the imposition of censorship on the press, emphasised for millions of politically-conscious Indians the value of liberty for which the West stood.
For all we know the US administration might have found it easier to deal with the emergency regime than the Soviet government. But the Soviets could not claim to stand for individual liberty which the US did. And by opposing the emergency and by advocating the cause of democracy, the Western media won for the West enormous goodwill in this country.
The pro-West sentiment did not contribute to the Janata party’s victory. It was wholly the product of popular reaction to the excesses of the emergency, particularly those committed in the implementation of family planning and slum clearance programmes, and alienation of almost the entire intelligentsia from the Congress party. But the Janata’s victory represented the triumph of pro-West feelings. The party contained certain individuals such as Mr. HN Bahuguna and Mrs. Nandini Satpathy who were known to be pro-Soviet. But essentially the Janata was a coalition of elements who had been opposed to Mr. Nehru’s and Mrs. Gandhi’s allegedly pro-Soviet foreign policy.
The charge against Mr. Nehru has, of course, been patently false. He shaped his policy when the US power not only in relation to the Soviet bloc but also to the whole world was at its height and Washington was determined to isolate and surround communist countries, including China, and bring other major and strategically placed countries, including India, under its dominance through a series of alliance systems. He had no choice but to resist this encroachment on India’s newly won freedom of action. He persisted in this approach in the face of Soviet-Chinese distrust of him. Naturally he grasped the hand of friendship which the post-Stalin Soviet leadership offered him. But the groundwork of his broad approach had been laid before, that is, in the period when the Chinese communists described him as the “running dog of imperialism” and Soviet leaders and theoreticians and their Indian supporters even disputed that India was a genuinely independent country.
Own Predilections
Mr. Nehru had his ideological and other predilections born out of his Brahminical background, his education in a British school meant for the aristocracy, his acceptance of the Marxist doctrine, though in its Fabian garb and his leadership of the Indian independence struggle which he saw as part of the larger movement for the emancipation of all suppressed peoples. He regarded the Soviet Union as an ally in this larger struggle and after World War II America as an opponent because in his view it had taken the place of Britain, France, Holland and Belgium as the promoter and protector of Western hegemony. But despite his authority in the government and influence with the people, he could not have ignored the pro-US sentiment in the country if President Eisenhower had not decided to arm Pakistan and involve it in wider alliances.
This produced a convergence between India’s security interest vis-a-vis Pakistan and the Indian left’s aversion to the United States. It lasted till 1971 when Pakistan broke into two and Bangladesh emerged as an independent nation. This eliminated the foundation on which an anti-American stance could be built and sustained. Thus despite Mr. Nixon’s well-advertised tilt towards Pakistan during the Bangladesh conflict there was no ill-will against America. In l973, Mrs. Gandhi responded enthusiastically to probings by the Shaft of Iran, America’s staunchest ally in the Gulf, and in 1974 Mr Kissinger received a warm welcome in New Delhi.
President Reagan has returned to the Dullesian policy of rearming Pakistan. Inevitably Mrs. Gandhi has reacted sharply and underlined its dangerous implications for India’s security again and again. But this has not made much impact on the people, particularly the intelligentsia who are normally sensitive to problems of the country’s defence. The people refuse to believe that Pakistan can in the foreseeable future constitute a threat to this country.
Invaluable Help
The Soviet Union rendered invaluable assistance to this country in the establishment of basic industries in the public sector. But the public sector as a whole has not done well with the result that it has few influential champions these days. Indeed, the impression has spread that Soviet-style economies have not done well anywhere in the world. In ideological terms the cause of free enterprise has triumphed in India, reinforcing the pro-West sentiment.
As is well known, America has replaced Britain as the main centre of learning for Indian students. Thousands of them are studying there, many of them never to return home. Thousands of other well-qualified Indians have settled there to become, in per capita terms, perhaps the richest ethnic community in that land of opportunities. Their parents and relations have not organised themselves. US Congressmen friendly to this country have even expressed surprise that the people of Indian descent in America have not sought to mobilise opinion against arms supply to Pakistan. Even so the presence of about a quarter million people of Indian origin and the fact of their doing well cannot but strengthen the pro-US sentiment.
It is ironical that this sentiment should continue to assert itself at a time when the American people have put in office an administration which is pursuing a whole range of policies which hurt this country’s interests in several ways. For the Reagan administration has not only decided to arm Pakistan but also reduced its contribution to the World Bank’s soft-lending affiliate, the IDA, of which India has been the single biggest beneficiary. And it has refused to honour the commitment for the supply of enriched uranium for the Tarapur plant. But the fact remains that despite all this the pro-US sentiment remains strong.
It will be ridiculous to infer that this would make it difficult for New Delhi to pursue a rational foreign policy which must emphasise co-operation and friendship with the Soviet Union. The government retains its freedom of action in this field. But a sensitive leadership cannot ignore public opinion even if it remains unorganised and diffused.
The Times of India, 19 May 1982