The casual and clumsy manner in which those close to Mrs. Gandhi have handled her proposed visits to the Soviet Union and the United States is symptomatic of a deeper malaise – a failure to recognise that India is the most significant power in the region which neither super-power can afford to ignore or slight. Else they would not have bracketed the two visits.
The stage is long past when this country needed to practise the balancing act between the United States and the Soviet Union for fear of causing offence to either of them. That situation ended in 1971 with the break-up of Pakistan and the rise of Bangladesh as an independent nation on the one hand and the achievement of self-sufficiency in food on the other.
It was a happy coincidence that the two spectres which had haunted this country for years – the spectre of Pakistan armed by the United States and befriended by China thoroughly hostile to India and that of a widespread famine – should have disappeared around the same time. But coincidence or not the resolution of these two urgent problems released us from the compulsion to do tightrope walking between Moscow and Washington. India had finally come into its own, though it was not yet quite ready to play a significant role outside of its immediate neighbourhood.
Food Imports
Till then India, as is well known, had been critically dependent on the United States for food – it imported 10 million tonnes, around 14 per cent of its total consumption, each year in 1966 and 1967 – and on the Soviet Union for military equipment for the modernisation of its armed forces which could no longer be ignored after the debacle in NEFA in 1962. The country has since continued to buy most of its sophisticated hardware from the Soviet Union but it has not been under active threat. The break-up of Pakistan in 1971 settled the problem of security vis-a-vis that country. China, too, could not any more use Pakistan as a proxy for harassing India. As it happened, China itself had not recovered from the ravages of the so-called cultural revolution by the early ‘seventies.
The world took note of the new reality of India as the dominant power in South Asia. This was best brought out in an editorial which The Economist, London, carried describing Mrs. Gandhi as the Empress of India. But in the final analysis the Shah of Iran alone came up with a policy frame which took into account India’s potentialities and offered it the prospect of realising these potentialities.
The India-Iran cooperation could not prosper fully. By the time the preliminary groundwork had been completed by the end of 1973, Mrs. Gandhi was beginning to be preoccupied with the gathering storm at home. By the time she had finally come out (January, 1980) of the troubles beginning with the Gujarat agitation in the winter of 1973-74, the Shah had been overthrown. Mr. Bhutto, too, had done all he could to frustrate the Indira-Shah grand design. But a great deal was achieved. In any case, it is necessary to recall all this to appreciate what this country can hope to achieve if it is sufficiently skilful, resourceful and daring. It speaks for our intellectual sloth that this phase of our cooperation with Iran is seldom mentioned in our discussions of our foreign policy.
One reason for this lack of understanding is that many of us have assumed, quite carelessly, that the Shah was a US stooge. This is as absurd a proposition as the belief among politically illiterate Americans that Mrs. Gandhi is a Soviet proxy. The Shah was a nationalist, his dependence on the US notwithstanding. His dream for Iran was unrealistic. It bore little relation to the reality of the country. But his proposal to marry Iran’s petro-dollar wealth with India’s technological and managerial skills was sound and would have given both countries considerable leverage in world affairs. Mr. Kissinger recognised the potentialities of this partnership and so apparently did Mr. Brezhnev who, too, did not react adversely to it.
Growing Ties
Both Mr. Brezhnev and Mr. Kissinger obviously made their own calculations. In all probability Mr. Brezhnev calculated that Iran’s growing ties with India would persuade the Shah to be more independent of the United States. Similarly, Mr. Kissinger could have convinced himself that India’s friendship with Iran would persuade Mrs. Gandhi to lean less towards the Soviet Union. Thus while the Soviet Union widened the area of economic cooperation with Iran, the United States began to treat India as the dominant power in South Asia with legitimate interests in the oil-rich Gulf. It quietly relegated its once “most loyal ally,” Pakistan, to the background.
It is an irony of fate for Mrs. Gandhi and India that her return to office should have followed a series of developments which should have greatly intensified the Soviet-US competition in the region. The Soviet military presence in Afghanistan is at once a product of these developments as well as their symbol. But the fact that the cold war is now being waged at our doorstep cannot be an argument for inactivity on our part. It is a powerful argument in favour of our asserting ourselves.
The issues involved are extremely complex and those whose reflexes were conditioned during 1962-1971 period are ill-qualified to grasp them, much less deal with them. But even they should resist the habit of simplifying issues and try and grasp the fact that India is not just a helpless and poverty-ridden country which needs to depend on the goodwill of others for its survival or well-being. India is a factor in world affairs in its own right.
The self-confidence has to some extent begun to influence the conduct of those who are in charge of formulating and implementing India’s foreign policy. Thus despite all attempts by some western governments, especially the US and pro-western elements at home, New Delhi has not been on the defensive on the twin questions of its recognition of Kampuchea and its refusal to join an anti-Soviet chorus on Afghanistan. Similarly, Mrs. Gandhi’s aides have not in deference to the pro-Soviet lobby been apologetic in connection with her recent visit to Saudi Arabia and acceptance of President Reagan’s invitation. Mr. Eric Gonsalves, secretary in the ministry of external affairs, may have been somewhat abrasive in some of the observations he allowed himself to make in private regarding China and the United States but they were an expression of India’s awareness of its position in the world.
The discerning observer will say: This is all very well but what should be the objective of India’s foreign policy? In a sense the answer is self-evident. The main objective of Indian foreign policy must be promotion of its interests. Thus we would be opposed to Soviet military presence in Afghanistan not so much because it violates certain principles of international behaviour as because it is likely to hurt our own long-term interests. Similarly, we are opposed to US military aid for Pakistan not so much because we do not favour the broader American policy of enlarging its presence in the region as because it creates security problems for us. We have to recognise that to clothe our interests in general principles is a form of defensiveness which fools no one and detracts from our stature and the effectiveness of our position. We must have the courage to state our interests and to pursue them.
It is also necessary for us to recognise that the region in which we live does not possess the minimum degree of coherence which we can possibly protect and promote by trying to exclude the external powers from it. Neither South Asia nor West Asia, including the Gulf, possesses such coherence, the latter despite its predominantly Arab-Muslim character. Any attempt, therefore, to evolve a viable long-term approach to the region is foredoomed. Nehru and Nasser failed to do so; so have the Americans and the Russians. It is futile to try again, though there is no harm in carrying on a propaganda campaign against the presence of external powers in the area.
Valid Proposition
The talk of the cold war having moved close to our doorstep confuses the issue. It is a valid proposition inasmuch as the US-Soviet competition in the area has become more intense than it was earlier. But they are battling over the shifting sands where every gain must at best be temporary. It is a senseless battle as much for the Americans as for the Russians, though such are their apprehensions of each other that they are not likely to abandon it.
So while wee may go on signing joint declarations with other heads of governments or states asking the super-powers to stay out of our region, we should not allow ourselves to be taken in by it. The super-power presence in the region is a reality which is not going to disappear in the foreseeable future. The two will broadly cancel out each other. So we have not much reason to be overanxious. Similarly, we should not take too seriously the confabulations of the so-called non-aligned countries. We should seek only bilateral agreements and arrangements and try to ensure that we are not unnecessarily hurt if they break down or are cancelled following an upheaval in the cosignatory country. Our experience with Iran should serve as a sobering example.
The Times of India, 5 May 1982