India’s policy of non-alignment is inevitably the product of the East-West conflict, whatever its other components. As such, Indian leaders have formulated and articulated their policies in this context. This, too, has helped emphasise differences with the Unites States, since of the super-powers it has been stronger and more prone to interfering in other people’s affairs in the region around India.
In its foreign policy, India has not, on the face of it, sought to promote the cause of democracy. But it is self-evident that its efforts at home have been dominated by the commitment to democratic institutions and values. Most Indians have not seen it as a deliberate attempt to internalise Western political and social values. But in reality, this has been the case. And this preoccupation with democratic values and norms would have inevitably found expression in India’s foreign policy if the US had not intervened in our problems with Pakistan.
Pakistan is, of course, a sovereign state. It was so in 1954 when the US decided to arm it. But its rulers still thought in terms of the pre-partition Congress-Muslim League conflict. Their attempt to grab Jammu and Kashmir testified to the fact that they did not regard the boundaries resulting from partition as final. They explained their raison d’etre in terms of a highly distorted view of Hindu-Muslim relations over a millennium. And they spared little effort to aggravate communal tensions within post- partition India. So India could not possibly treat the US decision to arm Pakistan as a transaction between two sovereign nations to which it had no title to object. For India, it constituted an intervention which was bound to prevent a natural balance of forces from emerging within the sub-continent and within India itself.
Indian experts had serious doubts regarding the validity of Sir Olaf Caroe’s theory that Pakistan was a Central Asian and a Persian-Arab Gulf power by virtue of its geographical location and religion and could, therefore, play an important role to contain Soviet power in those regions vital to the West. The Indians were convinced that Pakistan was neither inclined to play nor capable of playing such a role, that India was its sole preoccupation, indeed obsession, and that it would one day turn its US-gifted arms on this country, which it did finally in 1965.
New Circumstances
Indian doubts regarding Pakistan’s capacity to promote US interests in the Gulf can only be strengthened in the new circumstances of the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan, the Islamic fundamentalist revolution in Iran and the Iran-Iraq war. All these are matters of deep concern to India and New Delhi has little doubt that the US response in the shape of renewed arms supplies to Pakistan is not designed to help the cause of stability in the region, or to promote US interests or, for that matter, to help Pakistan preserve its own integrity.
The experience with Pakistan in 1965 cannot but lead us to believe that its rulers will try to grab Jammu and Kashmir whenever they think that their military position is strong and political authority in New Delhi wobbly. No ruler in New Delhi will wish to place his/her country in a position of apparent or real vulnerability ever again. That episode also convinced us that there can be occasions when Washington is not interested in trying to restrain Islamabad until it is too late. For many of us believe that Pakistan would not have sent thousands of armed infiltrators into Jammu and Kashmir in 1965 if the US had protested firmly and strongly enough against the use of its weapons earlier in the Rann of Kutch where Genera] Ayub Khan had organised a minor armed conflict with India as a dress rehearsal for the subsequent move in Jammu and Kashmir.
India today is much more confident than it was before 1971 when Pakistan broke into two. In terms of leadership, pragmatic individuals not unduly influenced by ideological considerations have taken over and are prepared to explore the possibilities of close ties with the United States. There is also a large reservoir of goodwill for America in our country despite serious policy differences. This sentiment is no longer limited to individuals who can be said to be influenced by cold war considerations. Among our elites, hundreds of thousands of families have now relations and friends living, studying and working in the United States. The ball is now firmly in the US court. India is ready for close ties with it.
Important Country
We have been told all too often that we do not matter all that much to the Americans. If that is, indeed, so, there is not much to discuss. But we do not think that is the case. As we see it, we are by far the most important country in our part of the world by virtue of our political stability, our economic achievements and potentialities and our geographical location. We are potentially a considerable economic and military power. We have little doubt that the US effort to build a world order under its tutelage has failed and cannot be successfully revived. In fact, some of us see in President Reagan’s policy of indifference to the North-South dialogue and the advocacy of a curtailed role for the IMF and the World Bank an abandonment of that effort, whatever the rhetoric that emanates from Washington. So our perspective is that if not now, then in course of time, the US should be interested in good relations with us. We are willing to wait. Meanwhile, we shall do all we can to protect ourselves against the ill-effects of US moves such as the arming of Pakistan.
As some of us see it in India, the US no longer has a coherent and viable world-view. Reaganism is a kind of neo-isolationism or neo-nationalism which cannot be reconciled with the requirements of the continuing competition with the Soviet Union and America’s leadership aspirations. Its militarism also we see as an escape from the complex international reality into a make-believe world. We are unable to predict how US policy will shape. In this situation of lack of a meaningful US foreign policy which accords with the reality of its own power and of the world scene, it is impossible to suggest the basis of a durable Indo-US friendship. But certain propositions can be made.
First, the US will need to show greater consideration for India’s security and the Indian appreciation of its security needs. This consideration should influence US decisions on the nature and amount of arms that are transferred to Pakistan and indeed to China as well.
Secondly, the US should recognise that the success of the Indian effort to modernise within the democratic framework calls for sustained support from friendly quarters.
Thirdly, the US should honour its commitments as in regard to the supply of enriched uranium for the Tarapur plant. For it to renege on solemn agreements is to make nonsense of the very concept of reliability which is essential for durable relations.
Fourthly, Washington must accept that India cannot and will not be a party to an anti-Soviet crusade, however strongly opposed it may be to specific acts of Soviet policy. This does not mean that the US must accept the Indian view of Soviet policy before the two countries can draw close to each other. Not at all. India is prepared for cooperation in areas of common interest despite differences in others. But it does mean that US policy-makers should not be obsessed with the so-called Soviet threat to a point where they find it impossible to appreciate the viewpoints of other friendly countries. What can the US expect from India in return?
For America, it should be vital that India remains true to itself and realises its economic and social potential as a democracy. In the very act of preserving its autonomy and integrity, even if in defiance of the United States itself, India will be contributing to the rise of a world order which is in America’s long-term interest to promote and sustain. India’s assertion of its independence and pride is an American asset provided, of course, its leaders and opinion-makers are true to their own heritage. A suppliant and pliant India will be a disaster for America in the long run.
Community Of Values
There is not a single instance when India can be said to have hurt America’s legitimate interests and to have promoted Soviet interests as such. Yet, Indian leaders can perhaps show greater regard for US susceptibilities than they have done in the past. The line is not easy to draw since there is no issue of foreign or defence policy on which opinion in the US itself has not been divided. But the task is not impossible. Indeed, as we in India have come to be preoccupied with our own problems, we have stopped reading moral lectures to others. Mrs. Gandhi is certainly not inclined to get on to the pulpit and preach sermons.
For America, the critical issue is India’s performance at home and not the policy it might adopt on any specific issue such as the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan, recognition of the regime in Kampuchea or whatever. India’s success in its present endeavour can make the world a little safer for the prosperous and democratic West, including America, while its failure cannot but add to the uncertainties and dangers that lurk around us.
Of all non-European civilisations, India’s is closest to the West in values and intellectual terms. Members of the other two non-European civilisations are essentially hostile to its culture even if some of them cooperate with it for reasons of expediency. So it should be possible for Americans and Indians to recognise the community of values and aspirations and not allow temporary conflicts to cloud their view of each other.
(Concluded)
The Times of India, 28 July 1982